Asteris Huliaras is Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of the Peloponnese, where he holds the European Jean Monnet Chair on EU relations with Less Developed Countries. His research interests focus on (global) North-South Relations, development studies, foreign policy analysis and civil society.

Professor Huliaras is the author or editor of several books and articles in peer-reviewed journals, including African Affairs, Asia-Europe Journal, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, and European Foreign Affairs. Among his recent publications are ‘Civil Society’, in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics (2020), and with Kostantinos Magliveras, ‘African Diplomacy’ in The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy (2016). He has served as an advisor of the Greek government on public policy, in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Greek Permanent Mission in the United Nations, while also having served as an expert in NATOs Expert Working Group on Africa and in the United Nations Human Security Network.

Professor Huliaras spoke to Rethinking Greece* on Africa’s prospects in the 21st century; on why EU’s interest for Africa is on the rise; on the evolving dynamics of the relationship between Europe and Africa and on the contacts, synergies and networks that are being created and strengthened between Greece and sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, he talks about the EU project he is the scientific director of, AfriquEurope, the largest network of African and European universities in the field of social sciences.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Africa was deemed to be at the point of economic take-off, and its geopolitical power was on the rise. Where does Africa find itself in the international geopolitical and economic landscape now?

By the turn of the century, optimism abounded regarding Africa's prospects. By 2000, six out of ten countries with the highest growth rates in the world were African. At that time the continent experienced unprecedented, since independence, levels of peace, with an increasing number of African leaders elected through largely free and fair elections. Global interest in African affairs surged, notably marked by China's emergence as a leading trade partner, aid provider and investor in the continent.

However, this optimism has since dissipated. Much of Africa's growth was tied to the soaring international prices of oil, metals, and other primary products. Consequently, when these prices plummeted, African exports suffered. While some resource-poor countries benefited, their gains were short-lived. The onset of the pandemic exacerbated existing challenges, compounded by civil wars in the Horn of Africa and Islamic rebellions in the western Sahel. The eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo remained mired in near-permanent crisis. These developments collectively displaced over 20 million people. Though several countries, such as Kenya, Ghana, and Cote d'Ivoire, exhibited relative resilience and maintained impressive growth rates for long periods, the overall landscape has markedly shifted. Numerous coups d'état, particularly in the Sahel, democratic regression (even in traditionally free nations like Senegal), and escalating conflicts that now threaten to destabilize entire regions have tarnished African prospects.

Still is difficult to generalize. Next to failures you have important success stories (e.g. Burundi versus Rwanda). Africa is more diverse than Europe. As the title of a recent book suggested: “Africa is not a country.”

How would you describe the Europe-Africa relationship today, and what are its prospects? How is it affected by factors such as the new Samoa agreement or China's dynamic presence in the continent?

In the past 5-6 years, developments concerning the future of EU’s relations with Africa are, at a first glance, disappointing. After BREXIT, Africa lost one of its strongest champions in Brussels. Then, the pandemic struck and EU’s attention focused on domestic health challenges. Finally, a week after the EU-African Union summit on 17-18 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Several analysts pessimistically concluded that Europe’s focus is shifting from Africa to other parts of the world. But then, in the past 5-6 years we witnessed several diverse messages and developments. In 2019, just before the last German election, Angela Merkel proudly argued that EU's “policies on Africa, now follow a common strategy, which a few years ago would have been unthinkable". In March 2020, while Europe was closing down in response to the coronavirus, the new European Commission released a new communication entitled “Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa,” a document with plenty of new ideas and plans. And finally, in December 2021, the EU announced the €300 billion so-called Global Gateway investment strategy – a very ambitious project, similar to the Chinese Belt & Road Initiative. Half of it – this means 150 billion euros - is to be deployed in Africa. Details of the Africa-Europe program, the first regional plan under Global Gateway, were announced just two months after the launch of the strategy.

So, there is no doubt that despite BREXIT, despite the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, increasingly EU officials and EU member-states are looking towards Africa. In my view, there are several factors that explain EU’s growing interest for Africa, leading to a much closer partnership. The first factor is a growing understanding that tackling underlying security and migration challenges would require a more holistic approach towards Africa. The second factor is the realization of the need to respond to Europe’s loss of influence amidst the growing number of external actors showing an interest in Africa, especially – but not only – China: India, Brazil, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Iran have all become important actors in Africa. The third is an understanding of the huge opportunities for European businesses that might arise from supporting Africa’s adoption and implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the new Samoa Agreement. Finally, in a strange way, the Ukrainian crisis has also increased Africa’s geopolitical importance for the EU. Both the EU and Africa focus on energy and food security. Among others, cooperation with some African countries is expected to help Europe replace imports of Russian natural gas and reduce dependence from Russia.

How can Africa complete the trajectory from a recipient of development aid to an equal partner with Europe? What do African countries expect from Europe?

Over the past half-century, the shadows of colonialism have gradually receded, paving the way for a shift towards what the European Commission terms a "partnership of equals" in Europe's engagement with Africa. Amidst this evolving landscape, there is a growing desire among Africans for increased European “greenfield” investments and greater support for infrastructure development across the continent. Additionally, there is a call for enhanced mobility opportunities for Africans seeking to relocate to Europe. While some authoritarian leaders may resist European pressure for liberalization and democratization, many African civil activists advocate for the EU to take a firmer stance, imposing stricter sanctions in response to human rights violations.

Thus, while the dynamics of the relationship between Europe and Africa continue to evolve, there remain tensions between the aspirations for a closer economic partnership and the imperatives of justice and accountability. Migration is also a constant challenge for policy-makers in both sides. Africa continues to be much dependent on both development aid and access to the developed world’s markets (especially for agricultural products). There is no doubt that to a large extent and despite the rhetoric, the relationship remains asymmetrical. However, this does not mean that African countries are powerless. There is much African “agency” in EU-African relations.

