karpozilosKostis Karpozilos (Ph.D. in History, University of Crete) is an A.G. Leventis Fellow at SEESOX, Oxford University, UK. He is the historical consultant and scriptwriter of the documentary Ταξισυνειδησία / Greek-American Radicals: the Untold Story as well as the editor of a book on the Cretan socialist intellectual Stavros Kallergis. Karpozilos has written extensively on the Greek crisis, the European Left and the limits of political imagination in the post-1989 world and he is currently working on an international history of the Greek Left.
Kostis Karpozilos spoke to Rethinking Greece* about Greek-American Radicalism, the current internationalization of the Greek story and the need for progressive reforms within a European radical project: 
As the historian behind the “Ταξισυνειδησία / Greek-American Radicals” documentary you brought forward an alternative vision of Greek-American history that focuses on class and radicalism, challenging the more traditional “Struggle and Success” narrative. How did the Greek-American Community respond to this approach?
The realization that the Greek-American community is not a monolith was one of the most refreshing aspects of my experience with the Greek-American Radicals documentary. Its reception illustrated the multiple and diverse worlds of diasporic communities. The official institutions and organizations -that claim to represent the community- have proven to be quite indifferent or hostile to any narrative challenging the dominant “struggle and success” story (which in the meantime has transformed to  “success and success”). On the other hand, in more than one occasion, I had the opportunity to engage in dialogue with a multifaceted Diaspora that associates its ethnic origins with contemporary social and political movements. Many Greek-Americans were active in the Occupy Wall Street movement, supported the documentary, organized screenings and more importantly, contributed with their own experiences and memories to the debate generated by the documentary itself. In a way their input reaffirmed one of the main arguments of “Greek-American Radicals”: that the untold stories of immigration and Diaspora deserve a place in history.
What is the connection, if any, to the history of the International, European and Greek Left? How does “Ταξισυνειδησία” touch upon the links between labor immigration and the contemporary global financial crisis?
In these past few days I have been writing the introduction to my forthcoming book on Greek-American Radicalism (Crete University Press, 2016). My opening scene draws a parallel between The New Colossus -the poem engraved on the Statue of Liberty- and The Internationale, the global hymn of the socialist movement. Both are written in the 19th century and make a call to the “wretched” of the earth. The geographical New World, the United States at that point, appears in dialogue with the socialist New World. This interplay between population movements and emancipatory narratives is integral to understanding the history of the Left. In the United States of the late 19th and early 20th century, labor migration proved to be pivotal in restructuring labor unions and radical politics. Being the wretched of the earth, the immigrants’ actions and visions transformed the American social landscape and gave rise to a phenomenal multiethnic working class movement. We cannot repeat history. What we have to address though, is why it is difficult to imagine contemporary refugees being at the forefront of a European Left in the years to come. This lack of imagination, I am afraid, illustrates a Left that has internalized its inability to listen to the voices of the “wretched” and, in turn, inspire a novel emancipatory narrative of social equality.
spartacusYou are currently working on an “international history of the Greek Left” project. Can you tell us more? Do you believe that the Greek Left constitutes a distinct case in the history of European Left or is it just a typical example?
What I have been thinking of, is a concise history of the Greek Left demonstrating how, in pivotal moments, developments in the Greek Left encapsulated broader European and global transformations. Let me give you an example: the first socialist representatives in the Greek Parliament came from the multiethnic radical movements of Thessaloniki amidst the Balkan wars (1912-1913). Should we view this story -which remains largely unknown- as merely a Greek one, or should we see it as a Balkan moment that illustrates the demise of the multiethnic world of the Ottoman Empire and the collapse of the Second International? In the same manner I intend to discuss the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) as a key episode in the Cold War, the education of Asia Minor refugees in the Communist International schools in Moscow, the activities of Greek radicals abroad and the constant shaping and reshaping of the Greek Left as a national and international project. We should not forget that the Greek socialist movement was formulated in diasporic and immigrant communities and therefore, the networks connecting Greece with radicals abroad were consistently revitalized. Even today, the generation of intellectuals leaving the country due to the crisis has proven seminal to the internationalization of the Greek story, to linking the Greek crisis with the global capitalist crisis. This is by no means an exception- one can detect affinities with the Spanish or the Italian case, or even more geographically remote examples, as in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements that were shaped by students and intellectuals in Paris, London and New York. The Left is by default an international and transnational phenomenon.
The SYRIZA government has been in power for almost a year in Greece, do you think that it still can reshape the austerity agenda?
This is indeed a difficult question. Just one year ago, even those of us who are quite skeptical, were temporarily convinced that there was a prospect for a meaningful change. This prospect did not only entail the anti-austerity agenda, but expanded to anticipating a radically different situation, with social movements generating dynamics in all spheres and transforming Greek society from the bottom-up. One year later this anticipation is in limbo. The setback in the financial negotiations is not the only reason. More importantly SYRIZA has proven to be very consistent in maintaining continuities with the existing state-structure and in doing politics in a old-fashioned way. Therefore the social, cultural and political movements that had flourished during the crisis are in crisis. In my view, this situation illustrates the problem of the Left being in power: our horizon has shrunk and we can only imitate the past; we don’t seem to be able to propose a vision for the future. SYRIZA, being supported by a popular majority, opted for a painful stability. In this context, I am afraid the main issue is not austerity; it is whether the Left is willing and able to propose radical reforms that will revolutionize conditions in Greece and challenge the long-standing inertias that remain in power.
taxisinidisia6The financial and refugee crisis highlight Greece’s involvement in Europe’s contrasts. Can we re-think Greece as the country of progressive reforms within a European radical project?
In order to do so we definitely need a European radical project. At this stage there is none. The Left is failing to transform the social discontent with the European Union policies into a vision for a different Europe. In all its versions the Left appears to be trapped in history: either in nostalgia for national sovereignty or in the acceptance of the European Union as an indisputable structure. Both stances are vulnerable: reactionary euro-skepticism has been much more effective in raising notions of nostalgia for a seemingly harmonious past and the neoliberals are much more convincing when they defend the existing EU, since it is currently operating as a neoliberal project. The first step is for the Left to discuss its position towards the European Union structures and to chart an alternative European project for the 21st century. This is not an academic discussion and it cannot be fruitful by simply returning to the anti-EU or pro-EU positions of the past. It should be an open debate that takes into account the post-1990s structural changes within the European Union and the experiences of political alternatives shaped within this structure. How do we envision Europe in the 21st century? Reforms can still produce radical outcomes. The necessary prerequisite is to discuss what their content will be: the Left should illustrate the discrepancy between social inequality and the potential of our existing world.  But this is not enough. What we actually need is visionary goals of social transformation that do not repeat the certainties and failures of the past. Otherwise, the failure of the Left will be the final triumph of the post-1989 ideological order. 
 *Interview by Nikolas Nenedakis, Athina Rossoglou

