Dimitris Tziovas is Professor Emeritus of Modern Greek Studies at the University of Birmingham, where he taught for over thirty five years and supervised many research students. In 2022 he received the Grand Greek State Award for his contribution to scholarship. His book Greece from Junta to Crisis: Modernization, Transition and Diversity (Bloomsbury 2021) won the European Society of Modern Greek Studies Book Prize. He has served as Director of the Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies at the University of Birmingham (2000-2003), on the editorial board of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies (1995-2009; 2020-; Reviews Editor 1995-2005) and Journal of Modern Greek Studies (U.S.A 1992-2007). His most recent publication is "Ιστορία, Έθνος και Μυθιστόρημα: Τραύμα, Μνήμη και Μεταφορά" (2024). His research interests involve the study of Greek Modernism in a comparative context; the reception of Greek antiquity and Byzantium; the study of Greek fiction informed by recent developments in critical theory; Greek diaspora and travel writing; nationalism and Greek culture; the Greek language controversy; and the cultural encounters between Greece and the Balkans.

Professor Tziovas spoke to Rethinking Greece* on the duration of Metapolitefsi, the aftermath of the crisis and its impact on the (self)image of Greece, how Greek fiction proposed a critical revisiting of the past, the influence of the Greek diaspora on cultural production, why Greek cinema was successful in conversing with global cultural trends, his proposal for a "hybrid" model of analysis instead of the dualist and ‘pendulum' models that accentuate polarities in Greek modern history, and finally, on the Metapolitefsi period as an era of identities.

Beyond your academic career, you are a public intellectual that often writes on Modern Greek Studies and Greece’s image abroad. In your book “Greece from Junta to Crisis,” you mention that the recent financial crisis led to a reassessment of the Metapolitefsi era and yet another “rediscovery” of Greece from the West. Where do you think we stand on these issues today i.e. the assessment of Metapolitefsi and Greece’s (self)image?

The period following the fall of the military junta in 1974 is known in Greek as Metapolitefsi (meaning regime change), referring both to the transition from dictatorship to democracy and to the ensuing period. Though it has been praised as a period of peace, democratization and improved access to health and education, there is no agreement as to when it ends. Some argue that it ends as early as June 1975, others place its conclusion in 1989 with the end of the Cold War or much later with the economic crisis. In my view, the crisis was both a global and a local event which turned the international spotlight to Greece, judging from the number of articles in the popular press, prime-time television programmes and academic studies on the Greek crisis. Since 1974, no other event in Greece attracted such a global interest. During the crisis a frequent use of stereotypes was made either of those modelled on Zorba depicting Greeks as feckless, lazy or profligate, or the ones based on the contrast between ancient and modern Greece.

The imaginative force of Greek mythology has been repeatedly deployed to describe the trials of the Greek people in images and cartoons or in stereotypical headlines such as ‘Greek tragedy’, ‘Greeks bearing gifts’ and ‘Odyssey without end’. It is interesting to note that the connection between Ancient and Modern Greece is made by westerners only in difficult periods in order to criticize contemporary Greeks as not worthy of their heritage. In short, the Metapolitefsi starts with the euphoria of the restoration of democracy (despite the invasion of Cyprus) and ends with the melancholy of the crisis and an attempt by the country to redefine its (self)image. After the crisis Greece, together with other countries, are entering an era of polycrisis and are facing increasingly new challenges posed by the climate, artificial intelligence, migration, demography and the shortage of energy.

In Greece, literature often explored historical topics—like the Civil War—before historians did, at least until the post-dictatorship period. Does this trend still exist? How has the relationship between history and literature changed in recent decades?

The gradual transformation of Greek fiction since the fall of junta involved the erosion of the national history by highlighting marginalized events and the critical revisiting of the past. Fiction explored aspects of the historical past not touched before or followed the trend in Greek society towards diversity and the creation of space for the inclusion of the Other more closely than poetry did. The themes which have preoccupied fiction writers since the early 1990s can be classified under three broad and overlapping categories: identity and otherness, the historical past and the validity of representation, and cultural metaphors and cosmopolitanism. Novels with a historical theme do not aim to recreate the past but challenge the modalities of historiography and the truth-seeking involvement with the past. Narrativity emerged as the common ground between literature and history while the notion of mnemohistory signifies the impact of memory studies on both fields. It is remarkable the number of novels published on the Greek Civil War and its aftermath, focusing on the role of memory and highlighting the interaction between fiction and archival investigation. The emergence of graphic novels reinvigorated to some extent the historical orientation of Greek fiction which now tends to deal with current biopolitical issues.

You have noted that, during the Metapolitefsi, Greek culture became more outward-looking, with a renewed appreciation for the diaspora’s role. Can you tell us more about how the Greek diaspora’s perspective has influenced cultural production?

Up to 1974 Greece’s image was the one constructed mostly by foreign writers and scholars such as Arnold Toynbee, Henry Miller, Lawrence Durell, Patrick Leigh Fermor or Jacques Lacarrière. Following the fall of the dictatorship Greece gradually attempted a rebranding by promoting its own image and becoming more extrovert. This coincides with a preoccupation with Greekness and the publication in collective volumes of the essays by important literary figures of the 1930s such as George Seferis, Odysseas Elytis and George Theotokas. Since the 1980s the term ‘diaspora’ has been less strongly associated with a traumatic experience and has started to signify something positive in terms of its historical and cultural contribution. Diaspora writers and artists received special attention, and Greek populations were ‘discovered’ in some former socialist countries. Many writers started placing their stories outside Greece and there has been a particular emphasis on border literature. The global aspirations of the Greek nation since the 1990s changed dramatically during the crisis when Greece became once again a country of emigration, this time not of manual workers but of young professionals seeking skilled employment abroad due to the crisis. The earlier touristic image of the country as earthly paradise has been challenged and Greece has been treated as an ideological construct of the West or as a cryptocolony, even though the country has never been strictly speaking a western colony.

The push for Europeanization has made national identity an important topic, shaping Greece’s modern identity in dialogue with Europe. How do you see this relationship evolving in today’s complex political landscape?

Attitudes to Europe are central to the culture of post-junta Greece and reflect its ambivalence, ranging from Euroscepticism to fervent Europeanism. The West started to be associated more with Europe and democracy and not so much with the Cold-war identification with anti-communism. Economic and institutional Europeanization/integration have led to a preoccupation with identity since statements such as ‘Greece belongs to the West’ can be seen as identity statements. The dominance of the term ‘Europeanization’ in the political discourse raises the question as to whether we can talk about the Europeanization of Greek culture in the same way as many analysts talk about institutional or political Europeanization. On the other hand, anti-Europeanism has often been associated with populism and been represented as defying rationalism and modernization but, most importantly, culturally isolationist and unproductive.

In your books, you point out that, during the Metapolitefsi, Greek novels aimed to go beyond national boundaries, and in the past 15 years, Greek cinema has tried to do the same. Have these efforts been successful? How did these two art forms relate to broader European and international artistic trends?

Several recent Greek novels take place (partly or entirely) outside Greece or are written by Greeks residing abroad. They involve travel or migration, and they point to the increasing centrality of space, the growing role of technology and the fluidity of identities. As part of the effort of making Greek culture more extrovert there were attempts to promote Greek literature abroad, but the emphasis is no longer on national literatures but on individual writers or texts as part of a global literary network. Contemporary Greek literature lacked the emblematic figures of Angelopoulos and Lanthimos who made Greek cinema known beyond its national borders. By overcoming the earlier preoccupation with political history, the new cinema of the period of the crisis has become increasingly transnational, performative and biopolitical. The new filmmakers deconstruct the image of Greece as a holiday idyll that had been constructed by earlier films, going one step further in interrogating the notion of national cinema, trying to reach a transnational audience. In this respect, Greek cinema was more successful than Greek literature in gaining wider recognition and conversing with global cultural trends.

One of the most enduring interpretations of modern Greek identity is that of cultural dualism—between a culture of modernization and an underdog mentality. What do you think of this interpretation? Would you suggest an alternative?