How does Greece differ from the rest of Europe in terms of its relations with sub-Saharan Africa? Which countries are of particular interest to Greece?

There has been a great deal of diplomatic activity taking place within the last 5 years in Greek-African relations. Greece has opened a new embassy in Senegal and former foreign minister Nikos Dendias made several official visits to the continent. Much of these contacts relate to Greece’s ambition to be elected as a non-permanent member of the UN’s security council for the 2025-6 period. There is also a push to do more, due to Turkey’s advance and rising influence in Africa. So, the main reasons for the Greek-African rapprochement are political.

At the economic level, if we look at Greece’s trade of goods with Sub-Saharan Africa, numbers are still insignificant. However, there are reasons for optimism. Firstly, there is a “hidden” economic activity, not very well recorded in statistics, that has to do with trade in services such as shipping, consulting, etc. Secondly, the Greek business community, encouraged by the Hellenic-African Chamber of Commerce and a few diplomatic missions in Athens (like the South African Embassy) shows a renewed interest for investing in the continent. For example, Mytilineos Group is investing in Libya and Ghana. Thirdly, diasporic communities (Greeks in Africa and the rising number of Africans in Greece), universities, NGOs and various cultural groups undertake numerous initiatives that are largely fragmented and difficult to monitor, but are however gradually and continuously fostering a wider, closer and deeper Greco-African relationship. Contacts, synergies and cooperations are multiplying, and many new networks are created and strengthened between Greece and Africa.

You are the scientific coordinator of the European Commission project "AfriquEurope: The European Union and Africa in a world of multiple crises," which aims to support closer cooperation between the two continents. Can you tell us more about this project?

We are very excited about this project. With partners and collaborators in 33 countries representing all regions of Africa, including French-, English- and Portuguese-speaking countries, AfriquEurope (2024-7), funded by the European Commission - Jean Monnet Policy Debate, is the largest network worldwide of African and European universities in the field of social sciences. With the University of the Peloponnese as the lead partner, the project will organize 12 thematic conferences in Africa, Europe and China as well as 10 research groups that will produce books, articles and working papers on EU-African relations. As the world order is being reshaped, AfriquEurope is dedicated to a mutually reinforcing dialogue between Europe and Africa, aiming at deepening ties and creating evidence-based solutions for policy makers on both sides of the Mediterranean.

* Interview to Ioulia Livaditi

Read also from Rethinking Greece:

• Angelos Dalachanis on the Greek Diaspora in Egypt and the Middle East
• Alexander Kitroeff: “Greek Diaspora has affected the history of host countries around the world”

The post Rethinking Greece | Asteris Huliaras : Contacts, synergies and cooperations are multiplying between Greece and Africa appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Angelos Dalachanis is a Researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) and is based at the Institute of Early Modern and Modern History in Paris. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the European University Institute, Florence, and was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Seeger Center for Hellenic Studies at Princeton University and at the French School at Athens. His research interests include the history of migration, labor and Greek diaspora in the Eastern Mediterranean in the modern period. He is the author of "The Greek Exodus from Egypt: Diaspora Politics and Emigration, 1937–1962" (2017) and co-editor with Vincent Lemire of "Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840-1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City" (2018).

Angelos Dalachanis spoke to Rethinking Greece* on the socio-economic characteristics of the Greek community in Egypt and in Jerusalem, the Greek 'exodus' of the early 1960s and how it relates to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the collapse of colonial empires, and the Cold War; the complex relations between the diasporic communities and the Greek state, and finally, the challenges the Greek diaspora communities face now in the wider area of the Middle East. As far a a more dynamic Greek presence in the Middle East is concerned, he emphasizes the role Greek Universities can play, by giving more grants to students from the area so that they can come and study in Greece, and utilizing the human capital of numerous students from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries that have studied in Greek Universities over the last decades. He concludes that "to rethink the Greek presence in the Middle East, we need historical knowledge of the region and its people, as well as a strong imagination and an unbiased attitude".

Greeks were the largest community of foreigners living in Egypt during the first half of the 20th century. How big was the Greek community in Egypt and what were its socio-economic characteristics?

Indeed, the Greek community was the largest foreign community in Egypt during the 19th century and until the mid-20th century, followed by the Italians. The Greek population fluctuated in the course of this period, reaching its peak in the late 1920s, after the arrival in Egypt of Greek refugees from Asia Minor. At that time, according to official statistics, there were approximately 77,000 Greek nationals living in Egypt, while the total population of Egypt was over 14 million. Just before the exodus of the early 1960s, the number of Greek citizens had already dropped to about 48,000, while the Egyptian population had almost doubled, approaching 26 million.

Other numbers that still surface from time to time in the public debate, and sometimes in the historical literature about the demographic power of the Greeks in Egypt, are based on arbitrary estimates, and always show the community to be much bigger than it appeared in the census. Many explanations can be given for the difference between official statistics and estimates. But there’s one explanation I would like to insist on. This difference is largely due to theuncertainty about who could be considered Greek in Egypt:Was it only those who were citizens of the Greek state?Those of Greek origin? The Orthodox Christians who spoke Greek? So, it is important to emphasize here that neither the census takers nor the Greek diplomatic authorities and communities had a clear picture of the exact number of the Greek population in Egypt, because it was not clear exactly who constituted this community. Even though we consider Greeks a single entity, the boundaries of the community were not firmly defined, but were fluid and constantly changing.

One thing is for sure. Even though Greeks never exceeded 0.6% of the overall population of Egypt in the early 20th century, their economic power however was immense, mostly because of the Greek economic elites’ dominant place in the cotton and banking sectors. This of course doesn’t mean that all Greeks of Egypt were rich; quite the opposite.