See also: Journal of Modern Greek Studies (May 2015): Interview with Kostis Karpozilos; Despina Lalaki: Comments on the documentary Taxisinidisia, Greek American Radicals - The Untold Story (Chronos Magazine, 2014)


Dimitris Christopoulos is an Associate Professor of State and Legal Theory at the Panteion University of Athens and the Vice President of the International Federation of Human Rights - after having chaired the board of the Hellenic League for Human Rights from 2003 until 2011. He is frequently interviewed by Greek and international media and writes regularly in the Greek press, contributing to the promotion of human rights awareness in Greece, particularly within the current crisis. Professor Christopoulos spoke to “Rethinking Greece” about human rights in Greece, the economic and refugee crisis in its European context, and the Greek government’s relevant policies:

Do you think the SYRIZA government has made positive steps as far as human rights are concerned? Could they have done more or could more be done in the future?

I believe that since the beginning of the crisis in Greece - a situation that has taken on structural characteristics - human rights suffered major losses par excellence. More so, losses that are not secondary,but absolutely pivotal to our lives. The systematic devaluation of social rights that hasn’t stopped for six years has lead to the constant shrinking of genuine democracy in the country. Caution: I am not saying that in the Greece of memoranda we don’t have democracy. I never said that. But what I am saying- and this has not changed since January 2015 - is that the quality of our democracy does not honor us. In the current state of affairs, substantial democratic procedures are being sacrificed for financial aims and because there is never enough time. An indebted democracy, such as ours, finds itself in a dependent position, like every debtor to every lender.