Cultural and political dualism, in its various forms, has emerged as the dominant model of analysis for the post-junta period as well as the earlier history of Greece. In the early 1990s the political scientist Nikiforos Diamandouros charted the evolution of two cultures. The older of these two, the underdog culture, has been marked by a pronounced introversion, xenophobia, anti-Westernism and adherence to pre-capitalist practices. This culture competes with its younger counterpart, the modernizing or reformist culture, which has its intellectual roots in the Enlightenment and liberalism. Apart from the dualist pattern there is also the ‘pendulum model’ which sees Greek history and culture as swinging between polarities: archaism/anachronism and modernization (Vassilis Vamvakas), individual and society (Vaggelis Hatzivasileiou), catastrophes and triumphs (Stahis Kalyvas). An alternative method of analysis, based on hybridity, does not highlight polarities or the struggle for the supremacy of modernizing culture but the in-between space which involves the tension and hydridization of competing cultures or opposites. The language reform of 1976 can serve as a case in point here. On the one hand, it could be seen as a victory of modernization and on the other hand as a rehabilitation of the underdog culture and its Romeic strand. It is also interesting to note that some of those who fought for the institutionalization of the demotic language resisted the introduction of the monotonic system in the early 1980s or agonized over the decline of linguistic standards.

You define the Metapolitefsi period as an era of identities, noting that identity issues unite both phases of this period. Can you tell us more about the concept of identity, how it was expressed during the Metapolitefsi era, and how it reflects current global cultural and political developments?

First, I should point out that a classic book Keywords (1976) by the British Marxist intellectual Raymond Williams did not contain an entry on identity which was added in the second posthumous edition (New Keywords, 2005). This suggests that the emphasis on identity is a relatively recent phenomenon, and its rise coincides with the post-junta period. In Greece the prominent role of identity in various forms resulted from the major shift from politics to culture and the disentanglement of group identities from political affiliations. After 1974, Greece opened to the world and renegotiated its position and its image by looking not only towards the West but also eastward and engaging with its forgotten Balkan and Ottoman pasts. The common denominator in the fundamental questions that preoccupied Greeks during the post-junta period (how the nation is defined; who owns the past; and how the past is remembered) is the quest for identity. As a result of the critical engagement with the past and its perceived loss of stability, questions were posed about identity more intensely than ever before. The thematic shift in contemporary Greek cinema away from the grand narratives of political history to concerns about identity, sexuality and family dynamics coincided with similar transitions in social movements. Queer culture gained in visibility, while homosexuality began to be perceived as an identity and no longer just a sexual practice. In conclusion, politics might help to divide the post-junta period into phases, culture and identity draw it together, acting as its overarching metaphors.

*Interview to Ioulia Livaditi

The post Rethinking Greece | Dimitris Tziovas on Greece in Transition: Identity, Culture, and Global Engagement appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Κοstis Kornetis is Assistant Professor of Contemporary History at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. He has studied History and Political Science in Munich, London and Florence, taught history at Brown University, New York University and the University of Sheffield. His monograph "Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the 'Long 1960s' in Greece" (2013) won the Edmund Keeley prize, while he has co-edited the volumes “Consumption and Gender in Southern Europe since the “Long 1960s” (2016), “Rethinking Democratisation in Spain, Greece and Portugal” (2019), and “The 1969 Greek Case at the Council of Europe. A Game Changer for Human Rights” (2024).

Kornetis’ research is focused on the history of dictatorships in southern Europe and the social movements of the twentieth century, especially around 1968 and the 'long 60s'. Likewise, he has published theoretical reflections on transnational history, oral history and the relationship between history and cinema. His most recent line of research focuses on the so-called history of the present and analyzes the history of democratic transitions in Spain, Portugal and Greece and the collective memory built around them.

On the occasion of the celebration of the 50^th anniversary of the restoration of Democracy in Greece as well as  the impending publishing of his new monograph “A Collective Biography of Southern European Democratization,” professor Kornetis spoke to Rethinking Greece* on how Greece, Spain and Portugal experienced and remember their respective democratic transitions, the imprint of the Metapolitefsi (post-dictatorship) period in Greek culture and of course, its political legacy.

Your latest book manuscript is titled “A Collective Biography of Southern European Democratization: The Age of Transitions.” Could you tell us a bit about this periodization of three generations and its significance?

The Age of Transitions is about how Greece, Spain and Portugal remember, represent, and commemorate their transitions today beyond similarities and differences: how moments of change, and the steady acceleration of events, are reflected in memory; how the transitions solidified into settled ‘autobiographies’ of individuals, of a generation, of each nation. I expound these transitions and their afterlives according to multiple political generations, identifying missing links between stories, storytellers, contexts, and respective political generations.

Hence the book shifts the attention of inquiry from institutional breakthroughs and setbacks to political generations. As transitions are inherently ‘multi-generational’ the book looks at three distinct generations. One that went through the events of the transitions as young adults and hence remembers them fully. One with people who were children during the transitions – not old enough to have participated in the events, but old enough to hold memories of them, however vague. And a third one, which was not born then, but contains ‘projective’ (post)memories of the events that go beyond family memories and recollections. The book is largely based on people who have become academics, artists and activists, at times with an overlap between these different functions, and hence combines their own lived experience with their capacity to reflect on the events using the tools of their disciplines or craft. Several of them have worked on the very issue of transitions, hence the book operates on multiple levels of analysis. 

In the book I sought to explore the intersection between personal recollections and collective remembrance, linking democratization studies to oral history and memory studies. I look at the memory battles, or conversely the synergies, between two sets of opposing poles: between individual memory and collective memory, and between private microhistories and dominant transition narratives. To do so, I bring into dialogue historical and biographical time. The similarities in memories across time, geography, and generations are surprising, outweighing their differences. 

Generational memory, I conclude, plays a crucial role in shaping the political, social and cultural developments of the entire post-authoritarian period, affecting people’s political conclusions. The diverse memories are, the book argues, concomitant with the myriad experiences of transition; and these unique experiences, and their memories subsequently structure present political space. They determine the meaning of democracy, as well as the identities of the political Left and Right.

What do you believe were some of the biggest challenges Greece faced in transitioning to a democratic system? How did the initial years of Metapolitefsi shape the political landscape of Greece?

Greece transitioned to a full-fledged democracy after many decades of political stalemate, extreme polarization, political exclusion and violence. Its post-1974 democratization did not signify the return to the status quo ante, meaning the pre-1967 state of affairs, but rather the end of the long post-civil war period. It was the final end of the “30-year war” according to novelist Alexandros Kotzias’s acute description, himself being an emblematic literary figure of the transitional years. So Greece had to move away from the anticommunist state of ethnikofrosyni and the ‘sickly democracy’ [καχεκτική δημοκρατία] per Ilias Nikolakopoulos, into a plural, parliamentary system, that included the banned Communists after decades of persecutions. In this respect, and despite inertias, it proved to be successful – with the last chapter of the revival of the repressed being written in 1981 with PASOK’s spectacular victory. The three additional challenges being the settlement of the nature of the country’s political system, the constitutional process, and the issue of transitional justice were all swiftly and efficiently dealt with: Greece abolished monarchy once and for all, voted a liberal Constitution, and put the culprits of the 1967 coup d’état on trial and in prison. Another great success was that for the first time in the 20th century the army stayed in the barracks where it belongs. Less successful was the issue of ‘dejuntification’, or cleansing, of the police and the judicial system from authoritarian residues.

How does Greece’s experience of transitioning to democracy compare with Portugal and Spain?

These are three societies that had to deal with a different set of problems and different chronologies as far as the onset of authoritarianism is concerned, with the Iberian dictatorship being residues from the interwar years. Nevertheless, they synchronized at the time of their transitions, being faced with similar challenges as far as democratic consolidation was concerned. Portugal faced the crucial issue of the loss of its empire, propelled by a revolutionary process, hence a full rupture with the authoritarian past. Spain, on the other hand, experienced a ‘pacted’ transition, based on an agreement between regime holders and recently legalized political parties aspiring to power. This transition from within had its own complexities but was hailed for a long time as a ‘model’ transition. The greatest challenge of the new democracy were the local nationalisms – Basque and Catalan, above all, a legacy that the transition bequeathed to the present day. Greece of course had its own major issue which was the ongoing conflict in Cyprus that followed the Turkish invasion. It did not deal with this issue head on as it was of existential proportions – a possible direct involvement in warfare might have had tremendous consequences for the country as a whole. Instead Karamanalis opted for the clever move of the removal from NATO’s military wing to let off steam. However, this lack of direct engagement of sorts fuelled resentment and a lingering trauma – especially in Cyprus proper, of course.

The Age of Transitions is actually grounded in the premise that each country’s transitional process led to distinct political histories and national trajectories. These distinctions, in turn, caused major variation in how each generation remembers the transitions. How people remember the transitions and both their achievements and their setbacks matters because these people became the very subjects of democratic rule.