Most Greeks arrived in Egypt in the 19th and early 20th century as migrants. Initially, this movement concerned big merchants andtraders who were part of the Greek merchant diaspora around the Mediterraneanand Black Sea. In Egypt, they established nodes of extensivecommercial networks, encouraged by Muhammad Ali, the leader of Egyptfrom 1805 to 1848, who favored their settlement. Later, migration to Egypt also took the form of a mass movement of labor, as in the case of thousands of Dodecanese islanders who came to work on the construction of the Suez Canal. The newly arrived Greeks settled not only in Cairo and Alexandria, but also inhabited the old town of Suez and the newly founded cities across the Suez Canal area, Port Said and Ismailia, and penetrated theinterior, namely the cities of the Nile Delta such as Mansoura, Tanta, andZagazig, and also Upper Egypt.

Greek migrants who arrived in Egyptbecame engaged in a wide range of economic activities. The big Alexandrian cotton merchants and other entrepreneurs (Georgios Averoff, Emmanuel Benakis, Konstantinos Salvagos and others), who are now mostly known for their activities as benefactors, constituted only an extremely small part of the community. The economic elites greatly profited by the regime of the Capitulations and the British semi-colonial presence in Egypt after 1882. The Capitulations were bilateral agreements between the Ottoman Empire and individual states that regulated the rights and special privileges of foreigners within the empire, including Egypt. When in 1940 the Greek consulates conducted a survey on the professional activities of Greeks they revealed an interesting social stratification: the “clerks” constituted the majority of the workforce, which amounted to 33.5% of it. They were followed by the technicians (13.2 %), handicraft laborers (12.8 %), and the various shopkeepers (7.8%), while several other professions such as artists, waiters, teachers and professors, drivers, nurses, doctors, and all kind of liberal professions amounted to just over a quarter of the workforce. Finally, the upper middle class and the big bourgeois of the community—merchants and industrialists, various businessmen, landowners, and rentiers—accounted for 6.6%.We should not forget that the community also contained a significant number of destitute people with very low or no income at all. If the magnates mentioned above were involved in charitable activities (soup kitchens, orphanages, hospitals, etc), it was because there was a real need for them. In fact, there were people who relied on such practices for their survival.

In terms of context, there are similarities between Palestine and Egypt: both are Arab provinces under Ottoman rule, the majority of the population is Muslim, and they are under strong European influence, especially British, until the mid-20th century. Nevertheless, there are obvious differences between these two settings: Palestine did not have a significant port and Jerusalem was not a major merchant city, nor was it built around fertile grounds to attract rich merchants, or big landowners, as it happened with Egyptian cities. Even though itinerant workers from Egypt moved to Palestine for the construction of major development projects (such as the Palestine Railways) this did not result into permanent settlement. Moreover, Egypt had a high degree of autonomy from the Sublime Porte, and the Capitulations were extremely favourable to foreigners, more than in any other place of the Ottoman Empire.

The Greeks in Jerusalem tell us a somewhat different story from that of Greeks in Egypt. The Greek presence in Jerusalem has been invariably related to the existence of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, which is the oldest Christian institution in the Holy Land, the principal custodian of the Christian sacred shrines, and one of the most important non-state landowners in what is now Palestine and Israel. Greek and Palestinian Arab sub-communitiesformed the clergy and the congregation.Palestinian Arabs always formed the largest part of the Greek Orthodox congregation in Jerusalem, while Greeks constituted a small minority. However, due to historical factors, the Greek clergy always controlled the Brotherhood of the HolySepulchre, and thus the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.

Beginning in the 1840s, European powers opened consulates in Jerusalem and the city attracted people who were for the most part religious, but also Greek migrants from the Ottoman Empire and Greece. In demographic terms the Greek population in Jerusalem reached its peak at the end of World War II with 1,500 people out of a population of about 165,000. Despite its small size, the symbolic capital of the Greek community was large, due to the spiritual and economic importance of the Patriarchate. Jerusalem’s Greek economic elites consisted mostly of liberal professionals and were not comparable with the strong economic elites in Egypt. There were, however, links and connections between Jerusalem and Alexandria, mainly through the religious networks between the Jerusalem and Alexandria patriarchates. Some of the most prominent figures of the Greek community in Egypt, who spoke Arabic and actively participated in the community’s intellectual life, had studied at the theological school of the Monastery of the Cross in Jerusalem. The best known example is Najib Michail Sa‘ati, a Greek Orthodox Arab born in Jerusalem in 1885, who translated and adapted the spelling of his name into Greek Eugenios-Michailidis when he moved to Alexandria in 1912 and became a prominent figure of Greek intellectual life in Egypt. Ηe is included in Despina Sevastopoulou’s 1950 book on “The Alexandria that is leaving” among other biographies of “Alexandrians of the last 50 years”, and his case is conceptualised in a recent article by professor Antony Gorman.

What were the main factors that made the Greeks of Egypt gradually leave the country? Conventional wisdom connects the 'Greek exodus' to the nationalization of many industries in 1961 and 1963 by the Nasser regime, but your research shows that there were other factors at play as well. 

You are absolutely right in saying that Greeks left Egypt only gradually. People often leave one place to find a better future in another, and those Greeks who left Egypt did so because they were convinced that the country offered them no future or because they had better prospects elsewhere.

Greeks always left Egypt either after fulfilling the objectives that had driven them to emigrate there, or in times of economic crisis. In the post-war setting though, something fundamentally changed. Greeks stopped migrating to Egypt because it became more difficult to enter the country and opportunities for work and wealth dwindled.

The mass departure of Greeks did take place in the early 1960s, but the dismantling of the structural components that linked the Greek presence to Egypt had begun years ago. The most important structural change was the abolition of the capitulation privileges that foreigners had been enjoying in Egypt until 1937. The capitulations protected Greeks and other foreigners by exempting them from almost all taxes and guaranteeing freedom of movement and commerce. Moreover, they granted immunity from legal and judicial control. As long as the Capitulations were in effect, Egypt had no right to promulgate laws relating to foreign citizens, over whom Egyptian courts had no jurisdiction. The results of the abolition of the Capitulations in real life were not always immediately perceived.