But I know that I you want me to talk specifically about SYRIZA. The SYRIZA government, except for the prison reform law, the law on citizenship for second generation immigrants and the introduction of civil partnership for same sex couples, hasn’t undertaken bold steps as far as human rights are concerned. Of course they could have done more and still now they can do more. SYRIZA must realize that a human rights agenda is not judged by its popularity, but by its value.


According to the World Press Freedom index, Greece is ranked #91 out of 180 countries for 2015, the European Union’s second lowest ranking, after falling 56 places in the index from 2009 to 2014. What do you think is the level of the freedom of expression and press freedom in Greece? Are there any Greek peculiarities?

I believe that in general, Greece is doing rather well as far as freedom of expression is concerned. With the exception of 'national' issues i.e. issues concerning minorities, the Macedonian question, Cyprus, and more recently the issue of the Pontian ethnic cleansing. One cannot express "heretic" views in the public sphere on these issues.  What is happening in the country is that the crisis exacerbates already existing problems, not so much directly connected to freedom of speech itself, but mainly pertaining to media independence. This is where Greece is doing really bad, and it seriously affects freedom of expression. This explains the phenomena of tabloid newspapers systematically defaming and slandering individuals who cannot turn to justice to be vindicated. Furthermore, the fear of unemployment, of falling out of line with a "nationally correct" discourse or with various private interests, leads to self-censorship in the media: this situation is to some extent a Greek peculiarity, but it also closely resembles the Italian model.

What are the positive and negative points in how the Greek state handled the refugee crisis so far? What can be done from now on?

The positive point, and it is very positive, is that we left the former PM Samaras’ xenophobic agenda behind us: the notion that by making "life unbearable" for people who enter the country, or that by erecting fences, we will stop them from coming. This change, after January 2015, affected our fellow citizens. At least they do not see refugees as scapegoats for their myriad problems. Beyond this, I am concerned that unfortunately - and this is very unfortunate - inside Greek administration, defeatism has taken root. The belief that nothing can be done. But if you think that you cannot do anything - because you do not have personnel, you have no money, you have no structures - it is certain that you will do nothing. What can I say? We need great mobilization in order to improve things, especially in view of the fact that many of these refugees are not going to be able to leave Greece in the near future.


How do you comment on EU's handling of the refugee crisis, especially in view of recent news about pressures on Greece for border management?

In Europe, due to the recent refugee flows, the concept of external borders has collapsed. Greece is not to blame for that; whatever other grievances we can voice about how the country managed the refugee crisis. Unfortunately, what I see being consolidated in the EU is a systematic and unfair awarding of all responsibilities to the weak link called Greece. The EU is using Greek shortcomings as a pretext to saddle the country with more responsibility than it deserves. Moreover, the EU cannot be proud of its performance in the refugee crisis: the member-states have not told the people openly that this crisis is not a "bad moment" in our current history, but a situation that we should have to learn to live with, since we made a mess of things in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. European states are raising fences and closing their borders to refugees within the Union; next they will close their borders to other Europeans as well. You see what is happening: even though the extreme right in France didn't win the recent regional elections, it achieved its highest rates in modern history. You realize how bad things would be if one of the two nations of the erstwhile European axis (France and Germany) had an extreme-right government … It would be something like Europe in the 30s!

paris or

What are the implications for the refugee crisis and social rights in Europe following the Paris terrorist attacks? Is there an Islamophobia issue in Greece?

The consequences - already apparent- are a new balance being struck between freedom and security, at the expense of the former, and a possible worsening of the refugee crisis, due to France´s hawkish reaction the day after the attacks. The time we live in is one of "war on terrorism" and it must be understood as a long historical period succeeding the "Cold War" which, may I remind your, lasted for two generations. I cannot guess where we will be in ten years' time. However, if we respond in the same way that Bush responded after 11/9, I don´t see good things. Now, for Greece in particular, of course there is an Islamophobia issue, and even a special version of Islamophobia that is not so much related to the current European postcolonial migration environment, but to the Greek Ottoman past and its relation to Turkey. However,I reasonably hope that due to our close proximity to the Middle East, the Greeks - as a society and as a government - will face the situation calmly and maturely, without recklessness.

How can we rethink Greece through the experience of the double economic and refugee crisis?