All three Transitions (Portuguese, Spanish, Greek) are considered as “political masterpieces”. How has this perception changed over time? Do you believe the public memory of the Transitions still plays a role in contemporary politics?

This perception has changed a great deal, especially regarding the Spanish case, which spearheaded the idea of the “model transition” which inspired the entire field of ‘transitology’ back in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. It was supposed to be smooth and peaceful but nowadays we are much more aware of the bloody aspects of that transition, with extreme right-wing and left-wing political violence ruling the day, but also institutional one lurking from the Francoist era. More importantly, Spain’s transition was based on a so-called pact of silence regarding the past and the flagrant lack of transitional justice as far as Francoist crimes are concerned. This particular issue has come to be a matter of intense debate in the past years. Portugal on its own right was considered a rare case of a revolution that was both bloodless and without an authoritarian outcome. By contrast it led to a long and stable democracy ever since 1976 and the first free elections. However, some dark aspects concerning in particular the issue of war crimes, were never tackled head-on, as the militaries who made the revolution were themselves involved in that bloody conflict that lasted thirteen years. Connected to the above was the issue of half a million refugees from the ex-colonies, dubbed the ‘returnees’ who experienced great difficulties in becoming assimilated in Portuguese society. These are all issues which were slipped under the transitional carpet. For Greece dejuntification and Cyprus remained, as mentioned above, unresolved issues.

Such issues experienced a powerful comeback in the past years due especially to a new generation of thinkers, intellectuals, politicians, activists and artists wanting to promote uneasy memories. Definitely in terms of academia there is a much more analytical and critical approach to the transitions, backed up by more reflexive writings and artwork. In all three cases the public memory of transitions became weaponized during the years of the Great Recession (2009-2015). While the hegemonic discourse transitioned from celebratory to condemnatory, we might be reaching a point of more balanced approaches. After all, fifty years since the events are always a landmark point that triggers more reflection.

What was the imprint of the Metapolitefsi period in Greek culture and arts?

If we consider as Metapolitefsi the short period of 1974-75 or even 1974-81, its imprint was great, since this was a time of great effervescence. It is a time that is very much connected to the last years of the Colonels’ regime. In music, cinema, and the visual arts, we witness the dynamism and passion of the dictatorship years being channeled into creative expression. Contestatory action was fueling the arts and vice versa. So, we need to keep in mind the fact that, even though 1974 is a rupture and a turning point politically, much of what is happening in the arts has its origins, inspiration and raison d’etre in the previous era. Both New Greek Cinema and the dawn of the Greek political song date in the dictatorship years – and the same applies to the so-called Generation of the 70s in literature, or even the burgeoning counterculture and figures such as Leonidas Christakis, for instance. The current exhibition at the National Gallery of Greece on “Democracy” charts precisely this dynamism and the suffering of the Junta years being transformed into creativity in the mid-1970s onwards. As the exhibition shows, similar traits can be spotted in the Iberian Peninsula around the time of the fall of the dictatorships as well. 

What I find interesting in the book is the revival of certain political and aesthetic norms during the Great Recession (2009-2015) in Greece. The political or éngagé art had a comeback, or an afterlife – in a way several artists felt the need to go back to codes of a time of rupture and renewal to deal with a time of stagnation and crisis.

What do you think is the legacy of the transition in Greece?

The legacy of the transition is twofold. The present stable parliamentary system that managed to overcome grave crises has its roots in those very days, including the Constitution, which has remained basically unaltered. The ‘big bang’ of the Metapolitefsi, in historian Antonis Liakos’ fitting term, generated the socio-political plurality that characterized Greece in the following decades. I don’t share the negative appraisals of the Metapolitefsi which dominated the 2010s, identifying it with corruption, cronyism, clientelism and populism, to name but a few examples. Even though such traits existed and continue to exist, I doubt that they are the main characteristics of Greek democratic practice – to quote Robert M. Fishman's term– from 1974 to the present.

The second one has to do with the dual nature of the Greek transition: it bore from the very outset both the legacy of the Polytechnic uprising in November 1974, which discredited Papadopoulos’ ‘liberalization’ ‘from below’, and the actual collapse of Ioannidis’ junta on 23-24 July1974, that triggered regime change ‘from above’. The abundance of social movements during the first Metapolitefsi years and the continuous symbolic significance of the Polytechnic till the present-day attest to that dual significance. What is more, much of what happened in the first Metapolitefsi years and in a way shaped Greek democratic practice was moulded through these characteristics. In my book I quote legendary left-wing composer Mikis Theodorakis boasting in 1975 about Karamanlis’ above-mentioned withdrawal of the country from NATO’s armed wing, as being a left-wing demand all along. It is this dialogue between Left and Right, the government and the movements, unheard of until that moment, that can and should be catalogued alongside the Metapolitefsi characteristics – and why not, a legacy that should be rescued.

*Interview to: Ioulia Livaditi

Read also from Greek News Agenda:

• Rethinking Greece|Christina Koulouri on half a century of Greek democracy: “The greatest achievement of Greek democracy is its resilience”

The post Rethinking Greece | Kostis Kornetis on the Democratic Transitions of Greece, Spain, and Portugal: Memory and Legacy appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

In 2024, Greece commemorates the 50th anniversary of the fall of its military dictatorship (1967–1974) with a series of exhibitions reflecting on the nation's journey from repression to democracy. These exhibitions explore the social, political, and cultural impacts of the dictatorship and its collapse, offering a window into this pivotal period in modern Greek history. Key exhibitions include “1974. From Dictatorship to Democracy” at the National Library of Greece, which chronicles the struggle against the regime and cultural and societal shift of the first years of the Metapolitefsi; “City of Athens 1974 & 1944 – Athens Celebrates its freedom” honoring two crucial milestonesons, the 50 years since the restoration of democracy in July 1974 and 80 years since the liberation of Athens from the Nazi occupation in October 1944 and finally, “Democracy,” an art exhibition at the National Gallery of Greece that explores artistic responses to the struggles against authoritarian rule and pursuit of democracy in 1960s-70s Greece, Spain, and Portugal.

National Library of Greece: "1974. From Dictatorship to Democracy"

The National Library of Greece (EBE), the General State Archives (GAK) and the Greek Broadcasting Corporation (ERT) are co-organizing an exhibition in celebration of the 50-year anniversary of the Metapolitefsi (post-dictatorship) period, entitled "1974. From Dictatorship to Democracy," taking place from July 17 to December 31, 2024 at the National Library of Greece.

The exhibition presents unique archival evidence and rich audio-visual material on the dictatorship as well as the anti-dictatorship struggle, outlining the major institutional changes of first year of the Metapolitefsi period, but also the grand scheme changes in the social and cultural landscape of the country, up to the first years of the 1980s.

National Broadcaster ERT participates in the exhibition with material from its archive, including, among others, 100 photographs, 240 minutes of audio-visual material, censored documents from broadcasts and news, 20 vinyl records, etc. The National Library of Greece participates with material from its Collections, which mainly includes newspapers, magazines and books (over three hundred items in total). The exhibition is accompanied by a 288-page color catalogue, which is a publication of the National Library of Greece, edited by Stavros Zoumboulakis.

The artistic curation of the exhibition has been undertaken by Vassilis Zidianakis and ATOPOS, who invited the visual artist Alexis Fidetzis to present the installation "Phoenix Canariensis" on the ground floor of the National Library, posing the question: How does one present the continuity of archives through the plastic language of visual arts?

As the president of the National Library of Greece, Stavros Zoumboulakis notes: “Let us repeat the undeniable: the unprecedented, in Greek history, period of untroubled democratic life spanning half a century, was entrenched in those first few months of the Metapolitefsi. The Metapolitefsi is not merely the restoration of a pre-dictatorship Republic, but also the transition to a new period of a full democratic life.

We all know its three most critical achievements: the army’s return to the barracks, the end of the Monarchy, and the abolishment of Emergency Law 509. It was all carried out swiftly and dutifully by the first post-dictatorship national unity government and the first Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, who undoubtedly played a pivotal role, as well as by dint of the forceful demand of mass democratic movements.

But no one can appreciate the significance of the Metapolitefsi without knowing about the dictatorship, its violence and its vulgarity. We want our exhibition to be one of memory and education, aiming to convey to its visitors, and especially to school pupils, both the horror of the Dictatorship and, most importantly, the belief that the Metapolitefsi of 1974 is a major political achievement. In a country with such high rates of self-pity, let us hold that fact in mind with a certain amount of pride.

In the purely political and institutional field, the Metapolitefsi lasted a few months, until the end of the year or, at the extreme, until the passage of the new Constitution in June 1975. But beyond that purely political and institutional Metapolitefsi, there is also a social and, even more so, cultural Metapolitefsi, whose limits cannot ever be strictly defined. What is for certain is that the wind of political change began to blow strong in the final years of the dictatorship, as early as 1970-71, with that unprecedented publishing boom, but was brutally interrupted by the junta of Ioannidis that seized power on 25 November 1973. In the summer of 1974, the country’s intellectual world picks up the severed thread once again and extends it, dynamically and with optimism. In the field of cultural Metapolitefsi, the exhibits of our exhibition stretch as far as the early 1980s."

The President of the General Archives of the State, Dimitris Sotiropoulos commented that this exhibition brings together individual memory and the historiographic record. The exhibition, which spans the three floors of the EBE at the SNFCC, will run until 31 December 2024. Admission is free and the public can visit the exhibition every day of the week from 09:30-20:00.

City of Athens “1974 & 1944 | Athens Celebrates its freedom”: 50 years since the restoration of Democracy & 80 years since the Liberation of Athens

The year 2024 marks 50 years since the restoration of democracy in July 1974 and 80 years since the liberation of Athens from the Nazi occupation in October 1944. The City of Athens, in a spirit of unity and collaboration, is honoring these two crucial milestones for the country’s journey to freedom and democracy, as well as the struggles of the Greek citizens for national independence, by organizing a series of events called “1974 & 1944: Athens celebrates freedom”. The program, aiming to highlight the city’s vibrant historical memory and initiate a dialogue with our modern history is being designed and carried out by the City of Athens Culture, Sports and Youth Organization (OPANDA) and the Technopolis City of Athens, featuring a wide array of events and artistic and educational activities, which will take place until the end November.

The major historical exhibition “1974 & 1944: Athens celebrates freedom”, which is the centerpiece of the City of Athens’ celebrations, is hosted at the OPANDA Arts Center, in Eleftherias Park. The venue, with its buildings of profound historical and architectural value, is part of the memorial site of the old junta Detention and Interrogation centers. From July 22 to October 28, the grand historical exhibition, a joint effort of the Technopolis City of Athens, the Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI), and the General State Archives, commemorates this double anniversary.

Divided into two major sections, dedicated to the events of 1944 and 1974 respectively, the exhibition narrates a journey from darkness to light, from the extreme cruelty of the Nazi occupation to the frenzied celebration of the first days of freedom, and from the brutality of the junta to expectations born of the fall of the authoritarian regime. Through rare photographs, audio-visual material, documents, newspapers, posters, works of art, notices, personal items and rich archival material, the more than 500 items in the exhibition "1974 & 1944: Athens celebrates its freedom" the exhibition highlights the collective historical memory and the popular struggles for freedom and democracy, focusing on the feelings of hope and joy that these generate and the same enthusiasm that accompanied the Athenians both on the festive days of 1944 and 1974.

At the same time, the exhibition cannot but to unite joy with sorrow, redemption with pain, relief with agony, as the double holiday outbreak was weighed down by both the shadow of the Decemberists and the fear of civil war in 1944, as well as the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

Visitors discover, among other things, evidence from the period of the great famine of 1941 in Athens, audiovisual material related to the arrest and torture practices of the junta, an installation with personal stories of three women of the Resistance who sacrificed themselves for the liberation, and also an installation dedicated to the 25 murdered activists of the Polytechnic Uprising.

And on the other hand, in the center, unique impressions from the river of people that on the day of liberation in 1944 flooded the flag-decorated streets of the capital with songs and dances, flyers, banners and improvised posters full of festive slogans, celebratory front pages for the triumph of democracy, snapshots of hugs with those who returned from places of exile.

Some of the bitterest moments of Athens' modern history join its happiest, in a unique exhibition that is a tribute to two different eras and two different worlds united by the same city, Athens, but the common demand of its inhabitants for democracy and freedom, the collective dream for a better life.

The exhibition, which ends on October 28 and has free entry, is surrounded by talks, discussions, screenings, special guided tours by the exhibition's curators, educational programs, exhibitions, theatre, music, dance, theatrical and historical tours, activities for children and schools as well as an insert of contemporary dance and dance performances. See here for the detailed program of events.   

National Gallery of Greece: “Democracy”

As nearly half the world goes to the polls in 2024 in a historic year of elections, the National Gallery of Greece in Athens unveils a timely exhibition on art, social change, and democracy. This is the first major exhibition to explore artistic responses to the struggles against authoritarian rule and pursuit of democracy in 1960s-70s Greece, Spain, and Portugal. It marks the 50th anniversary of the restoration of democracy in Greece.

Featuring 140 works by 55 artists, brought together in collaboration with the Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía – MNCARS, Museu d’Art Contemporani de Barcelona – MACBA, Centro de Arte Moderna Gulbenkian, Centro de Estudos Multidisciplinares Ernesto de Sousa and private collections from Greece and Portugal.

Running from 11 July 2024 to 2 February 2025, this is the first major international exhibition to examine the political role of art during the pivotal period in Southern European history as Greece, Portugal and Spain transitioned from authoritarian to democratic rule during the 1960s to 1970s.

The large-scale presentation brings together 140 masterpieces by 55 artists and artist groups, showcasing a diverse range of styles, perspectives, and practices. It explores how artists were inspired by and depicted the struggle against the era’s dictatorial regimes and the new cultural expressions and creative practices that evolved during the pursuit of civil liberties, including the rise of critical realism and abstract art, as well as the emergence of performance and conceptual art.  The formation of artistic collectives, the art of protest in posters and prints, the politics of the body and the involvement of art in the public sphere all underscored the demand for democracy in the realm of the arts, providing a vibrant field for creative research and activity.

The National Gallery aims to reflect on the current socio-political state of the world and its resonance with the conflict and turmoil of 1960s and 1970s Southern Europe. Against the backdrop of a historic year of global elections and challenges to democratic values, the exhibition traces the shared cultural experiences, emotions, and trauma shaped by disruption, acts of protest, defiance, and resistance, that are just as relevant today as they were fifty years ago.

Syrago Tsiara, Curator and Director of National Gallery says “We proudly present our landmark exhibition on Democracy and Art in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, showcasing powerful artistic responses to repression and the fight for freedom. This exhibition prompts reflection on our historical experiences, achievements, and their impact on our collective identity and future. Amid rising extremist voices, declining voter turnout, and growing scepticism towards institutional credibility, it serves as a poignant reminder of the ongoing need to defend democracy. In these challenging times, museums and art play a vital role beyond solace, empowering profound engagement with imagery, ideas, and critical questions that shape our social interactions and coexistence.”

The exhibition explores themes of ‘Facing the Enemy’, ‘Resistance’, ‘Uprising’, and ‘Arousal’ through  a range of artistic mediums, including sculpture, painting, engraving, posters, video, performance art, as well as theatre and literature and runs until 02.02.2025

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Rethinking Greece|Christina Koulouri on half a century of Greek democracy: “The greatest achievement of Greek democracy is its resilience”

I.L.

The post A nation’s journey: Three major exhibitions highlight the legacy of 50 years of democracy in Greece appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Christina Koulouri is Rector of the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences and Professor of history, specialized in Greek, Balkan and European History of 19th-20th centuries. She has studied at the History and Archeology Department of the University of Athens, the Sorbonne University (Paris I) and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris.

In 2010 she was a visiting researcher at the University of Sorbonne (Paris 1 –UMR IRICE), in 2017 Visiting Research Fellow at Princeton University and in June 2019 Visiting Fellow at the University of Regensburg (Germany). She has been awarded the Nikos Svoronos award "for outstanding achievement in the research of modern Greek historiography" (1994), the "Delphi" award of the International Olympic Academy (2012) and the Dimitrios Vikelas award of ISOH (International Society of Olympic Historians).

Professor Koulouri has published 8 books, 5 collective volumes and many articles in Greek, English and French, on issues such as history of nationalism, history of memory, history of sports and of the modern Olympic games, history of education and textbooks, reconciliation and peace education. Her latest book "Fustanellas and Togas. Historical Memory and National Identity in Greece, 1821-1930" (Φουστανέλες και χλαμύδες. Ιστορική μνήμη και εθνική ταυτότητα, 1821-1930, Athens, Alexandria, 2020) was awarded the Anagnostis Prize and the State Essay Prize.

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Restoration of Democracy in Greece, Professor Koulouri spoke to Rethinking Greece* on the Metapolitefsi (the period of transition after the fall of the military junta in 1974) and its values; the social and cultural changes that occurred in Greece during that period; the importance of Greece's EU membership; the political and social impact of the 2008 crisis; the ever-changing but still vivid memory of the Metapolitefsi, and finally on the achievements of the past and the challenges of the present and future for Greek Democracy.

Discussions on the 50^th anniversary of the Restoration of Democracy in Greece cannot but examine the concept of the Metapolitefsi. How would you define Metapolitefsi, chronologically but also in terms of the values ​​it embodies?

Metapolitefsi literally means regime change and in this sense, it is identified with the period 1974-1975, from the fall of the colonels’ regime to the adoption of the Constitution and the Trials of the Junta. However, the term has come to denote a broader period whose beginning is known but whose end is disputed. In my opinion, the period ended with the 2008 financial crisis, when the political system was reshuffled, and the achievements of the previous historical period were questioned. At the same time, we can identify political cleavages within the Metapolitefsi period, which correspond to domestic and international events. In terms of values, the Metapolitefsi is identified with the democratization of Greek society at all levels and therefore refers to the values ​​associated with Democracy. Politically, this period is identified with PASOK, so it’s no coincidence that its ending also marked the political decline of PASOK, while the other major party, New Democracy, survived the political upheavals of the 2010s.

What were the most significant social and cultural changes in Greece during the Metapolitefsi period? How did Greek society evolve?

The euphoria following the collapse of the junta was reflected in every form of activity, characterized by what we could call a joy of life, especially during the optimistic 1980s. Democratization of family relations and education, changes in women's status, and sexual liberation marked profound social changes, bolstered by Greece's outward orientation, its entry into the EEC (later the EU), and rising living standards. In education, democratization meant changing the power relations governing the system and providing all young people with access to education, regardless of social or geographical background or gender. The publication of KLIK, the first lifestyle magazine in 1987, marked a shift towards conspicuous consumerism and a fantasy of social mobility. However, it wasn’t only social identities that were rearranged; since the 1990s Greek society enters a sort of identity crisis, which equally affected national identity, political identities as well as other collective identities. New collectives formed around cultural identities, such as those defined by traumatic memory (like the Pontians) or gender (like the LGBTQ+ communities), transcending the divide between "left" and "right," and intersecting with the political crisis post-2010.

How did international events and global geopolitical developments affect the course of the Metapolitefsi in Greece?

A small country in Southeast Europe like Greece is inevitably influenced by international developments at all levels and is less resilient to global shocks. The end of the Cold War found Greece in the Western bloc, avoiding thus the dramatic transformations of Eastern bloc countries, but still affected the country in two ways: firstly, by neighboring Balkan countries' aspirations to join organizations like NATO and the EU, and secondly, by a massive wave of economic migration to Greece. In the first case, issues like the new Macedonian question over the name of (now) North Macedonia, Kosovo's independence, and relations with Albania posed many challenges. The so called name issue, in particular, plagued Greek foreign policy for decades and wasted precious resources, while domestically it fueled conservative reactions, exacerbated by the immigration wave. Racist rhetoric and xenophobic violence strengthened the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, and although its parliamentary representation was curtailed following its trial, far-right and fascist ideologies survive, subtly infiltrating other areas. As long as wars rage nearby, peace remains precarious both externally and internally.

What was the impact of Greece's EU membership on the country's course? How has the Europe-Greece relationship transformed over these decades?

Greece's EU membership has been pivotal in many respects. Joining the EEC in 1980, soon after the transition to democracy and following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, was seen as a guarantee of political stability. The EU set specific requirements and conditions for Greece's membership, leading to many institutional adjustments; it also offered economic support for development projects (the "Delors packages", the Community Support Frameworks etc). Moreover, European integration offered Greece significant advantages, ranging from the right of free movement in other EU countries without many formalities and foreign currency exchange, to the country’s participation in shaping supranational European policies. However, these benefits were questioned when the financial crisis struck in 2008 and during the bleak 2010s. Greece's relationship with Europe was tested by austerity policies and memoranda, increasing Euroscepticism. The 2015 referendum saw 38.69% in favour of the “we are staying in Europe” supporters, as opposed to 61.31% against. This result, however, should not be seen as an expression of a genuine desire to sever ties with Europe but as a protest vote against the severe austerity measures imposed and the dramatic increase in poverty.

How did the 2008 economic crisis affect Greek democracy and political stability? Do you believe the political fallout from this period has been addressed?

The economic crisis facilitated the rise of the so-called "anti-systemic" votes at the expense of the two parties that governed during the Metapolitefsi, i.e., New Democracy, and PASOK. The June 2012 general elections marked the shakeup of the political system, with New Democracy getting 18.85% (down from 33.5%) and PASOK just 13.18% (down from 43.9% in 2009), while the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn entered parliament for the first time with 6.97% and 21 seats. Turmoil continued with the collapse of SYRIZA in the May 2023 elections, a party that absorbed the social protests of the crisis era but was "punished" for failing voters' initial expectations. The real casualty of the crisis seems to be the two-party system that characterized the era of the Metapolitefsi. This can be evidenced by the current political scene where we have a strong leading party and a fragmented opposition; however, the political tradition of two opposing “camps” has not disappeared. It remains to be seen if the center-left will regroup or if the parties to the right of New Democracy will be further strengthened.

How has the memory and significance of the Metapolitefsi changed over time and across generations? Do you believe the historical memory of this period still plays a role in contemporary Greek politics?

As long as we believe that the era of the Metapolitefsi has not yet ended and for lack of a new term for the period that has succeeded it (in the event that we believe that the Metapolitefsi is ineed over), talking about collective memory is challenging. It's about the memory of specific events (e.g., the Athens Polytechnic uprising in 1973, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, PASOK's victory in 1981, joining the euro in 2001, the 2015 referendum etc) recalled by those who experienced them because they define their identity. And since we are talking about different generations with vastly different historical experiences, memories differ, and construct different identities. Given that the "Polytechnic generation" that ruled the country during the Metapolitefsi, is considered responsible for the financial crisis, younger generations who found themselves in the midst of the crisis hold a rather negative historical memory of the period. However, the negative assessment of the era is not only a generational issue, but also a matter of political identity. Criticism of the era’s policies mainly stems from right-wing positions, as a reaction against what was considered the ideological dominance of the Left. Indeed, the Metapolitefsi as a historical period has been invested with specific meanings and refers to particular values ​​associated with the Left. Hence, the memory of the Metapolitefsi lives on, through political ideologies and prominent figures in politics and culture.

Looking back, what do you consider the greatest achievements and weaknesses of Greek democracy over the last 50 years? What challenges do you think it will face in the future?

The greatest achievement of Greek democracy is that is has endured. This is no small feat for a country with a history of military interventions in politics, authoritarian deviations, dictatorships, civil wars, and regime changes. It's also notable that democracy withstood the shocks of the economic and political crisis and the threat of far-right extremism. However, issues of transparency, accountability, corruption, and clientelism persist. Recent tragic events highlighted the state's operational gaps. Democracy faces numerous challenges, present and future. Democracy is not a given; it is vulnerable to unforeseen threats—both domestic and international—making protective mechanisms and a cultivated democratic consciousness among citizens crucial.

*Interview to: Ioulia Livaditi, Translation: Magda Hatzopoulou

The post Rethinking Greece|Christina Koulouri on half a century of Greek democracy: “The greatest achievement of Greek democracy is its resilience” appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Yiannis Voulgaris is Emeritus Professor of Political Sociology at Panteion University. His scientific and research work is mainly focused on the fields of political science, modern Greek politics and the theory of globalization. Among his publications are the books “Greece: A Paradoxically Modern Country” (2019), “Post-Metapolitefsi Greece 1974-2009”, which has also been translated to German ('Politische Geschichte Griechenlands Parteien, Institutionen und politische Kultur vom Fall der Militärdiktatur bis zur Wirtschaftskrise') and “Greece from the Metapolitefsi to Globalization”. His essays and articles focus on issues of democracy, the State and civil society, globalization and historical sociology. His books and articles have been published in Italian, German and English. Voulgaris was a founding member of the Archives of Modern Social History (ASKI), has served as the Director of the Centre for Political Research at Panteion University, and recently as a member of the Greece 2021 National Committee. He contributes articles to national media publications on a regular basis.

Professor Voulgaris spoke to Rethinking Greece* on modern Greece as a success story; the Greek state’s crucial contribution to the modernization of the country; the long-lasting consequences of the "twin birth" of the Modern Greek State as a democracy; how the national goals that arose from our quest to 'catch up' with ‘Europe’ have shaped today’s Greece; the reaffirmation of the country’s European orientation as the "conclusion" reached by the vast majority of citizens that experienced the crisis; the defining role of Geopolitics and the autonomy of politics as macro-historical features of our national evolution, and finally, how Greece has always been exposed to the sharp turns of History and what this means for the goals the country needs to set for the future.

Earlier narratives that focus on modernization in Greece are characterized by a relatively pessimistic undertone. A more recent trend in Greek historiography argues that the modern Greek state has been a success story. What is your view on the issue?

Indeed, the "national narrative", during the post-war and early post-Metapolitefsi period has been formulated in negative terms. Greece was a case of backwardness, underdevelopment, dependence, or, to put it mildly, a delayed, distorted and incomplete modernization. Historical conditions can explain this negative assessment. Greece was the only country in Western Europe that experienced a Civil War as well as a dictatorship in the post-war period. It thus stood out like a negative exception to the "European rule", that is, to the standard established by developed countries, and the various "schools of thought" had a different interpretation as to the causes of this backwardness. Marxists insisted on economic causes and dependence, liberals on cultural causes and the nationalists-conservatives on the injustices that the country suffered occasionally “from foreigners”.

This negative narrative began to change from the 1990s onwards, as historical circumstances changed. Democratic institutions had been consolidated, EU and EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) membership by then a reality and society was enjoying an unprecedented prosperity. The fall of Soviet communism retroactively disproved the notion of another better model that the country could have followed in the 20th century. At the same time, globalization widened the field of comparison. Previously, Greece was being compared to the most developed countries of in the West; now, the scope of comparison enveloped the entire planet. It was therefore natural to revisit the national narrative under a different perspective, more realistic and ultimately less negative, utilizing the new scientific approaches in history and sociology. We can therefore say with certainty that Greece is not among the "losers" of Modernity. On the contrary, it stayed – with discontinuities and transitions – on the path that brought it, as it wished, closer to the developed and democratic countries; to the "civilized nations" as they were called in the 19th century. It was able to absorb the advances and the great social transformations of Modernity, although it assimilated their easier aspects rather than those that required more complex changes and structures (such as industrialization). In this process, the Greeks themselves bore a great deal of political responsibility for both successes and failures, contrary to the self-victimization stereotype and the myth of the "wronged and dependent nation" that attributed failures to foreigners.

This new national narrative, this new national self-awareness has made great strides in society, but it has faced, and is still facing, two "enemies" from two opposite sides. The first is "banalization" – if I may use this word. By this I refer to some "interpretations" that fall into a historically naive and reassuring description of successes and failures and happy endings as a rule, without searching for their root causes, neither highlighting the dramatic conflicts along the way. The second is the regression to previous patterns of thought. The recent economic crisis brought back outdated schemes, either of the Marxian "Greece is a debt colony" type, or of the elitist "we are an underdeveloped country" type. These perceptions are not about the actual revival of such lines of thought, that are scientifically obsolete, but about the repetition of stereotypes which always outlive scientific theories.

There is a widespread belief in public opinion that the Greek state has always been clientelistic, oversized, inefficient and almost an obstacle to the economic and social development of the country. In your book "Greece: a paradoxically modern country" you propose a different assessment. What is your approach?

I have characterized the State as the "wronged protagonist" of our national development because it has been considered the pre-eminent culprit of the "delayed" modernization in both Marxist and liberal interpretations of the "Greek case". In public discourse, moreover, the State is identified with Public Administration and its typical problems, while in reality the State is a broader concept and carries out broader functions. I do not deny its negative aspects, but I believe at the same time that it contributed greatly to the modernization of the country. Indeed, it functioned as a conduit for European and international knowledge, expertise, and functions that exceeded the capabilities of society. This is what I mean by the term "paradoxically modern country". Historically, the driving forces of the country's modernization were primarily Politics, Geopolitics and modern Institutions. In contrast, capitalism and industry contributed less, as they did not go beyond the micro-scale.

It should be noted that in the long term the Greek State has been parliamentary and democratic. Greece is indeed an interesting case of "early democratization" that has been poorly studied as such in international comparative political sociology. The peculiarity is that the Greek State was created almost from scratch and was almost immediately democratized; we are one of the first countries in Europe to adopt universal male suffrage as early as 1844. Our case was very different to that of the rest of Europe, where long-established aristocratic classes continued to control the state throughout the 19th century, while at the same time the new bourgeois forces that would later dominate the state were beginning to emerge.

This "twin birth" of the Modern Greek State as a democracy had long-lasting consequences. We were used to emphasizing the negative ones: widespread clientelism, the tendency towards political polarization and partisanship, the weight of populism that, as we know, accompanies all modern democracies like a shadow. But equally important were the positive consequences. We established an impressive parliamentary and constitutional tradition. After all, our national political life was not determined by the micro-politics of clientelism, but by the great national goals we set from time to time.

You claim that Greece’s outward orientation played a significant role in determining these goals, correct?

Precisely. These goals always arose from our quest to 'catch up' with those ahead – namely, 'Europe'. In this strategic pursuit (catch up strategy) Greece reaped the benefits of a historical 'dividend'. Ancient Greece was a focal symbol in the formation process of the modern Europe of nation-states, and conversely, modern Greeks were flattered but at the same time anxious to appear worthy of their "ancestors". It was a complicated relationship, but, in any case, it helped that the new national consciousness, "Greekness", was associated right from the beginning with "Europeanness"; it provided a peripheral country like Greece with a strong compass.

How can we join all of the aforesaid together? I have summed up my analysis with the phrase "we are a geopolitical, historical, democratic and small-medium nation". That is to say, the state and the trans-national relations in our region, the historical dividend and early democratization, all these factors, gave shape and structure to a micro-capitalist society, explaining both its successes and setbacks.

In established interpretive schemes of the "Greek case", such as those of political dualism and modernization, particular emphasis was placed on the modern / traditional dichotomy. In your book "Greece: a paradoxically modern country", however, you talk about the ‘modernizing’ functions of tradition. Can you elaborate?

I was not talking about a specifically Greek phenomenon; sociology, history and political economy have dealt with this in many cases. It has been observed in societies going through a transformational phase, that their traditional "communitarian" elements, be it the family or local networks, can serve modernizing goals. To give you two examples: The traditional family can encourage social mobility by investing in the education of its younger members; or, it can ease the social tensions that emerge during the transitional period of moving from the countryside and adapting to life in the city. Also, family and local networks can help entrepreneurship, usually micro-entrepreneurship. All three happened inPost–Civil War Greece.

But at this point I would like to underline an issue that I consider important. Usually, the modern/traditional dichotomy, as presented in analyses based on cultural dualism, calls to mind the East- West dilemma, an ambivalence that traversed the intellectual life of modern Greece. In reality, the "East", whatever meaning it may have acquired at various times, was never truly an option for Greek society, and even less so for its political leaders. But it was used as a concept that summed up cultural resistances to modernization, or criticisms of modernity. Resistances and criticisms constantly accompanied the emergence of the Modern World everywhere, even in developed societies, and that was not because they were remnants of tradition, but anxieties reproduced concerning the risks of modernity. In this sense, such resistances can serve as a reminder of these dangers.

If the "long" Metapolitefsi began in 1974, with the fall of the dictatorship, and ended in 2008, with the beginning of the financial crisis in Greece, what are the characteristics of the period we are going through now? Can we speak of a dominant political culture like that of the Metapolitefsi period?

Greece suffered in a unique way, and experienced the international financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis of 2010 extremely traumatically. It was not a conventional fiscal crisis, nor an ordinary debt crisis. The statist-corporatist development model of the Metapolitefsi essentially collapsed, and along with it, the structure of organized interests that it had produced, as well as the informal intergenerational social contract; incomes fell dramatically and Greece’s place in the EU was at risk. Society was divided, political polarization reached unprecedented -since 1974- levels, and for a period of time the democratic "acquis" of the Metapolitefsi period was called into question. Unlike in other countries that had also signed Memoranda [bailout programs/economic adjustment programmes], the Greek political system did not find a way to reach a general consensus, so that time spent under financial supervision would become shorter and the relevant social costs reduced. Only from 2016 onwards, when all three major political factions had each signed their own memorandum, did political tensions begin to de-escalate.

Since then, some common perceptions have been and are still being formed in society, the most basic of which is the widespread acceptance of Europe and the euro. Essentially, this perception defines the framework for exercising public economic policy for any party that aspires to govern. In a sense, the reaffirmation of the country’s European orientation was the "conclusion" reached by the vast majority of citizens that experienced the crisis. But also in the crises that followed – the corona virus, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis – broad majorities were formed according to opinion polls as well as observed attitudes. I think that Greek society is more mature, rational and European than we often think, although there is always the risk of derailment.

But can we speak of a "dominant political culture"? I think not – or not yet, for two reasons. First, because the world and international politics are going through a period of great risk and uncertainty. In circumstances of international tensions, Greece usually “imports” these tensions and there is no present or emerging "zeitgeist" that would facilitate convergences at the national level. Second and most important, because the party system and party antagonism that took shape in the aftermath of the 2012 elections has become a self-contained factor of polarization and animosity in our national life. We are, I think, at a strange point: as if society is seeking to tame a fierce and divisive partisan rivalry that has no basis in reality. The issue is that this autonomy of politics is a macro-historical feature of our national evolution; sometimes this worked to our advantage, sometimes to our detriment. Today it works to our detriment by prolonging this divisive atmosphere and civil-war rhetoric.

 

There is an anxiety about Greece's place in the world, which seems to have influenced many of the questions asked by Greek social scientists as they try to determine Greece's position in the context of international hierarchies. What do you think is Greece's position and prospects in today's geopolitical environment?

From what we’ve discussed, I believe that the course of this country is characterized by uncertainty, as it is exposed to the sharp turns of History. We experienced this in the recent Eurozone crisis and it would be a good idea to keep it in mind as a lesson. Precisely because Politics, Geopolitics and the quality of Leadership have always played a decisive role in Greek history, we are always exposed to their contingency. We did not have, nor do we have now the safety net of a dynamic economy, for example, to make up for political failures; nor of a public administration that can operate with continuity in periods of political instability or absurdity like those we experienced recently.

In short, Greece is not marching straight towards Progress, nor has it bought a ticket to Hell. But it is going through an era of intense uncertainty, which should serve as a warning, because there are two dangers. The first, again, concerns the international context. We have seen that "Europe" has historically functioned as a factor that bolsters the modernization and extroversion of our country. Today, however, we do not know what weight this Europe will have in the new World that is coming, nor whether the democratic, liberal and progressive values will dominate within it. The second danger concerns the internal situation. Even if Europe finds its way, even if the international framework is balanced, Greece may find itself trapped in the low ranks of the European Union and the global hierarchy. The sources of concern are well known. The productive system remains introverted, lacking in technology, and heavily dependent on private consumption and tourism. Moreover, structural problems are added to all this which can lead to decline. The ecological crisis can take threatening forms in the Mediterranean. The demographic issue will result in an aging society if not addressed in time. Despite successive cuts, the Greek social security system’s long-term viability remains tenuous. I believe that the new national goal for the mid-21st century is to address these risks. We can achieve it, under the condition that we improve our political discourse and party antagonism and upgrade our national reform agenda.

* Interview to: Ioulia Livaditi, Translation: Ioulia Livaditi, Editing: Magda Hatzopoulou

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Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos is Professor of Contemporary Political History at the Department of Administrative Science and Technology of the University of Peloponnese. He is Greece’s representative at the Observatory on History Teaching in Europe of the Council Europe and the general editor of New Hestia (Νέα Εστία), a Greek literary magazine that has been on circulation since 1927. His recent publications include "Phases and contradictions of the Greek state in the 20th century, 1910-2001" (in Greek, 2019) and Political and Cultural Aspects of Greek Exoticism (co-edited with Panayis Panagiotopoulos, 2020).

Professor Sotiropoulos spoke to Rethinking Greece* on the success story that was establishing the modern Greek state ‘from scratch’ since 1830, the importance of capable elites and mature societies in overcoming crises, the concept of “Greek exoticism” and the ambivalence of the ‘Western’ gaze on Greece, how the country has ultimately managed to benefit from its geopolitical significance, and how Greek ‘syncretism’ has historically enabled the country to course correct. Sotiropoulos suggests that the next strategic goals for Greece should be the implementation of a new productive model and bold reforms in higher education and public administration; finally he proposes that the "Greek life", the art of living well, is a concept that we should further develop and utilize to stand out as an advanced country that has as a priority the well-being of its people.

Your work could be considered as part of a new trend in Greek historiography and political science that argues that the modern Greek state was a success story, making a sharp break from previous schools of thought (theory of dependence, "clientelistic state") and perceptions of “Greek exceptionalism”. Would you like to tell us more about your approach?

Indeed, recently, national literature on the Greek state has been enriched with 4-5 new studies by historians and political scientists which break away either from the classic scheme of foreign dependence, or from our "beloved" Greek exceptionalism. However, this new perception that has since become prevalent and tends to describe the Greek example as a "success story", should not be misunderstood as a simple attempt to move the pendulum from the old self-flagellation to a tardy self-admiration. This is not about that. After all, there are other examples of nation-states in Europe that have had a very successful trajectory in the course of time, and we do not hold exclusive rights to success.

To begin with, the concept of success is always relative. It is determined, first of all, by the starting point and the prospects that opened up at the birth of a new nation-state. Let me just remind you that neither the Revolution of 1821, which seemed defeated as early as 1825, nor the Greek state itself, whose creation was completely unanticipated, was a cause in which one would initially bet one's money. And yet, for various reasons, the Revolution achieved its goal, despite its limited resources and civil wars, and what is more, the new Greek state managed, albeit its very small size, to stand on its own two feet and gradually adopt institutions that were pioneering for its time.

And not only that, this new state will manage in the process to integrate in its territory, more than double its original size areas and populations, in many cases in fact, thanks exclusively to the organization and implementation of its own (and not foreign) plans for the realization of the Great Idea (eg as in Balkan wars). The very fact of the administrative and social integration of all these new areas and populations (and later of more than one million refugees) in the Greek territory is a feat in itself and it should not be taken for granted just because the populations integrated were Greek.

In fact, there is an even more important parameter: in contrast to the French Revolution, which inherited from the monarchical regime an organized state and institutions with a long history, the Greek state is called to be established from scratch. And yet it succeeds, in the beginning thanks to the foreign elites who take over its government, but also thanks to domestic groups of power, part of whom in fact prove to be very capable in modernizing the state. Because our current observatory is one of a time of great turmoil for the Greek state, there is a tendency to focus on bankruptcies, dictatorships and civil wars, which have not been few during these past two centuries. However, it is worth remembering that such episodes are not absent from the history of almost any modern state, including the most powerful. The major question is whether a state has capable elites and mature societies to overcome such crises and recover. And these variables were present throughout all phases of the Greek state.

In your contribution to the book you co-edited, "Political and Cultural Aspects of Greek Exoticism" you analyze historically the patterns of "Greek exoticism", noting that it emerged more strongly as a phenomenon in times when Western cultural projections for Greece met the geopolitical interests of the 'great powers'. Did this also happen during the financial crisis of 2010? Is the latest version of "Greek exoticism" different from its previous incarnations?

Greek exoticism is certainly a form of Orientalism, however with important particularities, since Greece was considered by other Europeans (and by Americans) as the cradle of Western civilization, whether as the West of the East or the East of the West. Thus, their gaze was always ambivalent: on the one hand idealizing and with excessive expectations from the "descendants" of Aristotle and at the same time dismissive and partly arrogant, not only because they were disappointed by the domestic scoundrels who probably did not look much like the great ancient philosopher, but also because they never stopped operating in acold-blooded manner, seeking to advance the expected priorities of any Great Power.

Thus, when geopolitical necessities prevailed in times of intensifying international competition in the region, such as in the 1820s, 1910s, or 1940s and 1950s, the dominant cultural projections were adapted accordingly. At the same time, however, due to the complex significations that accompany, as we said in the beginning, "the Greece paradox", movements were created internationally against "xenocracy" (i.e. foreign rule) in the country. The small country of Greece, as a "geopolitical nation" and as a symbol of democratic fantasies, has been frequently transformed into a site that prefaced international developments.