The domination of foreigners as a result of the Capitulations and the British presence had not only economic and political but also cultural aspects. It led to a superiority complex toward the Egyptian population, apparent in the reluctance of the majority of Greeks to acquire fluency in Arabic. In other words, they refused to integrate into Egyptian society to any significant extent, as well as to “converse” with the Egyptian state, especially since after Arabic language had become one of the basic tools of Egyptian nationalism, and its use had been extended to all aspects of public life through the 1940s and the 1950s.

So, yes the nationalizations of the early 1960s did indeed take place and played a role, but they did not happen like a bolt from the blue. Measures associated with the process of transforming Egypt from an autonomous Ottoman province under European control into an independent nation-state, were taken also before the coup of 1952 and the ascent of Nasser to power, and contributed to Greeks’ decision to leave Egypt. Historians must expand the picture in terms of time and space in order to understand complex phenomena such as the Greeks’ definitive departure from Egypt. In doing so, it becomes clear that the departure of Greeks was not an isolated phenomenon, but part of broader population movements, relatedto three different historical developments: the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the collapse of colonial empires, and the Cold War.

You mention that many diasporic communities historically preceded the emergence of the Greek national state, which complicated relations between the new Greek state and “it’s” Diaspora. How have these relations evolved over the years?         

The demographic power of the Greek nation and the geography of the Greek state have never been in complete agreement. Despite the fact that quite a number of Greeks live outside Greece since the foundation of the Greek state, the state has never developed a stable and consistent policy towards the Greek Diaspora. And despite the pompous statements of governmental and non-governmental actors who speak of an «ecumenical Hellenism», the Greek State does not treat all Greeks outside its borders in the same way. Its concern for the diaspora is determined by its own needs: the presence of Greeks in the territories of the Ottoman Empire, for example, supported the irredentist doctrine of the Great Idea and the need for geographical expansion. After 1922 and until the end of the Second World War, interest in the diaspora was limited. Diaspora interest was strengthened again by the need for reconstruction after WWII and was greatly renewed in the 1970s after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and in the 1990s when the Macedonian issue came to the fore again.

The state turned its gaze in the most beneficial direction for itself, depending on circumstances: either to the East until 1922 or to the West in the post-war period.However, apart from the general geographical orientation, the institutional, political and economic aspects of relations between the state and the diaspora were mostly based on personal strategies and initiatives that rarely went beyond the period of one governmental or ministerial term, or one generation on the part of the expatriate community.

For Greece, it is itself at the centre, and the expatriate community revolves around it. But for many members of the Greek diaspora, this is not necessarily the case. Over time, numerous Greeks of the diaspora did not treat Greece as their sole or even major point of reference. For instance, there are cases of Ottoman Greeks who decided to migrate to the US, France and other Western countries without ever passing through Greece. Similarly, only approximately half of the Greeks who left Egypt moved to Greece. The rest moved to Diaspora settings all over the world, to Africa, Western Europe, Oceania and the Americas. For these people, the homeland was and is more of a cultural, imaginative space. But if we consider that “Hellenism has no borders”, as the Atlas Larousse illustré wrote back in 1901, for the additional reason that it is an imaginary space, we cannot disregard the fact of its multiple centers, both political (the Greek state) and religious or other symbolic (Istanbul, Jerusalem, Alexandria). So, the point of reference is not always and not solely Greece but areas in Asia Minor, Egypt, Palestine and other regions, mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greek populations lived for a long time.

What are the challenges the Greek diaspora communities face now in the wider area of the Middle East? 

Each country of the Middle East has its own specificities. For instance, the Greek population of Egypt has three main components today: those who are descendants of the old flourishing communities and never abandoned Egypt; newly arrived expatriates who work for Greek or other western companies for a certain period of time; and clergymen and people close to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria.

Each of these sub-communities faces different challenges. I would say that the Greek secular presence, whose roots go back to the old Greek community of Egypt, is most at risk. Demographic decline and lack of proper education are the most important challenges. There are very few Greeks living in Egypt nowadays and the use of the Greek language is decreasing day by day. The Greek state, and especially the Ministry of Education, has a central role to play here. It should strengthen the educational structures in the area and listen more carefully to the demands of the communities. As for the demographic problem of Greeks in the broader area, we should probably reconsider who is a Greek in the Middle East and who can become Greek or come closer to the Greek communities.

Examples like that of Eugenios Michailidis, which I mentioned earlier, can show us how to envisage these relations in the future. You know, hundreds, maybe thousands of students from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries have studied in Greek Universities over the last decades. Accordingly, thousands of immigrants who have lived and worked in Greece for many years have returned to their countries. Are there any significant efforts by the Greek state or other associations to maintain relations with these people after they return to their homeland? I strongly doubt it.

However, these people often have a solid knowledge of the Greek language and modern Greek reality. Some of them have been married to Greeks. The Greek state should establish ties with them and make them unofficial ambassadors of Greece, so that the country can play a more energetic cultural and economic role in the Eastern Mediterranean. More grants should be given to students from the area so that they can come and study in Greece. Greek universities have always been a hub for people from the region, but the Greek state traditionally has shown indifference to them. So, instead of providing golden visas and citizenship to people with controversial economic and moral status, because they pay a few thousand euros, we should find ways to exploit the human and cultural capital which is already there. These people should be creatively integrated into the actual communities and create the Greek communities of the future. To rethink the Greek presence in the Middle East, we need historical knowledge of the region and its people, as well as a strong imagination and an unbiased attitude. This will also help us rethink Greece and the ways in which migrant and refugee populations from the Middle East can be integrated into our country and become part of the Greek nation.