Even if we couldn't  think of Greece through this experience, it is impossible not to do so. From the historical conditions of a universal, multifaceted crisis, something new will be born. Such is history. The point is, firstly, not to have yet more losses in our society and institutions until the country is back on its feet, and secondly, to realize that the management of the refugee crisis is not an exercise in charity, but a dry run before widespread social challenges. In Greece, we often say that the painful changes that occurred during the years of crisis were without precedent in peacetime Europe. So it is, and if we look at the Greek and European history of the 20th century, I see something positive in this observation: that indeed we are talking about peacetime. Let me remind you, that the war, Nazism and other monstrosities are not alien visitors to the Old Continent. They are the other side of it. 

*Interview by Ioulia Livaditi



The ongoing financial crisis has highlighted different aspects of how Greece is engaged in various European dilemmas and how political developments in the country are interwoven with Europe’s contrasts. In this context, tracing the history of left wing political forces in Greece and their access to power involves a reexamination of the history of eurocommunism, since SYRIZA and other European radical left parties draw their legacy from this ideological tradition. At the same time, eurocommunism has also influenced Social-democratic parties and policies.

hopebalPanteion University researcher Giannis Balabanidis’ new book on Eurocommunism (just published in Greek by Polis editions) studies the history of Eurocommunism and the "long" decade of the 70's, exploring at the same time the dilemmas and prospects of progressive political forces both in Greece and in Europe. Giannis Balabanidis spoke to GrèceHebdo and Rethinking Greece*:

Your book is an exploration of the forgotten history of Eurocommunism. What made you choose such a topic?

My starting point was the “KKE Interior” communist party (1968-1987), a paradoxical case: a small party with a wide ideological appeal; a communist party that was at the same time a reformist, moderate, pro-European party, bearing the message of an advanced political liberalism. Soon I realized that this small party was part of a much broader political movement, namely Eurocommunism, which at the time (early 70´s) included the Italian Communist Party (PCI) of Enrico Berlinguer, the French Communist Party (PCF) of Georges Marchais and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) of Santiago Carrillo. A movement that has been a major attempt to renovate the communist project in order to adapt it to the Western liberal democracies and to part with the less and less attractive soviet model. Despite its contradictions and regressions, this renewal was successful, before its demise, just before 1989. Its heritage however has been essential for the European left.

euroWhat are the elements that bring SYRIZA as a party of the radical left close to the case of Eurocommunism?

The legacy I refer to applies to the case of SYRIZA in two ways. First, in terms of political kinship: the Greek Eurocommunism party, “KKE Interior” is the ancestor of SYRIZA. Second, as a renewed strategic proposal. The great innovation of Eurocommunism has been the attempt to transform the radicalism of "Global 1968", the political agenda of social movements focusing on the idea of a new utopia in the West, into a program for gradual social transformation through “structural reforms”, following the democratic conquest of power. This eurocommunist synthesis - "party of struggle and government party” - was the key for communist parties to evolve from “pariahs” to legitimate players in the national political scene.

We could draw parallels between this “forgotten history” of Eurocommunism of the 70s and the current political situation: the crisis and the austerity policies have lead to the emergence of a new radicalism in Europe, which favors radical Left parties - SYRIZA here being an exceptional but not unique case. The post-communist Left, which after 1989 was limited to a protest and "anti-systemic" profile, is now facing these old questions and seeks answers from its manifold and often conflicting heritage.

Once in power, can SYRIZA retain its radical left identity or will it be forced to turn into a social democratic party?

Eurocommunists have constantly oscillated between two divergent strategies: governance based on gradual reforms / breaking with the capitalist system. Far from attempting a direct historical analogy, a similar ambivalence may be observed during the government period of SYRIZA. The radical populist strategy that brought a party of 4-5% in power marked the first phase, haunted by the temptation of the "big rupture" with austerity, international lenders, the EU - culminating with the referendum of July 2015. But the moment of the rupture never came. SYRIZA has accepted the constraints of a conservative Europe, choosing the fight within the EU instead of a national retreat. In its second governing phase, SYRIZA is in search of a progressive public policy agenda and "anti-austerity" allies among the socialists of France, Italy, etc. Will SYRIZA then turn into a Social Democratic Party, parting with the radical Left? The question remains to be answered.

poulantzas1In your opinion, is there a promising future for social democracy or is it just a political force in decline?