During the 2010’s Greece became such a site where international developments were played out: on the one hand, its bankruptcy and its weak productive model highlighted the structural problems of the single currency, so its expulsion from the Union looked like it could be a resounding warning for the rest of the eurozone PIGS; at which point the cultural projections from the West were the well-known stereotypes about the lazy people and kleptocrats of the South. On the other hand, populists everywhere (on the Right or the Left), anti-Europeans, etc. projected here all their confessed and unacknowledged desires for the collapse of capitalism, the EU, the euro, "bourgeois democracy", and so on.

Thus, foreigners of the extreme Right and the extreme Left suddenly found themselves together in defence of domestic drachmists (those who supported the re-introduction of the drachma) and the –exceptionalist in their view of Greece– Indignant Citizens Movement (the Greek ‘Indignados’) who imagined Greece as the Cuba or Venezuela of the Balkans. These foreigners, found in the modern ruins (and innocent victims) left behind in Athens by the great anti-memorandum demonstrations of the time, and in the general social deregulation, the corresponding ruins that European Romantics were looking for in the archaeological landmarks of the 18th and 19th century, with indigenous peoples living in poverty and ignorance, waiting for outside enlightenment to understand who they were. I do not honestly see how this paternalism differed from that of the "imperialists" of the past.

 

You often use the concept of "anti-imperialism without colonialism" to describe a -at least until recently- popular perception in Greece of 'foreign intervention' in the country. Although Greece never really colonized, some analysts speak of "crypto-colonialism." Do these post-colonial approaches have anything useful to tell us?

Greece has never been neither a colony nor a crypto-colony. Other factors are required to characterize a regime as colonial, such as those established in India or in African countries. First of all, foreigner powers had little economic interest in Greece over time. What characterized the country from its formation was a charged relationship with the Great Powers of each era. First and foremost because, as we said earlier, the Great Powers themselves projected on the country their own fantasies and expectations of modern Greece as a heir to antiquity, and the small state has not always been able to meet these expectations.

Secondly, geopolitical interest in the region has been very high over time. In fact, Greece has oftentimes served as the "advanced outpost" of the West in major international conflicts, both in the 19th and 20th centuries. So, these interventions and interferences in the country’s internal affairs by the Great Powers created this whole sense of "xenocracy" (foreign rule). In turn, this perception has been politically and ideologically instrumentalized from time to time by domestic political forces that wanted to present themselves as anti-systemic. It should also be noted that because the Greek state, in the context of the Great Idea, viewed the Cyprus issue as its own affair and because Cyprus was indeed under colonial rule, this sense of anti-imperialist struggle, especially after WWII, was -somewhat vicariously- further strengthened.

The main problem with "anti-imperialism without colonialism" is precisely that it reinforces this feeling of being an underdog, which can permeate small nations of the periphery, creating a sense of perpetual victimization by the powerful. In other words, it creates a collective mindset of miserabilism and defeatism or, vice versa, one of the perpetual resistance fighter. On the other hand, reality is much more complex, because the interventions of the Great Powers were not continuous; furthermore very often it was the Greek side that had asked for their assistance and protection from external dangers or from its occasional bankruptcies, protesting when they denied it, or when they expected something in return - as was natural on their part.

However, whenever the Greek state managed to stand on its own two feet and organize its own developmental or diplomatic plans, utilizing international politics prudently and methodically, it was never hindered by foreigners in its success. Finally, I do not see how a country that has managed to more that double its territory and population in a century, to be one of the fastest growing countries of the developed world and to belong in all the major international organizations, can claim to be a victim of colonialism.

In your book "Phases and Contradictions of the Greek State" you mention that Greece's path to modernization –like that of other countries– looks more like a zigzag than a straight line, and is based more on syncretism rather than on the clash between traditional and modern elements. Could you expand on that?

We usually tend to blame our modernization woes on the absence of a bourgeois class, a perception has more to do with the Marxist origins of our thinking. But what was missing from Greece was actually an aristocratic class, because otherwise, a kind of bourgeois commercial class, and in fact one with a pan-European and pan-Mediterranean scope of action, had existed since the 18th century. But, with the possible exception of the Phanariots in Constantinople and the nobility of the Ionian Islands -who were later incorporated into the newly formed Greek state- there was no upper class whose presence would create clear class delineations from the rest of the population.

Due to this absence, a sort of class uniformity was imposed, which did not particularly allow for social discrimination. At most, social discrimination was limited to the differences between urban and rural areas, or between the illiterate villagers and the ‘schooled’ people of the city, mainly in the 19th century. From the 20th century onwards, the steady upward mobility that characterized Greek society was aided by precisely those family strategies of investing in education and schooling as well as in (mass) immigration to urban centers. At the same time, the aversion of the popular classes to proletarianization led to the creation of this ocean of ​​petty bourgeoisie and small business entrepreneurship that characterizes modern Greece.

To get to your question, a constant feature of the petty bourgeoisie is its versatility and even more so its eclecticism. The petty bourgeois makes, in other words, a selective use of elements from both tradition and modernity. For example, in order to maintain his communitarian references, he organizes his cities as small villages, while at the same time, in order not to miss the ‘train’ of development and its benefits for his life, he basically votes for politicians who make sure that the country will keep up with the West. Accordingly, the political class has to simultaneously fuel clientelistic relations, at the same time as it is called upon to conceive and develop modernization plans of high expertise that can stand up to Western standards. As one understands, this balancing act is difficult and sometimes dangerous, hence sometimes we fail. Greek syncretism, however, offers the advantage of course correction, and we have seen this in a number of cases, such as in 1974, 1989 or 2015, to limit myself only to the period of Metapolitefsi.

In your work you emphasize the importance of strategic and modernizing goals that have been embraced by governments, elites and the majority of society at various pivotal historical phases. What could such a ‘big’ strategic goal be now?

Over the course of two centuries of a Greek nation-state, some major modernizations project have been: the modernization of the state and the army in view of the Great Idea; the distribution of lands in a rural, low productivity economy; the integration of refugees during the interwar period; the reconstruction of the economy to escape from under-development in the post-war period – alongside the priorities of the ‘state of emergency’ that was post-civil war Greece; and more recently, the restoration of democracy along with the strengthening of social rights.

What is needed today, after the prolonged crises of national integration in 1821-1922, the crises of democratization in 1922-1974, as well as the great economic crisis of the last decade, is a new productive model. This is absolutely necessary, on the one hand because almost 1/3 of GDP has been lost in the recent economic crisis; on the other, because globalization and the 4th Industrial Revolution, in addition to the pandemic’s aftermath, are creating new global upheavals for which states must prepare, if they don’t want to lose out in this competitive environment. I am absolutely convinced that this will not be possible without bold reforms at all levels of education -especially higher education- as well as in public administration. We can do everything else right, but if we do not enact changes in those areas, whatever other plans we make, they will always be subverted.

The digitization of public services due to the health crisis already constitutes a big leap ahead. This is very promising, because, among other things, it is a given that from now on, states will be called upon to respond more and more frequently to crisis and emergency situations, due to health or climate crises. All this is not temporary, let us realize it as soon as possible. Reforms are also underway in secondary education, but the universities need to be radically restructured so that they can function as incubators of the new professional specialties that will be required in the 4th industrial revolution. We can not even imagine how much our world will have changed in 10-20 years from now, so it does not make sense for us to still deal with issues from the '80s or the ‘90s, such as university squatters.

On the other hand, it is very important that we, as a state and as a society, leave our own mark in how we manage this technological revolution. Do we have to offer something singular, besides the basic and necessary adjustments that we should make anyway? I believe that our contribution has to do with this kind of "Greek life" that was not unjustly deified by foreigners in the 60's, but that we have lost since then, due to other priorities. It is the result of the combination of a stunning landscape – on the islands as well as on mainland Greece, a mild climate, a relative lightness in the way of dealing with life situations, a "cosmopolitanism" that emerges from tolerance and openness, a love for some of the more immersive arts, such as theater or song, as well as a socially inclusive model of sustainable development.

These above traits have wrongly been identified with Zorba's persona, we are not talking about this penchant for the picturesque and for colourful aesthetics. We are talking about all that makes those who visit Greece fall in love with the country; these are traits that will not only bring tourists but more importantly, talented foreigners who want to live and create here, do business, research, art. The organization of everyday life may henceforth be based on technology, but the art of good living will remain what marks the difference between a balanced and an unbalanced life. If we manage to adapt our culture and institutions around this approach, I believe that we will be able to stand out as an advanced country that has as a priority the well-being of its people.

*Interview and translation: Ioulia Livaditi

The post Rethinking Greece: Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos on the modern Greek state and its ability for success and course correction appeared first on Greek News Agenda.