The post Rethinking Greece l Angelos Dalachanis on the Greek Diaspora in Egypt and the Middle East appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Antonis Chaldeos is a historian, writer and Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg. His research focuses on the history of the Greek Diaspora in Africa. He holds a PhD in History from the University of Johannesburg, has published several articles in peer-reviewed journals, as well as 10 books on the Greek presence in Africa, including: The Greeks in Morocco during 1904-2012; The Greek presence in Tunisia (16th-21st century); The Greek presence in Mozambique; The Greek community in Sudan (19th-21st) century; The Greeks in the horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia); The Greek community in Tanzania; The Greek community in South Africa; The Greek community in Malawi, and more. He maintains an active blog, Greeks of Africa as well a Facebook page by the same name where he publishes excerpts of his research.

In 2017, he was honored with the St. Marcos Holy Cross by the Patriarchate of Alexandria and All of Africa for his contribution to the promotion of the Hellenism in Africa.

Antonis Chaldeos spoke to Rethinking Greece* on the political and economic circumstances that resulted in the Greek presence in Africa, the Greeks’ contribution to the host countries and relations to the local population, their activities in agriculture, construction, trade and industry, the unknown history of Greek communities in Sudan and Mozambique and Ethiopia, and finally, on the future of the Greeks in Africa.

What were the political and economic circumstances that resulted in the Greek presence Africa? Are there any distinct (geographical, chronological or other) trends to Greek migration in Africa, like for example to North Africa as compared to sub-Saharan Africa?

Greek presence in countries that were also part of the Ottoman Empire, such as Tunisia and Libya, dates back to the 16th century. As far as sub-Saharan countries are concerned, Greek immigration started during last quarter of the 19th century, as a result of the political and social conditions in the wider south-eastern Mediterranean area, and the strategy of the European colonial powers in Africa. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the duration of the journey from Europe to Asia decreased and new ports were founded to refuel the ships making this journey. Gradually these ports became the starting points for exploration into the unknown, but rich in natural resources, Africa.

It was the period of intensified competition between European countries for the exploitation of Africa that created the background and the conditions for the migration and settlement of European citizens in that Continent. In addition, the need for infrastructure, both to move European military forces in a continent where the landscape was covered by desert, jungle and large rivers, and to open up trade routes, led to a high demand for a skilled workforce. Finally, we should note the key role of the introduction of steamships, which facilitated long-distance migration, especially for the Greek islanders.

The majority of the Greek immigrants in Africa settled in urban centers as they were more attractive locations for those who wanted after a relatively short time of work to return to Greece or invest their money in a small business. Most of them were involved in trade. However, in Eastern Africa, a significant number of Greeks engaged in agriculture and livestock development that were strenuous activities with low prestige and uncertain profit.

In Kenya, Tanganyika, Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Mozambique, many Greeks had farms and livestock. They took advantage of the lack of interest of the political and economic elite that avoided dealing with the difficult, demanding and less profitable agriculture sector. Greeks dealt with the intensification of the existing crops and introduced new ones, such as tobacco. They were pioneers, they invested money, and they laid the foundations of the industrialization in many countries such as Sudan, Mozambique and Zambia.

Greeks know a lot about the Greek community in Egypt, but no so much about the Greek presence in other African countries. In which other country (or countries) would you say the Greek community had a particularly significant contribution?

Between the late 19th and the early 20th century, Greeks gradually emigrated to more than 25 countries throughout Africa. Although they were not numerous in most of the countries where they settled in, their role in the local economy and society was decisive. Greeks had a fundamental role in the history of Sudan till the 1880, were responsible for the industrialisation of Mozambique in the 1940s, dominated agriculture sector in Tanzania and Malawi and controlled coffee trade in the horn of Africa.

The Greeks who settled in Sudan during the 19th century were widely dispersed within this huge country -the third biggest in Africa, settling even in the most desolated areas, when no other European had ever been. In the first decade of the 20th century the number of the Greeks living in Sudan grew steadily as there was a strong demand for work force. That time, almost 2,500 Greeks resided in Sudan while the total number of the Europeans including the British colonial administration was 3,100 people. Due to the construction fever that Khartoum experienced between 1899 and 1902, thousands of workers arrived in the capital of Sudan. Most of them were of Greek origin. Gradually, more Greeks settled in the city making the Greek community the largest among the Europeans of the Sudanese capital.

Apart from being the most populous European community, Greeks proved to be protagonists in Sudanese economic history. The majority of Greeks turned to trade, both import and export. Those who were export-oriented bought raw materials from the domestic market and distributed them primarily to big trading houses that had office branches inside or outside Sudan. A typical case of a Greek tradesman was G. Contomichalos, owner of the largest import-export firm in Sudan that also participated in numerous international businesses ventures.

Some Greeks went into the construction sector, making the most of Sudan’s burgeoning development and the effort to build land and maritime infrastructure. In the late 19th century, Greeks became also involved in the industry sector and established the first factories in Omdurman and Khartoum in tobacco, flour mills, oil, sesame oil and cottonseed oil.

The Greeks of Sudan focused their professional activity on two main categories throughout the 20th century, trade and constructions. However, few of them owned coffee shops and restaurants. Typical is the case of “Great Britain” that belonged to Panagiotis Pagoulatos. It included a restaurant, pastry shop and bar. Gradually, it evolved into one of the largest bars of Khartoum.

As mentioned before, the Greeks were pioneers in the industrialization of Mozambique, investing money and laying the foundations for new industries. The Greeks’ role was also in fundamental in the constructions sector, as they took up one of the biggest transport projects in south eastern Africa, the building of a bridge in lower Zambezi which linked Malawi with Mozambique in the 1930s. The Greeks' industrial activities in Mozambique were focused on tobacco, food processing (milk, juices) and plastics.

Greeks who immigrated to Ethiopia in the late 19th century implemented a wide range of infrastructure works in Addis Ababa and other cities. Those who dealt extensively with trade managed to overcome difficulties -such as increased mortality due diseases and extreme geophysical conditions- in order to provide even the most remote regions of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia with products.

Lots of Greeks marked the history of host countries. Two examples that stand out in my mind are, firstly, George Stravelakis, an enslaved Greek who as a child survived the massacre of Chios in 1822, to be sold as a slave and raised by the family of the local Bey in Tunis. There he was converted to Islam and was given the name Mustapha. He managed to climb to the highest offices of the Tunisian state: he became state Treasurer (Khaznadar), lieutenant-general of the army, Bey in 1840 and finally to president of the Grand Council from 1862 to 1878.

The story of Dimitris Tsafendas, the man who in 1966 assassinated the South African prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd -commonly known as the architect of Apartheid- is also fascinating. Dimitris Tsafendas was born in Mozambique, Lourenço Marques in 1918.His father, Michael Tsafendis had emigrated from Crete in 1915 and his mother was Amelia Williams, a Mozambican of mixed race. In his adolescence, Tsafendas worked as a labourer in South Africa, where he was organized in the Communist Party due to his political beliefs and also because no other political party (including the African National Congress) accepted people of mixed race.

In 1957, Tsafendas participated in the unarmed demonstration of 20,000 black South Africans in the town of Sharpeville, a few kilometers outside of Johannesburg, where 20 police officers killed 69 people and wounded 830, including Tsafendas himself. According to the Apartheid laws, he was a mulatto and as a result, he had difficulties finding a job; also he was also unable to marry the woman of his choice, because Apartheid laws did not allow marriages between people of different race.

In July 1966, Tsafendas found a temporary job as a messenger in the Parliament of South Africa. On September of the same year, he assassinated the prime minister of South Africa Hendrik Verwoerd, who died three days later. The trial started lasted four days and Tsafendas refused the defense lawyer, declaring "I did my duty. Kill me". Initially, the judges condemned him to death. Nevertheless, to avoid political ramifications, the judges changed their initial verdict and declared him not guilty by reason of insanity. Tsafendas was sentenced to life imprisonment and transferred to a high-security prison in Pretoria where he was tortured.

He died in 1999 and the Greek community of Krugersdorp covered the cost of his funeral. He was buried without a gravestone, only with a stone with the number J59 inscribed on it, the number he had as a prisoner.

Tsafendas had became a symbol of the struggle against the apartheid, and in the great demonstration of 1976 in Johannesburg, people chanted rhythmically “Tsafendas inyanga yezizwe” (Tsafendas liberated the nation). However, he passed into oblivion soon after the end of apartheid. Recently, interest in his life has been rekindled and his memory as a hero of the anti-Apartheid is being restored. 

The range of the professional activities of the Greeks community, as they have been shaped over the years, defined the social status of the Greek community. From the mid-19th century, the majority of the Greeks who settled in Africa were farmers, merchants, railway workers and people without professional experience. Migration was considered a one-way street due to the economic and social pressures for personal and family survival in Greece. From the 1930s, the identity of the Greek migrant changes, as a significant number of educated and experienced Greeks came from Asia Minor, the islands of the Aegean and Cyprus to settle in Africa. Many Greeks have shown great determination and managed to advance to a higher social status. After 1930, a small group of Greek settlers had evolved into industrialists, owners of large estates and building contractors acquiring wealth and fame.

Although Greeks were among the first Europeans who settled in Africa in the 19th century, they were considered as second-class Europeans. As Greeks experienced a kind of marginalization, they chose deliberate isolation from the colonial elite. This attitude was also derived from their need to preserve their ethnic identity within a multicultural society: Greek communities, until the first quarter of the 20th century were characterized by introversion and endogamy. The first migrants, who were usually men, after their first decade in Africa visited Greece and married spouses from their place of origin. Of course, at this point it should be noted that some Greeks from the late 19th century to the first two decades of the 20th century have established marriages with local women.

What were the relations like between the immigrant Greeks and the indigenous people in African host countries? How were they affected by colonialism?

The long-standing presence of the Greeks in Africa has been the reason for creating friendship bonds with the indigenous people of the continent. Greeks treated indigenous Africans as equals. An important factor determining these relationships was the professional activities of the Greeks: from the late 19th century, Greeks’ involvement in trade and agriculture brought them with close and direct contact with the local population; these relationships were favored by the fact that Greeks learned to speak the local languages.

What does the future look like for Greek communities in Africa in a post-colonialist era? Are there any countries were Greek presence is still particularly strong or that it is increasing?

Today, although the official data do not provide us with a very accurate picture, the total number of Greeks living in Africa is estimated at 100,000 people, excluding the descendants of mixed marriages who do not have Greek passports and who resided mostly in Ethiopia, Sudan and South Africa. The majority of the Greeks live in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo and Nigeria. However, in the last few years, the Greek communities in Africa experience are slowly increasing again, as a result of the crisis that plagued Greece.

In particular, Greeks who used to live in Africa and returned home in the 1980s or 1990s have, due to the difficulties in finding work in Greece, re-emigrated to several African countries and either invested money in their compatriots’ businesses or started their own activity as entrepreneurs. As a result, the Greek presence in some countries such as Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia the Greek presence is still strong.

*Interview by: Ioulia Livaditi

The post Rethinking Greece | Antonis Chaldeos on the Greeks of Africa appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Alexander Kitroeff is Professor of History at Haverford College in Pennsylvania, where he has been teaching courses on Modern European and Mediterranean history since 1996. His research interests focus on nationalism, enthicity and identity in modern Greece and the Diaspora, across a broad spectrum, from politics to sports. His recent publications include Greek Orthodoxy in America: A Modern History (2020), The Greeks and the Making of Modern Egypt (2019). He has also collaborated with film director Maria Iliou as historical consultant in several documentary films -such as Smyrna 1922: the Destruction of a Cosmopolitan City- and more recently “Athens From East to West, 1821-1896”  the first of a 5-part series on the city’s modern history. He is currently working on an project on the history of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) to mark the organization’s centenary in 2022.

Alexander Kitroeff spoke to Rethinking Greece* on the Greek Diaspora communities in the United States, Egypt and their common characteristics around the world; how the Orthodox church became the most important Greek American institution, Philhellenism in the US during the Greek Revolution of 1821 and now; how Greek Diaspora has influenced the history of host countries around the world; the centrality of ancient Greece in diasporic identity and finally, how Athens could recognize the Diaspora's attachment to the home country and their achievements by establishing a Diaspora museum.

Your latest book is on the modern history of the Greek Orthodox Church in America. Could you briefly walk us through how the Orthodox Church became such an important Greek American institution? Does it still hold this role today?

Orthodoxy is a cornerstone of Greek identity so it follows that the Church would play a role in shaping the Greek experience in the United States, but its significance was also due to its sophisticated infrastructure. Churches and community organizations were the first ethnic associations established by the Greek immigrants that began arriving en masse to the United States beginning in the late 19th century. The creation of a governing body of Greek Orthodoxy in America, the Archdiocese which was established in 1921 and officially recognized in 1922 helped strengthen the role of the Church in the United States. But it was the arrival of Archbishop Athenagoras in 1931 that set the Church on course to becoming the most important Greek American institution. Athenagoras strengthened the role of local parish organizations and gave them the responsibility to administer the Greek language schools and to initiate philanthropic activities through the local Women’s Philoptochos organizations. From then on, the parish replaced the community organization as the hub of Greek American cultural and social life and has remained so since then because its managed to adapt so as to serve the needs of the increasingly Americanized faithful.

 

You recently published a book on the Greeks of Egypt, the largest and most economically powerful European community in that country from the early 19th century to the 1960s. How important were their contributions to modern Egypt?

The Greeks of Egypt contributed to Egypt’s economy in all three phases of its evolution. In the first one, when the focus was overly concentrated on exporting cotton, beyond their role as cotton merchants and bankers, the Greeks also provided important know how as agronomists. They also helped the economy by manufacturing the world renowned “Egyptian cigarette” and by also introducing paper manufacturing, wine production as well as the production of range of beverages, confectionaries and foodstuffs. When Egypt embarked on a sustained effort to diversify its economy and create a large manufacturing sector, the Greeks contributed by investing in textile mills, construction companies and build factories that produced oil and soap from cotton. In the second half of the 20th century when the Egyptianization of the economy began the Greeks remained economically active in partnership with Egyptians until the nationalizations in the 1960s forced them to leave.

We have all heard about the American Dream. Are the any distinct aspects to the “Greek American” dream and how has it changed in the last decades?

The concept of the American Dream is a highly idealized concept that anyone can achieve success in America, that regardless of social or ethnic origin anyone can achieve success through sustained effort and hard work. Although this myth has not applied to anyone, nonetheless, compared to many other societies, America does reward innovation and inventiveness and adheres to meritocracy. This provided extraordinary opportunities to the Greek immigrants throughout the twentieth century and there are countless of success stories. A few are about the first-generation Greek-born immigrants such as Spyros Skouras who left a mountain village in Peloponnesos and became president of twentieth Century Fox in Hollywood. Most success stories involve primarily the children of the immigrants who benefitted from the work of their parents, were educated and achieved success. Among them are former presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, U.S. Senator Paul Sarbanes and businessmen and philanthropists such as George Behrakis, Michael Jaharis, Angelo Tsakopoulos and Roy P. Vagelos among many others.

Studies have shown that the embrace of market economics from the 1980s onwards have slowly eroded the chances Americans from underprivileged backgrounds have of achieving a version of the American Dream. But Greek Americans who can attain a good education still have the potential of gaining economic and social prominence.

Do you find that there are common characteristics among the Greek Diaspora communities around the world?

Yes, I believe there are common characteristics among diaspora communities. In settling in a foreign country both in the past and the present, the Greek knows that he or she cannot rely on the support of a big powerful country as is the case of American, British, French and Italian expatriates for example. This is despite the excellent quality of the Greek Consular services around the world. Therefore, the Greek immigrant takes care to adapt to the conditions in the host countries and to also observe the laws. Yet at the same time the Greek carries with him or her the experiences of living in Greece where rules and regulations are more loosely applied, where bureaucracy and red tape force one to find loopholes or rely on political connections and personal networks.

Thus, the Greek immigrant is in a position to both play by the rules and when needed to find ways to resolve issue through creativity and imagination. By the same token, the Greek takes care to establish good relations with the citizens of the host country, even when they held a relatively more privileged position as was the case in Egypt and several African countries. Many diaspora Greeks throughout history have played the role of economic and cultural middlemen.

A second common characteristic is the reliance on family ties which is a reflection of one of the pre-modern features of Greece that survived into the modern era and was carried abroad by its emigrants. The assumption and acceptance that the family is a closely knit unit benefits family-run businesses such as restaurants and provides a support mechanism. And if the diaspora family can evolve away from its traditional patriarchal structures it can play an even more helpful role for all its members.

A third important characteristic is the universally strong connection Greeks abroad feel for both their particular place of origin and for Greece. The first is another relic of traditional society in which the primary allegiances after the family was the village or island. A little bit like the family this works both ways, as a means of networking and a support mechanism but can also engender undue insularity and even suspicion of outsiders. More straightforward is the attachment to the country. This is strengthened by the continued geopolitical uncertainties and threats Greece faces, which elicit a deep attachment and concern about Greece and its general wellbeing, even among second and third generation Greeks abroad.

Philhellenism was ubiquitous in the US public sphere during the onset of the Greek Revolution in the 1820s. What is the significance of the Greek Revolution for Americans and Greek Americans today?

Americans identified with the Greeks during the revolution of 1821 because they saw close parallels with their War of Independence against the British, and they sympathized with a Christian people fighting for their religious freedom, with fellow white civilians who were suffering at the hands of a barbaric enemy. Because of its foreign policy interests, embodied in the Monroe Doctrine of non-intervention in European affairs, the United States did not offer diplomatic or military aid to Greece. But this unleashed a huge wave of humanitarian support that swept through the country and has been described as the “Greek Fire.”

Because this was a social movement focused on benevolence and philanthropic aid offered to the Greeks, it legitimized the involvement of women, and this was the first time they became so heavily involved in a public issue. The solidarity movement with Greece, that took the form of creating committees throughout the country aimed at gathering funds and supplies to the Greeks, prepared the ground for the movement for the abolition of slavery. This was the second major humanitarian issue that dominated American life in the ensuing decades, and thus the earlier involvement for the Greek cause provided a training ground for the abolitionists among whom many were women.

The significance of America’s support for the Greek revolution functions, for all Americans as a reminded of the legacy of humanitarian support that the United States has offered peoples throughout the world. While other forms of U.S. involvement abroad have been controversial, the humanitarian impulse that was expressed in reaction to the 1821 revolution and other similar events around the world stands out as a beacon that shines a light on the good sides of America’s global reach. And the same applies to Greek Americans, they can also learn from America’s support of 1821 and understand that the common interests of Greece and the United States are especially significant when they are built upon the principles of humanitarianism and of mutual respect.

In a recent presentation you outlined some modern historical perspectives that examine the Greek Revolution through the prism of American history, such as the research on Philhellenism and the Development of Female-led Reform in the United States. Could you talk to us about these approaches?

Inevitably, the earliest historiographic approaches to topics such as the Greek diaspora or relations between Greece and countries that have hosted the Greek diaspora were conceived as basic history recounting the main events. In the case of diaspora histories I am thinking of the works by Greek diplomat Athanasios Polites on the Greeks in Egypt, and of the work of scholars such as Theodore Saloutos and Charles Moskos on the Greeks of America. And among the earliest studies on American philanthropy towards Greece were those by George G. Arnakis on 1821 and Louis P. Cassimatis on the help Americans offered Greece in the wake of the 1922 Asia Minor Disaster.

Based on those valuable foundations, a new generation of historians are employing new perspectives that examine Greece and its diaspora through a lens that takes into account the dynamics of hist societies such as the United States and on the significance that gender, race and social class. For example, American philhellenism examined as a phenomenon that not only affects Greece but also America. Other example would be focusing on the position of women or on how racial discrimination in America both benefitted and harmed Greek immigrants. Overall, it is a way of understanding the past as a transnational, global process. The impact of 1821 on American society is just one example.

I can think of others along the lines of the title of my recent book “The Greeks and the Making of Modern Egypt.” We can have studies on how the Greeks helped make the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany and other countries. And studies of how other major events such as the Asia Minor Disaster affected other countries and elicited their responses. Greece and its diaspora in other words have a global significance and that is a story we need to start narrating.

In your 2004 book “Wrestling with Ancients” you talk about Greeks’ multi-faceted relationship with antiquity and with the way other nations view Greece through a history of the modern Olympics. Seventeen years later, how do you think Modern Greek identity and our relationship with antiquity has evolved?

My book on Greek identity and the Olympics appeared six months before the opening of the Athens Olympics of 2004. Based on Greece’s historically close association with the Olympics and the significance of Ancient Greece for Greek identity, I predicted that Athens would host the Games successfully. And that is what happened. Unfortunately, as soon as the international spotlight moved away from Greece, the authorities did nothing to capitalize on the spirit Greece had displayed and it also failed to find ways to reimagine and use the athletic facilities that had been built for the Olympics. But this was a failure of governance, not an indication that antiquity was somehow now being discounted. Indeed, the opening of the New Acropolis Museum in 2009 confirmed the continued pride the Greeks have for their ancient past and the continuity with it that they embrace.

And speaking about the close relationship of the Modern Greeks with their Classical era ancestry, we should note how this relationship is also very strong in the Greek diaspora. Naturally, Greek immigrants around the world invoke their connections with Ancient Greece not only because it is part of their identity but also because it enhances their status. Nonetheless this relationship remains strong and it is expressed clearly in many ways, as for example the concern Greek Americans have shown at times when Classical studies in U.S. higher education have been threatened.

Indeed, the diaspora’s attachment to Ancient Greece is an important reason why Athens functions as the unofficial capital of the Greek diaspora. Most Greeks living abroad originated from the provinces where conditions were more difficult than those in the cities. But for them Athens is Greece’s window to the world and they are attached to it. Many public buildings in Athens such as the Polytechnic, the old National Library and the Zappeion Hall were funded by diaspora merchants in the 19th century. When travel back to the homeland became easier, diaspora Greeks when they return to Greece, aside from going to their villages or islands they stay in Athens, visiting government officials, laying a wreath at the monument to the unknown soldier, visiting institutions they have funded such as hospitals. Major diaspora organizations such as AHEPA regularly hold their conferences or conventions in Athens.

What I would like to see would be for Athens to honor and recognize the diaspora’s strong attachment to it by establishing a diaspora museum. It could house exhibits showcasing the lives and the achievements of the Greeks around the world. Such a building would serve as a cultural bridge between the Greeks abroad and the Greeks of Greece, bring them together and help them understand each other together. And it would remind everyone that Athens is not only the city with the Parthenon and not only the capital of Greece but the capital of world Hellenism.

*Interview by: Ioulia Livaditi

The post Rethinking Greece | Alexander Kitroeff: “Greek Diaspora has affected the history of host countries around the world” appeared first on Greek News Agenda.