Although its political appeal is currently quite low, social democracy remains a power with deep historical roots and governmental vocation, an indispensable component of European politics. Following a period of great popularity of Blairism and “third way” politics, social democracy seems to be reduced to an emaciated political mechanism. On the other hand, the radical Left in Europe has been strengthened since it constitutes a voice of protest against austerity policies. But although the radical Left exerts a considerable electoral pressure to socialist parties, it remains for the time being a minority force, without direct access to power.

In any case, it can be noted that the (non-linear) emergence of a radical left in Greece, but also in Spain, France, Germany or the Netherlands, seems to trigger shifts within the socialist parties. Could we perhaps seek similarities to what happened during the 70s when the emergence of Eurocomunism provoked a radicalization of the Mediterranean socialist parties of Mitterrand and González? Look at what happened recently in Portugal, where socialists needed the radical Left’s cooperation to return to power, under the banner of an anti-austerity plan too! Are we witnessing the emergence of a “plural left” (socialists, communists, greens) at a European level? That’s a hypothesis that remains to be confirmed or not.


"Modernization" and “europeanisation”, central concepts in Greek political discourse especially during the Metapolitefsi period (i.e. after the 1967-74 dictatorship), are now met with the concept of "reforms", emphatically used in the political discourse of centrist political parties (Potami, PASOK). Can we rethink the Greek case as an opportunity to reconceptualize political radicalism and progressive reforms?

The "Modernization" and "europeanization” requests are intertwined with the history of the Greek state since its birth. And there is a corresponding unresolved duality in the Greek psyche, much more complex and contradictory than the supposed dualism between a progressive "Western" and a backward "East" aspect. Nevertheless, as many Modern Greek history scholars have shown, Greece has managed, even at the last moment, to follow the major strategic choices of the West, albeit with some delay, hence the perennial request for a “catch-up”.

"Modernization" in the Greek political discourse of the 1980s-1990s and more recently the call for "Reforms" are “floating signifiers”. Because what really matters is what kind of political forces will provide them with political substance and direction. Historically, the Left in Greece, despite its far-reaching efforts (e.g. with United Democratic Left during the 1950s-60s and KKE Interior during the 1970s and 80s) didn’t manage to rise to the occasion. The eurocommunist parties in general tried to incorporate modernization requests coming from the movements of 1968 and the new social trends (to the extent that some scholars have characterized them as “parties of modernization”). A case in point: a hegemonic moment for Italy’s PCI was its strong defense of the right to divorce in the referendum of 1974.

What kind of radical social demands are formulated in today's Greece? The right to citizenship for second generation immigrants and the right for civil partnership for homosexual couples are important cultural and institutional modernization demands. Thus there is a certain scope for progressive reforms beyond the MoU’s budgetary compulsions. But how can reforms really meet with left radicalism, under the conditions of the current Syriza alliance with the deeply conservative party of Independent Greeks? That's the question!

Can we (re)think Greece within the comparative framework of Southern Europe? Do you think that the history of Eurocommunism can contribute to this end?

Paraphrasing Antonio Gramsci I would say that the history of Eurocommunism is the history of Europe from a certain point of view - and within this framework, the history of Greece. This is the major virtue of the comparative method, the fact that it allows us to escape the occasionally parochial national perspective.

The economic crisis, which manifested itself in a sweeping way in our country, triggered a process of individual and collective reflection. Why did we get here? What went wrong and how could we fix it? The answers proposed often remain trapped in an ethnocentric perspective. However, the facts constantly contradict all those interpretations attributing the crisis solely to Greek pathologies, as well as those who opted for national solutions (and ruptures) to problems that can only be handled at European level. So I believe that this comparative methodology could be an antidote to a certain intellectual self-reference that affects us all.

*Interview by Nikolas Nenedakis & Athina Rossoglou

An extended version of this interview has been published in Greek in "Εποχή" weekly newspaper (Γ. Μπαλαμπανίδης: Η μεγάλη ευρωκομμουνιστική σύνθεση, 6.12.2015)


gourgouris1Stathis Gourgouris is Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University. He writes and teaches on a variety of subjects that ultimately come together around questions of the poetics and politics of modernity and democracy. He is the author of Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece (Stanford, 1996); Does Literature Think? Literature as Theory for an Antimythical Era (Stanford, 2003); and Lessons in Secular Criticism (Fordham 2013). Outside these projects he has also published numerous articles on Ancient Greek philosophy, political theory, modern poetics, film, contemporary music, and psychoanalysis.
He writes regularly in internet media (such as The Huffington Post, Los Angeles Review of Books,  Al Jazeera, Open Democracy, The Immanent Frame), as well as major Greek newspapers and journals on political and literary matters.
Professor Gourgouris spoke to Rethinking Greece* about Europe, 'the punishment of Philhellenism', the SYRIZA government tasks, aesthetic creativity and democratic autonomy:
In your seminal work “Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece” (1996) you note that “Greece stands in the heart of the European Community as an indelible reminder of the impossibility of Europe's Enlightenment fantasy". You also conclude that “Greece - as a social-imaginary institution - has never located itself outside the sphere of Europe”. How are relations between Greece and Europe twenty years later?
Much of what I argued 20 years ago still stands: an asymmetrical relation (politically and economically); a cultural disjunction, going back to the 19th century and before, that creates a trust deficit on both sides; and an internal ambiguity among Greeks that makes Europe the mark of both xenophobia and xenophilia simultaneously.
What has changed significantly is the 'Europeans' are no longer invested in things Greek – via their obsession with the ancient Greek ideal – as they were then. Or, perhaps, more accurately, the other side of their Philhellenism – the fact that modern Greeks are unworthy of their ancestors, that they are in the end Orientals – is no longer a counter-weight, it has taken over. What we now see is the full play of what in Dream Nation I had called 'the punishment of Philhellenism'. Greeks are paying for their ancestors by being held in debt by the Europeans, who claim to be the only real inheritors of the ancients.
You have argued that a Greek government of the Left has the responsibility to "save the most valuable principle of modern European culture: democratic autonomy." Is this still the case following the bailout deal reached on July 13?
Of course it is still true. Europe sure needs some heavy doses of democratic autonomy. The question is whether it is possible. One thing I can say, by some sort of negative logic, is that the Greek government, as a sort of troublemaker entity within the EU, has brought out in the open for the world to see the endemic democracy deficit in today’s EU institutions. But the balance of power is extraordinarily unequal. It will require people in other countries of Europe to bring their own democratic desires to the forefront as well.
As it has become, the EU structure has eroded the parameters of national sovereignty. The brutal ways it dealt with Greece is a case in point. The Greek government of the Left provides a unique opportunity to address the EU’s democratic deficit, precisely because it is not linked to the elite clientelist networks that are not just local – they are linked to their counteparts in Europe.
Several scholars have said that what happened in Greece largely involved corrupt local politicians in tandem with a ruthless international financial elite. Is this a diagnosis to build on?
It is a correct diagnosis on the whole, even if there are other factors involved. The most important task of a SYRIZA government – which is why it was elected by an electorate that exceeds its ranks – is precisely to reverse this course and put a stop to it.A Herculean task, no doubt, but only SYRIZA is the political force to make this happen. SYRIZA’s broad popular base is grounded on two things: it’s the only party based on a social movement – a very activist one, especially in the solidarity networks that grew in response to the crisis; its lack of clientelist connections gives people, for the first time, the hope that some real change can happen in Greek society.Contrary to what is believed, most Greeks actually resent clientelism; they desire some sort of honesty and meritocracy, especially in the public sector.
Is there any special role writers and literature have during this crisis?
Literature speaks precisely in the ways that politics cannot speak – it outmaneuvers the codes of power. But it is also a mode of action that takes much longer to develop; it is not dependent on the turn of events. Nonetheless, if there is one positive thing we have seen from the crisis is an explosion in aesthetic creativity, in all the arts, not just writing, and this because much of the youth, in the face of a rather bleak reality, turns with full force to the experimentalism of the imagination, to creating inventive fictions of reality cause reality is abhorrent.
Are there some ways in which we can 'rethink' Greece and Europe now?
I can easily imagine that Greece has a lot of lessons to teach Europe right now, except that Europe has locked its heels like a mule and refuses to learn!
*Interview by Nikolas Nenedakis (Interview taken in early August 2015).
The Opening Remarks from the Rethinking the Human Sciences conference, held March 30, 2012 at Columbia University in the City of New York. Nicholas Dirks, Executive Vice President of Arts and Sciences (Columbia University) and Stathis Gourgouris, Director, of the Institute for Comparative Literature and Society (Columbia University) present: