George Prevelakis is Professor Emeritus in Geopolitics at the Panthéon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1), Research Professor at CNRS (UMR Géographie-cités), Distinguished Visiting Professor at Hellenic American University and Archon of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. He specializes in European, Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitics, in Diasporas and in Physical Planning. After leaving Greece in 1984, he has occupied teaching and research positions in Paris, Baltimore, Boston and London. During the academic years 2003-2005 he served as the Constantine Karamanlis Chair in Hellenic and Southeastern European Studies at the Fletcher School (Tufts university). He has served twice, in 2013-2015 and 2019-2023 as Greece’s Ambassador to the OECD.

He has been active in international media and think tanks on questions related to Balkan security and Geopolitics and is a frequent op-ed contributor to the Athens dailies Kathimerini and Ta Nea.  Among his latest publications are, “Pourquoi une nouvelle Entente balkanique?” (2010), “Who are we? Geopolitics of the Greek identity” (2017), "Wooden Walls” ("Ξύλινα Τείχη," in Greek, 2020) and “In the OECD: Geopolitical Theory and Diplomatic Action” (2024).

In this interview with Rethinking Greece* professor Prevelakis explores the evolving landscape of geopolitics and its impact on international organizations, arguing that the era of globalization is receding, with non-economic factors like religion and geopolitical tensions regaining prominence. He advocates for a "new Western doctrine" that balances acknowledging Western contributions with historical reflection and cooperation. He highlights the growing importance of seas and oceans in economy and in geopolitical strategy and proposes that Europe embrace an "archipelago" model of interconnected entities linked by sea, pointing out that Greece could be playing a leading role in this future, due given its maritime geography, historical engagement with seafaring, and robust merchant marine. Professor Prevelakis also discusses demographic shifts as drivers of history and population geography as a significant long-term factor influencing the evolution of humankind. Finally, he argues that smaller nations like Greece can leverage multilateral organizations through bold strategies, an example of which is the establishment, during his tenure, of the OECD Population Center in Crete, as a critical institution to address global challenges related to population dynamics.

You have served two terms as the Ambassador of Greece to the OECD. In your book, “In the OECD: Geopolitical theory and diplomatic action” you highlight the importance of geopolitics in international relations. How does the primacy of geopolitics, and what you call the “revenge of history and politics” affect OECD’s mission and priorities?

There is a growing consensus among experts that the contemporary world is undergoing a period of profound transformation, precipitated by the election of Donald Trump but rooted in gradual developments over the preceding years. The post-Cold War era is coming to an end, giving way to a dramatic reversal of conditions and values.

The previous era was characterized by an increasing openness to global circulation. Individuals could travel with relative ease, capital flowed across national borders, commerce flourished, and information was exchanged with minimal restrictions. These developments were encapsulated by the concept of globalization, a phenomenon extensively theorized by scholars such as Francis Fukuyama. In 1989, at the height of these transformations, Fukuyama published his seminal essay The End of History, positing that ideological conflicts would wane and that the world would move towards political and economic homogenization. This idea suggested that the "End of History" would coincide with the "End of Geography," as globalization was expected to transcend national and cultural distinctions. In this envisioned world, adherence to rules would take precedence over the exercise of force, with the enforcement of these norms largely dependent on the actions of a benevolent superpower—the United States.

However, this ideological framework proved to be flawed. One of its consequences was the marginalization of traditional geopolitical approaches. This oversight contributed to several miscalculations and failures in Western interventions worldwide, particularly those led by the United States. To comprehend the complexities of contemporary global developments and to devise effective strategies, a balanced approach that integrates legal, economic, and geopolitical analyses is essential.

While globalization has yielded numerous benefits, including remarkable economic growth and a reduction of global inequalities, it has also generated significant challenges. New forms of inequality and exclusion have emerged, exacerbating socio-economic disparities. The multiple crises of the past decade can, in part, be attributed to the unintended consequences of unregulated global flows. In response, the world is now shifting in the opposite direction, transitioning from integration to fragmentation and diversification. Non-economic factors are playing an increasingly prominent role in shaping global dynamics. Religion, for instance, has re-emerged as a crucial force in both domestic and international politics.

This shift from an economic-centric discourse to one emphasizing geopolitics was not initially anticipated within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Along with a few colleagues, I sought to introduce geopolitical considerations into OECD discussions, often encountering resistance from an audience primarily composed of economists. However, ambassadors from countries that perceived themselves as directly threatened by post-imperial powers—such as Japan, Poland, and the Baltic states—were particularly receptive to these perspectives.

Despite the OECD’s predominant focus on non-geopolitical issues during my tenure as Ambassador, both the organization and its predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), were originally conceived with a clear geopolitical rationale. Economic initiatives were not ends in themselves but rather means to achieve broader geopolitical objectives, including containing the Soviet Union and fostering positive relations with developing nations.

In the current global context, the OECD has the potential to play a pivotal role by re-engaging with its geopolitical foundations. This would not constitute a fundamental revision of its mission but rather a return to its original purpose, which had been overshadowed by the illusions of the past era. By embracing its geopolitical potential, the OECD can contribute more effectively to addressing the multifaceted challenges of today’s world.

The rise of China and other non-western powers is challenging the traditional dominance of the West; you argue that the world is entering an era of dichotomy between “the West and the rest” and you call for a ‘new Western doctrine’. What would this doctrine focus on? How would it work to ease the aforementioned division?

The relative economic weight of Western nations is diminishing, while many developing countries have experienced rapid economic growth. Consequently, the global economic balance of power is undergoing a significant transformation. Many non-Western countries increasingly assert their influence and express growing criticism and resentment towards Western powers.This critique is not without merit; historically, Western nations have often treated the rest of the world with exploitation, arrogance, and, at times, outright cruelty. However, while these grievances are justified, the resulting anger and resentment risk fostering division and could potentially lead to a breakdown of international cooperation.

A growing discourse surrounds the emergence of the so-called Global South, or even a broader Global South and East. This concept, rather than reflecting an empirical reality, appears to be constructed as a means of unifying opposition to Western dominance. Unlike the West, which has developed a degree of cohesion through institutions that facilitate cooperation, the Global South and East lack a comparable common framework. In fact, key nations such as China and India remain engaged in significant geopolitical conflicts. Given these internal divisions, it may be more accurate to refer to this grouping as the Rest rather than as a unified entity.

The increasing dichotomy between the West and the Rest presents significant risks for the World. Addressing this divide requires the development of a coherent ideological and political framework. A "new Western doctrine" should first and foremost adopt a balanced perspective on historical relations. It is essential to navigate between the extremes of traditional Western arrogance and the tendency to deconstruct Western history in a manner that disregards its significant contributions to human progress. In this regard, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) could provide an appropriate institutional setting for fostering such dialogue.

Given the multiple contemporary threats facing humanity—including existential risks—it is imperative to prioritize intellectual and political efforts aimed at fostering collaboration. Constructive engagement between the West and the Rest cannot be achieved without a well-conceived ideological and political foundation, supported by a conducive institutional framework. The persistence of aggressive, unilateral approaches to global challenges is unlikely to alleviate tensions. In contrast, a collective and cooperative strategy is more essential than ever in addressing the complexities of the modern international order -or disorder.

In your book “In the OECD: Geopolitical Theory and Diplomatic Action” you emphasize the growing importance of seas and oceans. Could you expand on that concept and outline its advantages?

The seas and oceans have played a fundamental role in human history. Naval battles have decisively influenced the rise and fall of empires. Through maritime routes, ideas have circulated globally, and religions have expanded their influence. The sea enabled the Greeks to extend their cultural model across the Mediterranean, laying the foundation for Western civilization. Spain, Portugal, England, France, and other European nations later replicated this Greek maritime and colonial expansion on a global scale due to their naval prowess.

Today, the significance of the sea is greater than ever before. In addition to its historical role in navigation and trade, technological progress and economic growth present new maritime challenges. The increasing ability to extract resources from greater oceanic depths has transformed the sea into not only a medium for transportation but also a significant source of valuable materials. Consequently, maritime domains are acquiring characteristics traditionally associated with land, leading to territorial disputes over maritime areas. The concept of the "territorialization of the sea" encapsulates this evolving reality, which has profoundly impacted geopolitical relationships, such as those between Greece and Turkey in recent decades.

The maritime economy is expanding at a much faster rate than that of continental regions. Food production, mineral extraction, and energy generation have become prominent additions to traditional maritime industries, such as transportation. The expansion of global trade in the era of globalization has led to remarkable growth in the merchant marine sector. The Greek-owned fleet, in particular, has benefited significantly from the new opportunities presented by a more interconnected world. Simultaneously, the merchant marine has played a structural role in globalization. The advent of containerization and technological advancements in shipping have exponentially increased the capacity for transporting energy and goods, facilitating the rapid economic growth associated with globalization. While globalization has largely resulted from political decisions aimed at reducing trade barriers, the efficiency and fluidity of maritime transportation have been crucial in enabling its success.

Despite its economic benefits, rapid global growth has led to severe environmental challenges, with the maritime domain playing a central role in these developments. On the one hand, the world's oceans face significant pollution, much of which originates from land-based sources. The increasing concentration of populations in coastal cities has exacerbated this environmental degradation. Beyond pollution, climate change also poses a serious threat to oceanic stability. Rising temperatures alter the physical conditions of marine ecosystems, triggering a cascade of climatic and environmental disruptions.

The growing strategic importance of maritime domains, combined with shifting geopolitical trends, has intensified global focus on naval power. The principle of freedom of the seas, once considered secure, is increasingly contested. Recent crises, such as Houthi attacks on more than 60 vessels in the Red Sea, the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on grain shipments through the Black Sea, and U.S. President Donald Trump's remarks regarding the Panama Canal, underscore the fragility of global maritime security. These challenges have profound implications for the global economy.

The control of sea lanes and the strategic use of naval power—whether for offensive or defensive purposes—have long been fundamental to military strategy. However, in the emerging post-globalization era, naval capabilities are gaining even greater prominence. Heightened geopolitical tensions have led major powers, including the United States and China, to significantly expand their naval investments.

Finally, an essential yet often overlooked dimension of maritime significance is its role in digital infrastructure. A vast amount of global data transmission occurs via undersea cables that connect continents and nations. This digital interconnectivity further reinforces the strategic and economic importance of the maritime domain in the contemporary world.

In summary, the seas and oceans are central to global economic, environmental, and geopolitical dynamics. As new technological and strategic developments emerge, maritime domains will continue to shape the course of international relations and economic development in the twenty-first century.

Why do you advocate for Europe embracing the "archipelago" concept of interconnected entities linked by sea? How do you see Greece leveraging its maritime heritage and geographic position to lead in this paradigm shift?

With the exception of certain seafaring nations such as Britain, the geographical perspectives of most Europeans have been predominantly continental. The role of Germany in shaping geographical theory cannot be underestimated. Maybe under this influence, the European project, which emerged after the Second World War within the strategic and geopolitical framework of the transatlantic alliance, has gradually assumed a more continental character. Following the end of the Cold War, numerous Central European countries joined the European Union. Alongside the reunification of Germany and Brexit, these geopolitical transformations have significantly altered the European Union’s spatial configuration. Consequently, the Union’s center of gravity has increasingly shifted toward the east and the north, distancing itself from the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

This ongoing trend toward the continentalization of Europe may become even more pronounced if the war in Ukraine concludes with a relative victory for Russia and if the United States adopts a more isolationist foreign policy. Through both gradual and abrupt changes, the European project risks diverging from its foundational values.

Historically, Europe’s global influence in the 19th century and its role as a pioneer of civilization were largely shaped by its engagement with the seas and oceans. Europe’s openness, its spirit of adventure, and the curiosity of its populations were fundamental to the development of a distinctive culture—diverse yet unified by an outward-looking perspective.

Geography has played a crucial role in shaping this historical European trajectory, a process that can be traced back to Ancient Greece. Contrary to the modern perception of Greece as a land-based entity, the Ancient Greek world was a network of small regional entities interconnected by the sea. This spatial organization reflected the archipelagic nature of Greek civilization. The Ancient Greek Archipelago was not solely composed of islands but also included coastal plains separated by mountains and linked by maritime routes.

Europe has largely followed the Greek model. From a physical geographical perspective, it also possesses an archipelagic structure. The European continent, particularly to the east of the Elbe River, consists of peninsulas and regions connected to the seas and oceans via river networks, thereby embodying an amphibious character. Much like Greece, this archipelagic Europe has historically been politically fragmented. This division fostered a spirit of competition, exploration, and freedom. Conversely, the more continental values that characterize the eastern parts of Europe, including the vast Russian landmass, have traditionally been more conservative, hierarchical, and less inclined toward adventurous endeavors.

At the current European crossroads, the question of choosing between a continental or maritime orientation has resurfaced. The contemporary trend toward global fragmentation and increasing competition among major geopolitical blocs may suggest that a continental stance offers greater security. This dilemma echoes the ancient debate attributed to Themistocles: should the "wooden walls" serve as a fortification behind which protection is sought, or as ships that provide mobility and opportunity? Europe now faces a critical decision—whether to capitalize on the growing importance of maritime dynamics or to retreat behind its continental boundaries. Will it position itself as a continent or as an archipelago?

This debate holds particular significance for Greece. Given its maritime geography, historical engagement with seafaring, and robust merchant marine, Greece is naturally aligned with an archipelagic vision of Europe. From a strictly geopolitical perspective, however, Greece occupies a precarious position between its traditional maritime allies (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) and the nations that may assume a dominant role in a continentalized Europe (Germany and Russia), with which Greece maintains strong ties through its membership in the European Union and religious links.

Nonetheless, Greece has the potential to play a pivotal role in shaping the future character of Europe. Its historical connections to the wider oceanic world, its longstanding tradition of dialogue with other Mediterranean civilizations, and its diasporic culture equip Greece with unique capabilities to contribute to Europe's openness.

Additionally, the significance of the Greek merchant marine provides the country with a strategic advantage in both global and European affairs. However, to fully leverage its archipelagic strengths, Greece must work to mitigate the continental tendencies embedded within its state culture.

You consider population movements as the driving force of history. What are the main challenges demographic issues pose in this current conjecture?  Considering the growing significance of diasporas, how can Greece better engage with its global diaspora to support its geopolitical and economic objectives?

Population geography is arguably one of the most significant long-term factors influencing the evolution of humankind. Demographic developments, closely linked to physical geography, health conditions, migration patterns, and population densities, account for many of the forces shaping historical trends. These trends manifest in both short-term phenomena, such as the impact of invasions, and long-term transformations, exemplified by the rise of historical powers like ancient Egypt or contemporary China.

In the present era, one of the most pressing challenges is the unprecedented speed of demographic change, which rapidly alters established equilibria. A striking example is the demographic shift between Europe and Africa. In 1950, Europe's population was more than twice that of Africa. Today, Africa’s population is approximately double that of Europe, and projections for 2100 suggest that Africa may have between five and six times as many inhabitants as Europe. Demographic trends are dynamic and often unpredictable, influenced not only by material conditions, which are relatively easier to forecast, but also by cultural factors, such as matrimonial behaviors, which shape population growth and structure.

The imbalances created by rapid demographic shifts generate migration pressures. Population movements are also driven by climatic factors and geopolitical tensions. Migrations are contributing to instability within host societies. This phenomenon is reflected in the growing support for right-wing political parties in various regions.

In the previous era, that of globalization, migrations played a significant role in fostering economic growth in host countries, despite political tensions. Diasporas have become increasingly important in the global economy, both as results and as agents of globalization. However, it remains uncertain to what extent this trend will be affected by political decisions influenced by rising xenophobic attitudes.

Given these dynamics, it is evident that population challenges are critical for the future. There is an urgent need for comprehensive research and analysis of population dynamics to formulate effective national and global policies. Such policies should aim to mitigate tensions, preserve the benefits of migration, and develop strategies to protect vulnerable populations.

Regarding the Greek diaspora, numerous efforts have been made to integrate it into the strategic initiatives of the Greek state. However, most of these efforts have not yielded significant results. Notably, little research has been conducted to analyze the reasons for these failures. Instead, similar strategies and rhetoric are repeatedly employed, often leading to predictable outcomes. The decision to live in the diaspora frequently stems from dissatisfaction with conditions in Greece. Consequently, unless these underlying conditions change, the diaspora's potential contributions will remain constrained. In this context, the issue of meritocracy is particularly critical in shaping the relationship between the diaspora and Greek academic institutions.

Despite the challenges posed by state policies, the Greek diaspora continues to make substantial and positive contributions to Greece’s broader trajectory. It fosters openness within Greek society and enhances the perception of Greeks—and, at times, Greece itself—within host countries.

In your book, you showcase how a smaller nation like Greece can effectively leverage its position within multilateral organizations like the OECD, emphasizing the importance of bold initiatives, and the "strategy of the weak." Could you expand on that strategy?

In a multilateral organization such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the principle of equality among member states is firmly established, irrespective of population size or economic strength. All Permanent Representatives possess an equal voice and the same capacity to take initiatives. However, while no external barriers hinder member states from proposing bold initiatives or influencing the strategic direction of the Organization, internal constraints often arise. Smaller member states, in particular, may experience a sense of inferiority that leads to self-censorship.

Paradoxically, smaller member states have a greater need to adopt bold strategies compared to their larger counterparts. Only through such an approach can they overcome their inherent disadvantages. The concept of a "strategy of the weak"— borrowed from guerrilla warfare—can be applied to diplomacy. In the absence of substantial political or economic weight to rival that of larger states, smaller nations must act in unexpected ways, leveraging surprise to counterbalance their limitations. These initiatives must be striking in order to attract attention and maximize their impact.

The objective of such initiatives is not only to secure strategic advantages but also to enhance the country’s image. A pertinent example is Greece's bid for the position of OECD Secretary-General through the candidacy of Anna Diamantopoulou. Although Greece was ultimately unsuccessful, despite Diamantopoulou’s strong performance, this effort was not in vain. The campaign significantly altered perceptions of Greece within and beyond the OECD at a time when the country’s international reputation was at a low point. Greece transitioned from being seen as a passive recipient of foreign support and advice to a nation actively seeking leadership roles within the Organization. This ambitious campaign laid the groundwork for two subsequent successful initiatives that further enhanced Greece’s image: Kyriakos Pierrakakis’s election as President of the Global Strategy Group and the OECD Council’s approval of Greece’s proposal to establish the OECD Crete Population Center.

In the contemporary global landscape, a country’s image plays a crucial role in shaping economic, political, and geopolitical decisions. In the economic domain, investment decisions are particularly susceptible to perceptions and reputational considerations. Similarly, political and geopolitical choices are often influenced by subjective evaluations. By navigating an international organization with creativity and strategic acumen, a country can actively shape its global image. However, the strategic imperatives of smaller and larger countries differ fundamentally. While larger states tend to adopt more conservative approaches to safeguard their established positions, smaller states must assume greater risks to distinguish themselves and emerge from the constraints of relative obscurity.

One your biggest achievements as Greece's Ambassador to the OECD was the establishment of the OECD Center for Populations in Crete. How does the Center aim to address global challenges related to population dynamics, and what contributions will it bring to the OECD's existing work? What benefits does Greece, and the island of Crete, anticipate from hosting this center?

As previously discussed, population dynamics represent one of the most significant—if not the most critical—challenges facing contemporary societies and the global community both today and in the future. However, there is currently no institutional framework capable of examining and conceptualizing this issue in a holistic manner. Various aspects of population studies are addressed in separate disciplinary contexts. For instance, demography is studied independently from migration, while the economic consequences of population decline on the workforce are analyzed in a different academic field than the political implications of migration. There is a lack of a comprehensive perspective on the spatial distribution of populations, their dynamics, and migratory flows. Furthermore, cultural aspects are not sufficiently integrated with economic conditions, particularly in cases where demographic expansion occurs without corresponding economic growth. Finally, no systematic provisions exist to address emergencies affecting populations under stress or persecution.

Given the vast scope of this field, the need for a centralized hub to integrate the study of various facets of population challenges is increasingly urgent. This necessity led to the proposal of establishing such an institution in Greece. Any new institution requires a strong symbolic foundation, and Crete was identified as an ideal reference point for a global population center. Positioned between Europe, which faces a declining population, and Africa, which is experiencing rapid population growth, Crete symbolizes the essential connection between different demographic trends worldwide. Historically, Crete has served as a cultural crossroads, having been inhabited or influenced by Minoans, Mycenaeans, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Venetians, Ottomans, Jews, and others, making it a powerful emblem of coexistence. Additionally, Crete occupies a significant place in human history and is recognized as a cradle of maritime navigation.

The OECD Crete Population Center, while situated in Greece, is not a Greek institution. This arrangement aligns with OECD principles, which dictate that its centers operate under OECD management and leverage its intellectual and political resources without becoming « nationalised ». Greece’s role is to serve as the host nation, facilitating the center’s operations. For the Crete Population Center to attain global significance, it must fully engage OECD resources, ensuring that it fulfills its intended role on an international scale.

Greece and Crete stand to benefit from the OECD Crete Population Center only if it evolves into a genuinely international hub. The annual conference that the center is mandated to organize must develop into a major global event in order to attract significant international attention to Greece and Crete. Achieving this objective, however, requires substantial resource mobilization by the OECD, which, at present, appears to be insufficient. Consequently, the OECD Crete Population Center currently relies on Greece’s limited financial, intellectual and human resources. By tolerating thus the « nationalisation » of its Crete Population Center, the Secretariat of the OECD has undermined the decision of its Council to create it.

President Trump’s recent statements regarding Gaza have forcefully revived the debate on population transfers, a historically significant issue that gained prominence following major global conflicts. Notable examples include the Greek-Turkish population exchange after the First World War, the large-scale transfers of German populations following the Second World War, and the displacement associated with the partition of India.

In this context, a well-established and influential OECD Crete Population Center would have served as an appropriate forum for such discussions. Had it been developed as originally envisioned, Crete might today be a focal point of international diplomatic attention.

*Interview to: Ioulia Livaditi

The post Rethinking Greece | George Prevelakis on geopolitics, OECD, population dynamics and an “archipelago Europe” appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

The new composition of the European Parliament and, above all, the new European Commission, as it will be formed, will reflect the results of the recent elections and will have to manage a number of very important issues; in many cases, it will be necessary to do so in a very decisive way.

Think tanks diaNEOSis and ELIAMEP have collaborated to publish a report with four expert analyses under the title "Challenges and opportunities in the new political cycle of the European Union" (pdf, in Greek). These papers provide a detailed examination of the major challenges post-EP elections in four critical areas: defense, EU enlargement, economic governance and the Stability Pact, and asylum and migration policies.

These are all "hot" policy areas, which require an urgent, European response. As Professor Emeritus at National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, professor at Sciences Po and chairman of the board of ELIAMEP, Loukas Tsoukalis, writes in his introduction, emphasizing the need for these challenges to concern the citizens collectively, "a European public space, multinational and multilingual, is not is now a utopia. On the contrary, it is the condition for all of us to build our common home in Europe, in combination with more decisions in European councils that will be taken by majority".

 Defense

The war in Ukraine brought defense issues as a common European issue to the fore. The text on defense is signed by Spyros Blavoukos, professor at the Athens University of Economics and head of the European program "Arian Kontelli" of ELIAMEP, together with Panos Politis-Lamprou, assistant researcher at ELIAMEP. Their analysis presents the joint defense initiatives before 2022 - with the Maastricht treaties in 1993 and Lisbon in 2007- and goes on to analyze the recent Versailles declaration, signed just two weeks after the start of the war, and how it is being implemented.

Of course, despite the steps taken, many challenges remain. These are mainly related to the financing of the various initiatives, their institutional organization, but also their political management. And of course, how these initiatives can develop into an integrated European defense policy. But where does Greece stand in this context? "The developments create an important window of opportunity for Greece," the authors argue. "For the first time, the EU is investing strongly in the defense industry and is discussing a common defense. Given the geopolitical conditions prevailing in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, strengthening this prospect must be a priority for our country, which must continue to be in the vanguard of the EU member states in this field, without neglecting its national deterrent military capabilities."

Enlargement 

The war in Ukraine was also a catalyst for the enlargement of the Union. As in the previous phases of EU enlargement, so today, the respective reasons and concerns are both political and economic, which becomes evident by looking at the list of candidate countries for membership after 2023, whether they have started negotiations or not : Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis, signed by the associate professor at the University of Macedonia, Ioannis Armakolas and the journalist Alexandra Voudouri, both collaborators of ELIAMEP, highlights and comments on the challenges of a possible new enlargement.

How will it affect Union budgets? Which countries are likely to lose European funds because of new members? How feasible is it for the candidate countries to immediately proceed with the institutional and economic reforms required by the accession process? "The EU needs to offer a credible 'road map' for the deeper integration of candidate countries in the coming years, as well as clarity about its own path for the necessary reforms," ​​the authors note. "There should be, after all, a common approach linking reforms and enlargement in a gradual way, as well as a mechanism to 'measure' the corresponding progress."

 Economic governance and the Stability Pact

 The great importance of a functioning and effective European economic governance became known in Greece in the previous decade of the crisis, often painfully. But it became more widely recognized in the Union, especially after the introduction of the euro, that at least a degree of coordination of national fiscal policies is required for the stability of the new currency. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) introduced in 1997 and based on the Maastricht Treaty is the key tool: it sets limits on the budget deficit and public debt of member states. Of course, it has not remained unchanged since the 1990s, nor has it ever been followed to the letter by all countries. In 2008, 2011 and 2013 it changed with the global crisis and then with the euro crisis. In 2020 it froze and changed again with the pandemic crisis, while from the spring of 2023 a new framework has been adopted.

The analysis by Athens University of Economics and Business professor George Oikonomides looks back at the past of European fiscal rules, but also analyzes the most recent update of the SGP. Commenting on how this will affect Greece, he notes: "Among the positives of the proposed revision of the SGP as far as the Greek economy is concerned, one could note the exemption of public debt service interests from the new operational index – although public debt service interests low right now for our country, they are expected to increase significantly after 2032. Finally, the exemption of defense expenditures (as our country exceeds the average corresponding EU expenditures) or the exemption of other investment expenditures will be important, if implemented, as this will add degrees of flexibility to a particularly tight national fiscal framework."

Immigration

A few weeks ago, on May 14, the European Council adopted a new framework for the management of refugee and migration flows, the Pact on Asylum and Migration. This new framework, which consists of ten legislative texts, regulates the management of migration flows, ensuring both the external relations of the EU with the rest of the world and the internal balances between the member states.

It is well known fact how charged a topic immigration and refugees are in the countries of the European Union - something that was confirmed anew by the recent election results. In her enlightening text, Maria Gavouneli, professor at the Faculty of Law of the Greek National Academy of Sciences and general director of ELIAMEP, comments both on the main impasses of the past in managing of immigration, as well as on the main pillars of the recent Pact. It explains in detail what this means for guarding borders, for asylum procedures, for solidarity between countries in managing flows, but also for the integration of migrants.

Of course, many very important challenges remain. "The debate on immigration as a challenge, a problem, a natural phenomenon, an economic necessity, a social parameter, is an integral element of the political discourse and ultimately of the political confrontation, not only in developed countries but also in the Global South," the author of the chapter underlines. "As the pre-eminent destinations of refugee and migrant flows, European countries, and thus the European Union, act as a laboratory for political, social and ultimately legal experimentation. The Pact on Asylum and Migration is just that: an experiment. It is obvious that the proposed approaches and the possible solution are as demanding in their conception and implementation as the real problem they seek to address. We are still at the beginning of the complex legal and political management of a phenomenon that is absolutely related to human history."

I.L. translated from diaNEOSis article by Ilias Nikolaidis

The post Expert Report: Challenges and Opportunities for the new political cycle of the European Union appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Asteris Huliaras is Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of the Peloponnese, where he holds the European Jean Monnet Chair on EU relations with Less Developed Countries. His research interests focus on (global) North-South Relations, development studies, foreign policy analysis and civil society.

Professor Huliaras is the author or editor of several books and articles in peer-reviewed journals, including African Affairs, Asia-Europe Journal, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, and European Foreign Affairs. Among his recent publications are ‘Civil Society’, in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics (2020), and with Kostantinos Magliveras, ‘African Diplomacy’ in The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy (2016). He has served as an advisor of the Greek government on public policy, in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Greek Permanent Mission in the United Nations, while also having served as an expert in NATOs Expert Working Group on Africa and in the United Nations Human Security Network.

Professor Huliaras spoke to Rethinking Greece* on Africa’s prospects in the 21st century; on why EU’s interest for Africa is on the rise; on the evolving dynamics of the relationship between Europe and Africa and on the contacts, synergies and networks that are being created and strengthened between Greece and sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, he talks about the EU project he is the scientific director of, AfriquEurope, the largest network of African and European universities in the field of social sciences.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Africa was deemed to be at the point of economic take-off, and its geopolitical power was on the rise. Where does Africa find itself in the international geopolitical and economic landscape now?

By the turn of the century, optimism abounded regarding Africa's prospects. By 2000, six out of ten countries with the highest growth rates in the world were African. At that time the continent experienced unprecedented, since independence, levels of peace, with an increasing number of African leaders elected through largely free and fair elections. Global interest in African affairs surged, notably marked by China's emergence as a leading trade partner, aid provider and investor in the continent.

However, this optimism has since dissipated. Much of Africa's growth was tied to the soaring international prices of oil, metals, and other primary products. Consequently, when these prices plummeted, African exports suffered. While some resource-poor countries benefited, their gains were short-lived. The onset of the pandemic exacerbated existing challenges, compounded by civil wars in the Horn of Africa and Islamic rebellions in the western Sahel. The eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo remained mired in near-permanent crisis. These developments collectively displaced over 20 million people. Though several countries, such as Kenya, Ghana, and Cote d'Ivoire, exhibited relative resilience and maintained impressive growth rates for long periods, the overall landscape has markedly shifted. Numerous coups d'état, particularly in the Sahel, democratic regression (even in traditionally free nations like Senegal), and escalating conflicts that now threaten to destabilize entire regions have tarnished African prospects.

Still is difficult to generalize. Next to failures you have important success stories (e.g. Burundi versus Rwanda). Africa is more diverse than Europe. As the title of a recent book suggested: “Africa is not a country.”

How would you describe the Europe-Africa relationship today, and what are its prospects? How is it affected by factors such as the new Samoa agreement or China's dynamic presence in the continent?

In the past 5-6 years, developments concerning the future of EU’s relations with Africa are, at a first glance, disappointing. After BREXIT, Africa lost one of its strongest champions in Brussels. Then, the pandemic struck and EU’s attention focused on domestic health challenges. Finally, a week after the EU-African Union summit on 17-18 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Several analysts pessimistically concluded that Europe’s focus is shifting from Africa to other parts of the world. But then, in the past 5-6 years we witnessed several diverse messages and developments. In 2019, just before the last German election, Angela Merkel proudly argued that EU's “policies on Africa, now follow a common strategy, which a few years ago would have been unthinkable". In March 2020, while Europe was closing down in response to the coronavirus, the new European Commission released a new communication entitled “Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa,” a document with plenty of new ideas and plans. And finally, in December 2021, the EU announced the €300 billion so-called Global Gateway investment strategy – a very ambitious project, similar to the Chinese Belt & Road Initiative. Half of it – this means 150 billion euros - is to be deployed in Africa. Details of the Africa-Europe program, the first regional plan under Global Gateway, were announced just two months after the launch of the strategy.

So, there is no doubt that despite BREXIT, despite the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, increasingly EU officials and EU member-states are looking towards Africa. In my view, there are several factors that explain EU’s growing interest for Africa, leading to a much closer partnership. The first factor is a growing understanding that tackling underlying security and migration challenges would require a more holistic approach towards Africa. The second factor is the realization of the need to respond to Europe’s loss of influence amidst the growing number of external actors showing an interest in Africa, especially – but not only – China: India, Brazil, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Iran have all become important actors in Africa. The third is an understanding of the huge opportunities for European businesses that might arise from supporting Africa’s adoption and implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the new Samoa Agreement. Finally, in a strange way, the Ukrainian crisis has also increased Africa’s geopolitical importance for the EU. Both the EU and Africa focus on energy and food security. Among others, cooperation with some African countries is expected to help Europe replace imports of Russian natural gas and reduce dependence from Russia.

How can Africa complete the trajectory from a recipient of development aid to an equal partner with Europe? What do African countries expect from Europe?

Over the past half-century, the shadows of colonialism have gradually receded, paving the way for a shift towards what the European Commission terms a "partnership of equals" in Europe's engagement with Africa. Amidst this evolving landscape, there is a growing desire among Africans for increased European “greenfield” investments and greater support for infrastructure development across the continent. Additionally, there is a call for enhanced mobility opportunities for Africans seeking to relocate to Europe. While some authoritarian leaders may resist European pressure for liberalization and democratization, many African civil activists advocate for the EU to take a firmer stance, imposing stricter sanctions in response to human rights violations.

Thus, while the dynamics of the relationship between Europe and Africa continue to evolve, there remain tensions between the aspirations for a closer economic partnership and the imperatives of justice and accountability. Migration is also a constant challenge for policy-makers in both sides. Africa continues to be much dependent on both development aid and access to the developed world’s markets (especially for agricultural products). There is no doubt that to a large extent and despite the rhetoric, the relationship remains asymmetrical. However, this does not mean that African countries are powerless. There is much African “agency” in EU-African relations.

How does Greece differ from the rest of Europe in terms of its relations with sub-Saharan Africa? Which countries are of particular interest to Greece?

There has been a great deal of diplomatic activity taking place within the last 5 years in Greek-African relations. Greece has opened a new embassy in Senegal and former foreign minister Nikos Dendias made several official visits to the continent. Much of these contacts relate to Greece’s ambition to be elected as a non-permanent member of the UN’s security council for the 2025-6 period. There is also a push to do more, due to Turkey’s advance and rising influence in Africa. So, the main reasons for the Greek-African rapprochement are political.

At the economic level, if we look at Greece’s trade of goods with Sub-Saharan Africa, numbers are still insignificant. However, there are reasons for optimism. Firstly, there is a “hidden” economic activity, not very well recorded in statistics, that has to do with trade in services such as shipping, consulting, etc. Secondly, the Greek business community, encouraged by the Hellenic-African Chamber of Commerce and a few diplomatic missions in Athens (like the South African Embassy) shows a renewed interest for investing in the continent. For example, Mytilineos Group is investing in Libya and Ghana. Thirdly, diasporic communities (Greeks in Africa and the rising number of Africans in Greece), universities, NGOs and various cultural groups undertake numerous initiatives that are largely fragmented and difficult to monitor, but are however gradually and continuously fostering a wider, closer and deeper Greco-African relationship. Contacts, synergies and cooperations are multiplying, and many new networks are created and strengthened between Greece and Africa.

You are the scientific coordinator of the European Commission project "AfriquEurope: The European Union and Africa in a world of multiple crises," which aims to support closer cooperation between the two continents. Can you tell us more about this project?

We are very excited about this project. With partners and collaborators in 33 countries representing all regions of Africa, including French-, English- and Portuguese-speaking countries, AfriquEurope (2024-7), funded by the European Commission - Jean Monnet Policy Debate, is the largest network worldwide of African and European universities in the field of social sciences. With the University of the Peloponnese as the lead partner, the project will organize 12 thematic conferences in Africa, Europe and China as well as 10 research groups that will produce books, articles and working papers on EU-African relations. As the world order is being reshaped, AfriquEurope is dedicated to a mutually reinforcing dialogue between Europe and Africa, aiming at deepening ties and creating evidence-based solutions for policy makers on both sides of the Mediterranean.

* Interview to Ioulia Livaditi

Read also from Rethinking Greece:

• Angelos Dalachanis on the Greek Diaspora in Egypt and the Middle East
• Alexander Kitroeff: “Greek Diaspora has affected the history of host countries around the world”

The post Rethinking Greece | Asteris Huliaras : Contacts, synergies and cooperations are multiplying between Greece and Africa appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou is Professor of Postwar History at the Department of History of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens as well as secretary-general of the Hellenic Parliament Foundation for Parliamentarism and Democracy. His research interests include international history, the history of NATO during the Cold War, Greek foreign policy and political history and the Cyprus Question. Among his more publications are ‘The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 1969-1975: Transatlantic Relations, the Cold War and the Environment’ (2017), ‘NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Analysis and Reporting, 1951-1969’ (2014), and ‘Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967’ (2006). Professor Hatzivassiliou is also Fellow of the Eleftherios Venizelos Foundation and a member of the Greek-Turkish forum, a one-and-a-half-track diplomacy initiative, founded in late 1997 with the aim to promote dialogue and communication between Greece and Turkey.

On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne* Evanthis Hatzivassiliou spoke with our sister publication GrèceHebdo** on the importance of the Treaty for Greece and Turkey - as well as for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, on the new international legitimacy established by the Treaty, on the mandatory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, and finally, on Eleftherios Venizelos, the great political man who was the head of the Greek delegation during the Treaty negotiations.

It is generally believed that the Treaty of Lausanne only concerns Greece and Turkey, while in reality it is a treaty signed by eight countries. Could you briefly explain to us the importance of this treaty for both countries as well as for the wider geographical region?

The Treaty of Lausanne marks the solution of the Eastern Question, one of the most important, long-lasting and persistent international problems of modernity. The Eastern Question involved the possible dissolution and succession of the Ottoman Empire, and the control of the Straits; therefore, the whole region that was then called the “Near East”. The question raged at least since the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and touched upon the ambitions of the peoples of the region for political representation as well as upon the geopolitical priorities of the great powers and the long struggle between Britain and Russia for controlling the access to the Black Sea (therefore, also Russia’s access to warm seas).

In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic; to the creation of the successor states in the region that we now call “the Middle East” (even if some of them were for a time mandates of Britain and France, such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the region of Palestine, Jordan); and to the definite settlement of the international borders in the south-eastern area of the Balkans between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, many other issues were settled, such as the Ottoman public debt, international navigation in the Straits, or issues regarding minorities; among the latter was the harsh compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. Thus, as the solution of the Eastern Question, the Treaty of Lausanne regulates international relations in the wider area of the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. For this reason it also forms the basis of Greek foreign policy since then.

In your announcement at the recent ELIAMEP Conference for the 100 years of the Lausanne Treaty, you mentioned that the Treaty is a pillar of a new international legitimacy, as for the first time, small and sovereign states participated equally in it. Would you like to elaborate on this aspect, given that the issue of multilateralism remains relevant in international relations today?

The new international order that was created following the First World War was a profoundly liberal one. It involved the dissolution of the empires in East-Central Europe, and the definite rise of the nation-state as the main system of governance in the continent. At the same time, the creation of many new nation-states was also combined with an equally necessary move towards multilateralism, thanks to the setting up of the League of Nations, the brainchild of the US President, Woodrow Wilson. In the League all members of the international community participated, small states and great powers, on the basis of sovereign equality. This was a profound change compared to the past, when the existence and rights of small states were often ignored: during the nineteenth century, the European Concert had been a procedure of great powers only. Inotherwords, theinternationalsystemnowbecamemoreparticipatory. This was a decisive change in the international community. This new liberal legality was challenged cruelly by the forces of revisionism, especially Nazi Germany, but was confirmed with the outcome of the Second World War.

The Treaty of Lausanne, even with the admittedly dark aspect of the Greek-Turkish compulsory exchange of populations (a result of the crushing Turkish victory over Greece in 1922), brought to this part of the world the new international legitimacy, while it also settled international borders in the region, an element of decisive importance for the new order. As such, the Treaty of Lausanne is not only a crucial regional arrangement, but also the pillar of the wider international order in this part of the world.

In recent years, an opinion has been expressed – albeit very limited – that the Treaty of Lausanne ceases to be valid 100 years after its signature. Could you tell us what is the validity of the Treaty today and what is its importance for the future, especially of Greek-Turkish relations?

An international Treaty does not “expire” because of an anniversary. The Treaty of Lausanne continues to be in full force, and from the point of view of Public International Law it could not be otherwise. Apart from this, according to the prevalent view in International Law, the territorial settlement that such a Treaty establishes, would still remain in force even if the Treaty itself, as a legal instrument, were ever invalidated (which anyway is an extremely unlikely eventuality). Thus, the Treaty of Lausanne forms the basis of Greek-Turkish relations for the past 100 years and for the future. For this reason, the two countries need to show great care in respecting and implementing the Treaty: without this, chaos could ensue both in bilateral relations and in the wider region.

The mandatory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was a painful chapter in the Treaty of Lausanne, with significant socio-economic and political ramifications for Greece, while it was considered by many to violate human rights. How would you characterize the exchange of populations and in what way, in your opinion, did it determine the course and identity of modern Greece?

The Greek-Turkish compulsory exchange of populations was not only a controversial but a shameful act. This was because the compulsory character of the exchange fully violated human rights by depriving individuals of the right to choose. This was why it was even claimed, at that time, that the Exchange Convention was invalid according to International Law. This, on the other hand, was a rather theoretical view, since the exchange had already been done.

The compulsory exchange was imposed by the victorious Turkey on the defeated Greece of 1922: even since the autumn of 1922 (namely, before the signature of the Exchange Convention in late January 1923), the Greek populations had already been violently expelled from Western Asia Minor and from Eastern Thrace, while Turkey solemnly declared its determination to expel the remaining Greeks from Pontus, Cappadocia and other areas. In other words, even before the conclusion of the Exchange Convention, the larger part of the expulsion of the Greeks from Turkey was already a fait accompli, and could not be undone. The compulsory exchange was a fundamentally Turkish choice, which defeated Greece could not question. It was not the preference of Athens. The Greek perceptions, plans and aims regarding the populations had been expressed at the Treaty of Sèvres, which left populations in their homes, in the context of much more liberal arrangements.

At any rate, however inhuman and controversial from a legal or moral point of view, the reality that the Exchange Convention imposed shaped the contemporary Greek state and nation: the vast majority of the Greeks were now concentrated within the borders of the state; Greece became a “conservative” power, a supporter of the status quo. The exchange was a hugely traumatic experience. However, the Greek people and the state managed to overcome the trauma, and create a contemporary European state, capable of economic and social development.

Eleftherios Venizelos was appointed head of the Greek delegation to the negotiations in Lausanne, although he no longer participated in the country's governance. Do you think that the personality of the Greek politician, who was indeed the visionary of the Great Idea, contributed to upgrading of Greece's position during the negotiations of the Treaty of Lausanne? What was his contribution to maintaining peace in the region?

It is worth noting the tragic element in the case of Eleftherios Venizelos’ presence and roles during the Lausanne Conference: he was called to deal with the devastating consequences of a crushing defeat which could be attributed, to a large extent, to his own electoral defeat of November 1920. He had lost power, then the country had lost the war, and he now had to deal with the disaster. Yet he accepted this enormous responsibility.

There is little doubt that the international prestige of Venizelos was always greater than that of his small country – more so, of the vanquished Greece of 1922. This became very clear during the Lausanne Conference. Thus, even representing a defeated country, Venizelos managed to reach an honourable peace. Moreover, Venizelos’ sincere acceptance of the territorial status quo was decisive in Greece’s decision to abandon the Megali Idea and become a status quo power. This greatly aided the evolution of Greek policy, and shaped the international roles of the country for the past 100 years, as a pillar of stability and normalcy in the wider region, and as an ardent supporter of international legitimacy and of the liberal international order.

* The Treaty of Lausanne, the most enduring of the post-World War I peace accords, is a historic treaty signed on July 24, 1923, establishing national borders in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, with the aim of restoring peace in the region after the disastrous First World War. The treaty was signed by the Republic of Turkey, which had succeeded the defeated Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and by the Allied and Associated Powers (France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Greece, Serbia and Romania) , on the other hand. One of the most radical elements of the Treaty of Lausanne, particularly from a humanitarian point of view, is the obligatory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey.

** Interview granted to Ioulia Elmatzoglou | GreeceHebdo.gr

Read also from Greek News Agenda:

• 100 Years since the Treaty of Lausanne: Looking Back, Looking Ahead
• Davide Rodogno: Multilateralism plus prevention is a way of imagining a better future in humanitarian interventions
• Emilia Salvanou on the Greek-Turkish population exchange after 1922 and the making of Greek refugees' memory

I.L.

The post Rethinking Greece | Evanthis Hatzivassiliou on the Treaty of Lausanne and its enduring legacy appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

The 2nd Brussels Forum was jointly organized by think tanks diaNEOSis and ELIAMEP with the aim of facilitating the exchange of views between Greek officials working in European institutions and in the wider European public policy production system and of fostering the ongoing dialogue on the role of Europe in its neighborhood and in the international system, always in context of synthesizing EU goals with national interests. The event took place on 7 November 2022, with the participation of over forty officials and its theme was the major and multi-faceted challenges the EU faces now, from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its implications for energy and food security, to the geopolitical revisionism underway in the wider Mediterranean area. The discussions proceeded along two thematic axes: (a) Deepening the EU’s Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy, and (b) A Secure and Competitive Europe in a Changing World*.

The starting point of the participants' deliberation and the first main conclusion was that the European Union finds itself in a "perfect storm" of a series of challenges on major security issues. The Russian invasion brought back to the fore the traditional form of warfare, with extended war fronts, razing of urban and non-urban areas, and massive loss of life, including civilians. The return of large-scale military operations is added to the modern hybrid forms of security threats – that range from cyberspace and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities to food and energy security.

Beyond the war in Ukraine, the element of confrontation dominates the wider international environment. The US pivot to Asia and the prospect of a prolonged confrontation with China has created new geopolitical realities, which the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not expected to dramatically change. In the short term, the US is indeed active again in Europe, reacting to Russian revisionism, but it is clear that the field of American economic and political focus is shifting to the Pacific Ocean. In any case, although the November 2022 mid-term elections did not confirm the ominous predictions for the Democrats, the next presidential election may not rule out a new political leadership that will put Euro-Atlantic relations on the back burner.

Within this international context, there is no room for complacency in the European Union. The positive evaluation of the immediate reaction to the Russian invasion, with the full support of the Ukrainian resistance by military and non-military means and the imposition of extensive sanctions on the Putin regime, does not mean that there are no internal contradictions and significant heterogeneity of preferences among the member states. Also, a fruitful self-criticism of the EU regarding its handling of Russia after the end of the Cold War and especially during the last decade should not be discouraged. The increase in the EU's energy dependence on Russia after the first round of conflicts in 2014 and the unilateral annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation demonstrate the EU's lack of response to what we now see as a prelude to this major conflict.

This observation points to the need for a new mix of European Ostpolitik, of engagement and containment in relation to Russia, which will feed into the EU's strategic planning for new security architecture in Europe. The commitment part refers to the necessity of avoiding a permanent and total rupture with Russia. Without overlooking President Putin's flagrant violation of international law and with an obvious need to further support the Ukrainian resistance, the EU must recognize that the day after the crisis will find Russia sharing borders with a number of its member states and therefore, a new symbiotic relationship must be formed, which will strengthen any remaining liberal forces inside Russia and allow for relative normality over time. At the same time, the EU must work on the issue of containing Russia and limiting its revisionism in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The European reaction to the new circumstances resulting from global geopolitical developments can be summarized in four axes:

1. Firstly, there is an increased mobility in matters of military cooperation and armaments, both at national and European level. The Russian invasion acted as a catalyst to highlight significant military deficiencies in many member states and to initiate or accelerate extensive national armament processes, culminating in the German government's decision to make an unprecedented investment in this area. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the invasion of Ukraine prompted EU member states to take immediate action. This action included, in the first phase, the systematic and extensive supply of weapon systems to Ukraine as well as the training of soldiers to strengthen the Ukrainian resistance. The first phase was supported and utilized to a very large extent the new instrument of the European Peace Facility.

In a second phase, member states agreed at Versailles in March 2022 to substantially increase their defense spending in a collective and coordinated manner, investing in the acquisition of the necessary military assets and stimulating cooperative investment in joint armament actions and joint procurement of defense capabilities. These moves will advance and hopefully realize the EU's strategic autonomy, which is at the heart of the "Strategic Compass", that new EU security doctrine announced in the wake of the Russian invasion. Key tools in this direction are the creation of the European Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC) and the strengthening of the European defense industry. This force, which will have a size of up to 5,000 soldiers, will be aimed at the EU's immediate reaction to security crises around the world, based on specific operational scenarios. Obviously, there is no question of a "Euro Army", as neither the size nor the existing operational dynamics of this force indicate any such a development.

It could be argued that the increase in defense spending and the declared intention to cooperate in matters of the defense industry are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a "Europe of Defence" (l’ Europe de la Défense), which as a concept remains quite nebulous. The launched projects within the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO projects) and the European Defense Fund (European Defense Fund – EDF) cannot respond to security challenges of a range corresponding to the Russian invasion. The ongoing crisis broke the taboo subject of the EU's geopolitical role and character, bringing to the fore and necessitating the "normalization" of European foreign policy in parallel with the due importance to be attached to "hard power". Thus, it has opened a window of opportunity for substantive European military cooperation and defense integration. However, this window of opportunity will not remain open forever.

The Versailles declaration was rightly hailed as a potentially major milestone in the process of defense integration, but the implementation of what was agreed has a long-term horizon, especially since an entire high-tech, research-intensive and demanding industry is involved. The supporters of this project and those who see its long-term necessity consider that the intra-European defense deepening process is not yet "locked in effect", and therefore the possibility of its derailment cannot be ruled out. In this case, the high expectations that have been cultivated will be disproved once again, confirming the difficulty of a leap into an area that pertains to the hard core of state sovereignty.

 2. The second - very relevant to the first - axis of actions focuses on EU-NATO relations and on strengthening their complementarity rather than competition. Realistically assessing its current capabilities, the EU has a long way to go to implement a strategy of autonomy; therefore, strengthening the cooperation with NATO is a necessary condition for a stable security system in Europe. This cooperation has advanced quite a bit despite the upheavals of the Trump era. However, this cooperation has not achieved the necessary political depth and is limited to direct interactions between officials of the two parties (staff to staff) without the involvement of the political bodies of the two organizations. Therefore, cooperation has certain limits.

In any case, an enhanced cooperation is mutually beneficial, as the EU is perhaps better suited than NATO to manage certain aspects of security, due to deep expertise in, for example, counter-terrorism policy or hybrid threats. Also, geographical diversification makes the need for a militarily stronger Europe imperative, taking into account its existing interest in the Sahel region and wider Sub-Saharan Africa, areas that are not of NATO interest. So, then, this dimension of reciprocity through the specialization and complementarity of each organization’s actions must at the forefront if case US isolationism returns to the transatlantic agenda in the coming years. To this end, the European efforts for armament and defense cooperation at the national level but especially at the EU level should evolve with the aim of avoiding tensions and misunderstandings about their true intentions. This is possible by explicitly and permanently affirming NATO's primary role in the European security system, which is already systematically done in all EU official documents and policy texts.

3. The third axis of activity in the EU is the renewed dynamism but also a growing reflection on the enlargement process. Is a new round of enlargement it in the EU's interest and which countries will be invited to join it? The Ukrainian government's application for EU membership reminded us of the great value of the enlargement policy as a driver of internal transformation in the candidate countries and a factor of regional stabilization. These two invaluable contributions, of the structural transformation and stabilization, which were exploited to the maximum extent in the great enlargement of 2004 (and 2007) with the new members from Central and Eastern Europe, were shelved in the EU's political arsenal in case of the Western Balkans. The prospect of the enlargement of the region has turned into a protracted process with no visible completion, bringing about the gradual disillusionment of both governments and citizens in the candidate countries. The Russian invasion, combined with new rounds of tensions between Serbia and Kosovo and the risk tensions could spill to other parts of the Western Balkans is bringing the region back into the spotlight.

In this context, the prospect of enlargement is again presented as a panacea to the existing problems, accompanied, however, by a strong counterargument and a broad concern about EU´s functional limits and the ability to smoothly absorb new members. The evolution of the Ukrainian crisis will affect the dynamics of enlargement and the final choice between the above "consolidation of security - cohesion" dilemma, as it will affect the corresponding mobility in the field of defense and security, as discussed above. A settlement of the crisis will alter the urgent nature of the accession perspective of the Western Balkan countries. This fact has been realized by the states of the Western Balkans who are strongly mobilizing, adopting and promoting a more realistic but suboptimal perspective of "staged accession".

The debate on enlargement inevitably brings to the fore the accession perspective of Turkey, which at the present stage is essentially non-existent. In the last two relevant Commission texts, the 2021 and 2022 progress reports, the existing impasse is clearly highlighted. However, it is clear that the complete rupture of relations is not beneficial neither for Europe nor for Greece. Even recognizing that the current regime of relations is not functional and in fact these relations are frozen, it is appropriate not to completely discredit the prospect of closer cooperation. In other words, the EU must first study and formulate an alternative proposal for the framework of cooperation with Turkey, in the form of a revised Customs Union that could form the basis of the next day of EU-Turkey relations.

4. The fourth axis concerns the activity of the EU in the rest of the world and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Even this particular geographical neologism of Indo-Pacific was not widely used by the EU until three years ago, which shows the impossibility of an earlier conceptual conception of the region in a unitary way. Reacting, however, to the growing competition and rivalry of the US with China in the wider region, the EU has formulated - with great speed for its standards - a fairly coherent policy. Key features of this policy are equality and partnership in the relations that the EU builds with the countries of the region, in contrast to previous approaches.

What is encouraging about the prospect of European activity in the Indo-Pacific region is that Europe still has footholds in this wider geographical area. EU’s appeal rests on its function as a guiding model on a range of issues. Of particular importance are issues of ocean governance on the basis of international law, by reason of the importance the EU attaches to the implementation of current international treaties such as United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The EU is also recognized as a pioneer in less obvious subject areas, such as the issue of personal data security. In other words, the EU has significant "soft power" in the region that it can and should use.

In conclusion, these four axes summarize the European response to the ongoing geopolitical realignment. This is a highly dynamic process, possibly marking the "end of innocence" for the EU in terms of its refusal or inability to invest in power. The EU can no longer afford to ignore geopolitical and geoeconomic developments and the growing power asymmetry that has emerged in its relations with the new poles of the international system. The problem is that member states continue to adopt an ethnocentric approach to these challenges, which raises major concerns about whether the EU can finally proceed with a substantial political transformation in order to strengthen or even maintain its position in the new global security architecture.

The pursuit of unity, often on the basis of the lowest common denominator, undermines the EU's degree of ambition, beyond any difficulties and delays that the search for consensus may bring. This "unity-ambition gap" governs all discussions on a reform of the European modus operandi that would allow EU´s more active role within the new geopolitical environment. The debate on a reform of the treaty of Lisbon lacks political practicality and feasibility. As has been repeatedly confirmed, any attempt to reform the Treaties is an extremely long-term, divisive and polarizing process with unpredictable results. Therefore, it does not qualify as a realistic alternative. After all, the existing EU legal framework contains de facto and de jure options for substantial reform, such as, for example, the "passerelle clause".

The two key issues that can help address this "unity-ambition" gap are the issue of flexibility in decision-making and the perspective of differentiated integration. Something like this is already happening with the Eurozone, the Schengen Zone and the PESCO projects. To the extent that such schemes are open to participation in all EU member states and the membership criteria are well-defined and transparent, they allow for the promotion of a unitary vision even in a fragmented, politically and institutionally, version. Obviously, this method of integration is not a panacea for divergent views among EU members, but at least it offers a political alternative for groups "willing and able" to advance deeper and faster. The success of such schemes will enhance their appeal, and in the end, they can form the hard core of a substantial federalization of the EU.

* The article is a transated and summarized version of the report  on 2nd Brussels Forum on the Dianeos website. Tranlsation and summary: Ioulia Livaditi 

The post 2nd Brussels Forum: Europe in a Changing Geopolitical Environment appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Theodore A. Couloumbis, world renowned International Relations expert, Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the University of Athens and a firm believer of Greek-Turkish dialogue, passed away last week at age 87. He was among the founders of Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), one of the first and biggest Greek think tanks -established in 1988- and has served as the foundation's President (1993–95) and Director General (1998–2006).

As is mentioned in this obituary at ELIAMEP, "his contribution to ELIAMEP and to the Greek international studies community is immeasurable. He was a teacher, friend and mentor to hundreds of his university students and colleagues. A model academic teacher and a man of profound integrity, genuine courtesy and inexhaustible kindness, he also had an inexhaustible and sparkling sense of humour."

Theodore Couloumbis was born in Thessaloniki in June 1935. His father was an artillery officer, his mother a kindergarten teacher. He lost his father in 1941, when he was killed aged just 33 in the Battle of Crete. He grew up with his mother and brother and attended Athens College on a scholarship. He emigrated to the United States to study in 1952; he would live, study and work there for more than 30 years. He earned a BA in Political Science (1956) and an MA in International Relations (1958), both from the University of Connecticut, and a PhD in International Relations from the American University (1963). In the years 1965-83, Couloumbis was professor of International Relations at the American University’s School of International Service in Washington DC where he received several awards for outstanding teaching.

As he writes in his book “71…74: An academic’s notes“, the desire to return to Greece was always there in his mind and  in his heart especially, but the military coup of 1967 made this impossible, as he could not work under such suffocating conditions and constant censorship. So he stayed in America and fought the dictatorship from there. Testifying to Congress in July, August and September 1971, he strove to get “a simple but important message” across: “Stop supporting the Colonels! Greece is a country that can offer a genuinely democratic as well as non-communist alternative to the Colonels’ obscurantist and despotic regime”.

He eventually returned to Greece and from 1983 to 1989 he was professor of International Relations at the School of Law of the University of Thessaloniki, moving to the University of Athens early in 1990. In 1995-1996 he was a Senior Fellow with the United States Institute of Peace and in 2006-2007 a Policy Scholar with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He served as President of ELIAMEP in Athens (1993-1995), President of the Institute for Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki (1988-1990) and President of the Hellenic Society for International Law and International Relations (1985-1987). Couloumbis also attended meetings, as an expert, at the Greek Foreign Ministry’s Foreign Policy National Council, from its founding in 2003 to 2006. He was also a member of the Greek Turkish Forum, is a one-and-a-half-track diplomacy initiative, founded in late 1997 with the aim to promote dialogue and communication between Greece and Turkey.

Coloumbis’ work focused on conflict resolution in the post-Cold War international setting and on aspects of Greek foreign policy. He is the co-author (with James H. Wolfe) of the well-known text book, International Relations: Power and Justice, Prentice Hall, 4th ed. 1990, author of US, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (Praeger,1983) and co-editor of the new Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (Frank Cass and ELIAMEP). His more recent publications include the Greek Junta Phenomenon (Pella, 2004) and a co-edited volume, Greece in the 20th Century (Frank Cass, 2005). In addition to his scholarly output, he was a regular columnist and frequent contributor to newspaper “Kathimerini”.

His primary research interests included dispute resolution in the international environment, and he worked to bring about a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey based on mutual understanding within the framework provided by international law. He fought all his life for the settlement of international crises. He was a great teacher who filled lecture theatres with his infectious passion. A profoundly modest man, he did not accept positions of power when they were offered to him, always preferring to contribute quietly.

*With information from: Kathimerini, ELIAMEP

I.L.

The post A tribute to Theodore Couloumbis, world renowned International Relations expert appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

George Rorris is one of the most important representatives of figurative art in Greece. Born in the village of Kosmas of Kynouria (Arcadia, Peloponnese) in 1963, he was a student of Panagiotis Tetsis and Yiannis Valavanides at the Athens School of Fine Arts (1982-1987).

He went on to pursue his studies at the Parisian École Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts under Leonardo Cremonini (1988-1991) thanks to a Basil and Elise Goulandris Foundation scholarship coupled with a Bakala Brothers Foundation scholarship.

In Athens, George Rorris collaborated with the cultural centre Apopsi from 1996 to 2002. In 2002 he began working with the Art Group "Simio", where he tutors painters. In 2001 he received the Academy of Athens award for new painters under the age of 40. In 2006 the Alexandros S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation conferred an honourable distinction for his work. He maintained a permanent collaboration with Medusa Art Gallery, in Athens, since his first solo exhibition there in 1988, until 2017. Works by him can be found in public and private collections. He lives and works in Athens.

George Rorris (Photo ©Elissavet Moraki)

The works of George Rorris have been described as theatrical; the way he approaches people and objects is said to be clearly evident in the portrayal of his models. As he has said, he is interested in leaving behind historical records of his own time for future generations, thus paying attention to details that put the painting within a particular historical context.

For Rorris, a painting is the sincere revelation of one’s soul – it is thus no wonder that his works are believed to start a dialogue with the viewer, evoking sensations through his faithful depiction of the visible.

In the summer of 2021 (4 July – 3 September), the Basil and Elise Goulandris Foundation presents a retrospective exhibition dedicated to George Rorris, by at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Andros. The large retrospective, titled The Nobleness of Purity, will span 35 years of creation by "one of the most important visual artists of his generation".

On this occasion, the acclaimed artist spoke* to Greek News Agenda about his childhood, his introduction to the world of art, the man who played a key role in his decision to study at the School of Fine Arts, as well as about the way that the art of painting can "decodify the mysteries of nature by depicting them".

Large study in cadmium red, 1987 – 1988, oil on canvas

Mr. Rorris, you are one of the most important representatives of representational art in Greece. What motivated you to choose painting as a means of expression?

Thank you for the question. I believe the reasons motivating someone to choose to paint are different for every individual. Painting was for me a means to change my destiny; something I knew not then but I know now. I was born in a village and I had a lovely childhood. I have many memories of a country that belongs to the past. I was born into a rural family and grew up with my grandfather, my grandmothers and my siblings, without facing serious adversities or disparities in the small closed environment of the village, where we all knew each other. I did not have any direct artistic stimuli that would come from visiting a museum for instance, and almost no indirect with high art either through, let’s say, the wonderful Melissa publications on Greek artists that everyone seemed to have at home.

I was not acquainted with the works of Gyzis or Vryzakis, save for some black and white images in our history book of a work by Leonardo Da Vinci, and one probably by Delacroix, The Massacre at Chios. However, I regarded the images in our schoolbooks as art, especially those in our first grade readers. In our exercise books for writing, we had to draw a picture on the top half of the page that was blank for this purpose and write at the bottom half the few sentences given us by the teacher.

In the first months of first grade, my mother, who had some drawing skills, would draw the pictures for me in the evenings after she got home from working in the fields and I was sleeping, in order to help me. When I’d get up in the morning my exercise book would lay open on the table with her drawing on the page right above my writing exercise.

Half Self Portrait, 1989 – 1990, oil on canvas

When I think of this in hindsight, I can see that it was in a way a "small miracle" as, without realizing it at the time, I knew that the drawing, while not as refined as those in my books, was nonetheless unique. The uniqueness of a work of art is a crucial aspect of art. The drawing existed in my exercise book alone, not in those of my friends; only in mine.

At the end of the school-year, sometime in April - May, my parents had to come to Athens for a medical visit. I stayed back with my grandparents and there was no one to draw for me, so I had to draw on my own. My mother has kept that exercise book. I drew a swallow’s nest. Crude, hesitant but it was a swallow’s nest. That was probably one of the first things I ever drew, and I continued to do so henceforth. I enjoyed it and the grown-ups around me commented that Ι had drawing skills. I would copy drawings from our readers using pencil and paper, as I had no other materials.

Given that our schoolbooks were largely illustrated with black and white engravings, I did not feel the need to obtain colored pencils in order to draw. A pencil was just fine. My way of drawing was simple but in the end my drawings bore a resemblance, let’s say, to the illustrated images of Kolokotronis or Katsantonis. The subject matter of many of those images in our textbooks was related to the Greek War of Independence (1821) or Greece in World War II, aiming to inculcate patriotism in children and instill pride in the past; other images obviously related to life in peacetime as well.

Young woman with painted lips, 1997, oil on canvas

But the main reason I chose to paint was not related to the drawing skills I had shown. It was due to the encouragement of an authority figure, a person whose views I respected: that of my Greek language and literature teacher, a man of knowledge and culture, who perceived my inclination towards art.

In high school I was assigned artwork for celebratory occasions. Thus, for the festivities marking the October 28th celebration (when Greece entered WWII) I’d copy the cartoons by Fokion Dimitriadis depicting Mussolini, which I drew on large sheets of paper using a marker, not pencil. This teacher invited me to his house and advised me to not only take university entrance exams but to also apply for admission to the School of Fine Arts. That was huge encouragement for me, which also triggered intense emotions as what he did was actually induce me to try for something beyond my imagination.  

The rural setting I grew up in was defined by two mountains, Parnon and Taygetus. When we descended to another village to spend the winter, there were just the two mountains, Parnon to the north, Taygetus to the west, and nothing else beyond. The rest of Greece existed only in my imagination. I realised that my teacher’s inducement meant that I could go to Athens, study and become an artist.

Nude pose in the studio, 2001, oil on canvas

It all seemed magnificent, but it was also a source of anxiety. At first, I was concerned over my family’s reaction, of how my mother would take it, if they’d agree or put obstacles in my way. To their credit, they placed none. At that time -I am talking about 1981- meaning 40 years ago, we did not stress over finding employment.

If you were not admitted to the university there was always agricultural work in the fields. In other words, questions such as “if I gain admission to university, how long will it take me to find work, what job will I find, what salary will I get?” simply did not exist. For better or worse, these anxieties were not there. Thus, I cannot claim that my family didn’t put any obstacle in my way just because they were so cool. They did not stop me because they did not have any other expectations of me, to be admitted for example to Law School or to study to become a teacher so as to have a stable job and salary.

Either way, my inclinations towards Humanities were visible. From the age of thirteen, I’d buy the weekly Epikaira magazine. It was a great news magazine that reproduced pieces from world magazines such as Time, Spiegel, Stern, Nouvel Observateur, L’Express, and Newsweek. It contained topics related to foreign affairs, domestic news, science, society, art and art criticism, it contained everything. Every Wednesday, the magazine was available in the small shop of my village and I’d wait with my five drachmas to buy it.

Woman standing in a pink room, 2007, oil on canvas

It was a way out for me, because I’d read Epikaira and there I’d find out about books of interest which I ordered from Sparta. Via this route, I acquired the History of Modern Painting, published by Ypodomi, the History of Modern Sculpture, the History of Music and the History of Theatre. Thus there was no way for me to be accepted by a prestigious faculty, because it was these books that I studied. I had learnt the History of Modern Painting by heart.

When I began taking lessons in order to take entrance exams for the Athens School of Fine Arts, I was not unprepared. I already had knowledge of the history of modern painting. Of course, I had no knowledge of old art because I had learnt about modern art first. That knowledge came after I gained entry to the School of Fine Arts and in time I became aware of the complexity of art.

Why did you choose representational art?

I will tell you what I think. I entered the Athens School of Fine Arts in 1982. If that had happened in 1970, I would probably be doing abstract painting. If I was eighteen in 1970, I would be conscious of the fact we had a dictatorship (1967-1974), I would be studying in a School that by its nature is distinguished by the quest for the original, the avant-guard, the innovative.

Girl in the mirror, 2009 – 2010, oil on canvas

What’s more, the reason why abstract painting was the style in practice at the School in the seventies was not because it was adopted as a style with a delay of several years, but because of prevailing circumstances.

I believe that they practiced a defensive mode of art as if they did not want –probably unconsciously– to paint in a comprehensible and readable fashion in an environment where there was a dictatorship. It was as if they were telling censors that they could not comprehend anything about the art there.

In ’81 we were freer to express ourselves the way we wanted. Thus we studied and worked mostly with live models. We tried to paint what we were observing and we’d be corrected by our instructors. So the style and method was representational. We had a democracy, PASOK party had come to power gaining huge support from the Greek people and we knew and felt that in a democratic country we were free to paint whatever we wanted; that our work would not be censored, that I could paint what for example a girl holding a bouquet or a worker holding a trowel.

Ioanna, 2010 – 2011, oil on canvas

The painting style of my teacher at the studio, Panayiotis Tetsis, was representational, not realist. He painted the rocks of Hydra, the sea of Hydra, the street market. He was not one who would initiate his pupils, unawares, to the abstract format. After a while, as was his way with his pupils, we became friends, but we obviously treated him with due respect. I had the honour to be his friend to the end of his life in 2016. He played an important role in my artistic formation and he never stopped me from doing anything, on the contrary he encouraged me.

What is a painting to you?

It is the sincere revelation of one’s soul. At least this is what I try to feel when I enter a museum and see works which probably predate me by 300 or 400 years. Behind the web of codified shapes, colors, rhythms and contrasts in a painting that, for example, depict the Judgement of Paris or the Abduction of Europa, I try to understand the soul of the artist who created the work. If I were to give a more poetic response, I’d say that a painting for me is a prayer.

Nektaria, 2019, oil on canvas

A favorite subject in your paintings is women. Why do you choose to paint mainly women?

I will answer in a way that is currently fashionable. I did not choose women as a subject, but merely followed my instincts. I already know that I want to paint the women of our time, who fleetingly pass me by. I also know that the only way to pass on to future generations an idea, mine at least, of what a woman of my time is like is to paint her.

This is my way of doing this. Another person may write a novel, while another perhaps a poem. I can see how different women are today from those, let’s say, of the generation of the Polytechnic School uprising in 1973. Painting is a silent art form, interested in affairs that perhaps other arts take no interest in; in the way women, for example, occupy public and private space, the way they move, cross or do not cross their arms, the way they cross their legs, not to mention the way they dress.

A rugged land, 2019, oil on canvas

I believe that even the naked body has changed. When Georgios Iakovidis, for instance, painted a nude –Springtime– he had no concerns over how to paint the different skin tone of breasts and buttocks, since the model did not go sunbathing at the beach in summer. I, however, will paint it and it is a matter of concern as it is, in a sense, a record of time. I will also paint a navel piercing, because, rather than a pointless detail, it too depicts a point in time. When someone paints an electricity pole in a landscape, one understands that the landscape was shaped thus after electrification.

Moreover, women’s world and thus the condition féminine, woman’s nature, remains a mystery to me. The only way that painting can decodify mysteries is by depicting them; otherwise they remain elusive, mutating, constantly moving, and if not captured, nothing will remain and will finally be lost.

Yannis Moralis had painted some portraits of middle-class people in the 1950s. Whatever I may read, newspapers, financial statistics, advertisements or anything for that matter, I will not understand what a well-dressed woman looked like at the time. Moralis’ portraits faithfully depict the Greek middle-class in the 50’s. These alone are enough for one to understand what both men and women were like. This is what I want to leave behind for coming generations. My aim is that when two people stand in front of one my works in a hundred years’ time to be able to say: “This is what Greek women looked like back then”.

Mr. Rorris, are you preparing something for the future?

Yes, I am. The B&E Goulandris Foundation is doing me the honour of organizing for next summer a three-month exhibition of my works from 1982 to 2020, at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Andros.

Portrait of Basil and Elise Goulandris, 2017 – 2018, oil on canvas

During all this time of continuous lockdowns for more than a year on account of the Covid19 pandemic, what was the source of your subjects?

During the first very strict lockdown of March-April 2020, when no one knew what this pandemic actually was or how dangerous it was, I did not go to my studio. I brought some materials home and I actually worked more than I do now; I had a good set of colored pencils that I rarely used, which proved excellent companions in difficult times.

Objects that had always been in front of me and which I bypassed, precisely because they were in front of me, objects that I had never thought of seeing as subjects of art, became my subjects; in other words, I painted a pepper, a piece of bread, a piece of cake, a pear, an iris, a glass of wine, a corkscrew. I did approximately twenty-five paintings.

At first, I made one a day. As time went on I became more demanding. And in the end, a painting of a packet of spaghetti took me eight days. The only problem was that within a month, I ran out of some colors and I waited impatiently for the shops to reopen to buy new ones. The lockdown ended on May 4 but I continued drawing these objects throughout May and I still had not finished. There are still many of those objects that I intend to paint and I hope to do so one day, especially a comb which I feel has been left out and may feel neglected.

Drawing of still life, 2020, colored pencil on paper (from the artist’s personal archive)

Has the way you paint changed?

When I began to paint, I needed to set the scene, to tell the model what to wear and how to sit. I needed to embellish the world in order to paint it. Over the years, this tendency receded while I became increasingly skeptical over it, until I gave it up entirely. There is no need to beautify the world in order to paint it but to train the eye to see the ubiquitous beauty of reality.

Now I believe that if I am confined to my studio for ten years, I have things to paint for ten years. Besides, I have been painting in this room over the last twenty years and more or less the same subjects, usually a human being.

Drawing of still life, 2020, colored pencil on paper (from the artist’s personal archive)

What changes in your opinion?

What changes? We live in a time when everyone asks what you paint while nobody asks how you paint. Depending on the question, you understand if the image is prioritised over the art of painting. Image and painting are two different things: The image is the result of painting and it differs depending on the form of painting. In this sense, the image does not change: I paint a human being.

Green Night (Portrait of E.S.), 2019 – 2020, oil on canvas

The way I paint cannot be described in words because it concerns the diverse language of painting, which has its own grammar and syntax, it has to do with the warm and cool colors, the sharpness or bluntness of shapes, the dilution or density of colors, the intensity or moderation of rhythms, with the huge vocabulary of this language. The problem is that increasingly less people prioritise the art of painting over the image, which leads to confusion.

The intangible image of photography is confused with painting, which is a result of material elaboration. The shaping of form in paintings is not so different from the creation of man, according to the Book of Genesis. God created Adam from clay and breathed life into him. This is exactly what painting is. When the color in the palette becomes a stain, the painter needs to breathe life into it; every stain then connects to another, shaping the form which will be full of life, if the painter is good.

*Interview by Marianna Varvarrigou. Translation into English by Sofia Dimopoulou, edited by Magda Hatzopoulou. (Intro image: Marielena with Walkman, 1994, oil on canvas)

Read also via Greek News Agenda: Discover the National Gallery of Athens; Painter Dimitris Tzamouranis: "Art’s ultimate objective is the pursuit of beauty"; Artist Stavros Kotsireas: "Creativity is part of our humanity"; Anna Grigora: "I only paint what makes me feel good"

The post George Rorris: “A painting is the sincere revelation of one’s soul” appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Cities across the world are gradually starting to play a greater role in addressing challenges at the international level, from climate change and immigration to the health and security of citizens. As cities become global actors developing international partnerships and synergies with other cities or global actors, the concept of city diplomacy needs to be defined and analyzed.

GNA presents an insightful interview about city diplomacy with Dr Lorenzo Kihlgren Grandi, one of the speakers at Public Diplomacy Talks 2021, an online event organized for the second consecutive year by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Greeks Abroad and the Secretariat General for Greeks Abroad & Public Diplomacy). The topic of this year’s PD Talks is “City Diplomacy: Creating Global Networks” and the event will take place on Wednesday, June 16th, at 17:00 EEST. 

Dr. Lorenzo Kihlgren Grandi is the founder and chair of Urban Flag and a lecturer in City Diplomacy at Sciences Po Paris, École Polytechnique, and Columbia University. His primary expertise and research interests are in the international action of cities and their multilateral response to global challenges such as sustainable development, intercultural dialogue, and digital transition.

Lorenzo gained extensive practical experience in these areas, serving as an officer of the City of Milan’s International Relations Department and as an advisor and content strategist to the International Association of Francophone Mayors (AIMF). He is currently an advisor on city diplomacy strategies to numerous municipalities, city networks, and international organizations. He is the author of “City Diplomacy” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), the first global handbook of such a field.

A member of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Fellowship Program, Lorenzo holds a dual Ph.D. in Political Theory from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociale (EHESS) in Paris and the Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali “Guido Carli” (LUISS) in Rome.

Dr Lorenzo spoke to GNA* about the increasing role of cities in the global community illustrating the relation between city diplomacy and place branding. Dr Lorenzo also analyzed the role of community stakeholders in the transnational networks that municipalities are trying to forge, while he shared with us his advice for an impactful city diplomacy strategy as it is described in his latest book.

The role of cities in the global community is greatly increasing, and many cities are gradually becoming significant international actors. What is the scope of city diplomacy, and how can transnational networks help municipalities deal with global challenges such as climate change, migration, social inequalities, etc.?

City diplomacy refers to the ability of municipalities around the world to pursue local interests and promote universal values through international partnerships. Although it has existed for over a century, this practice has achieved great popularity over the last ten years, mainly thanks to the action of networks of cities dedicated to tackling major global challenges. The reason for the success of these networks lies essentially in their ability to scale up the exchange of best practices, foster joint innovation, and deploy advocacy campaigns.
As a result of such impactful methodology, city diplomacy features increasingly ambitious goals. An example regarding climate change is the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, whose 10,700 member cities worldwide (215 in Greece) have jointly committed to reducing their emissions by 24 billion tons of CO2 by 2030.
Moreover, the impact of cities' international action is fuelling their ambition to actively contribute to the definition of the next global agendas. In city diplomacy terms, this means to obtain a "seat at the global table." An example of this determination took place in December 2019 in Morocco. On the eve of the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), over 150 mayors from around the world signed the Marrakech Mayors Declaration, calling on the international community to acknowledge their essential role in achieving the GCM. The objectives of the Declaration are pursued by the Mayors Migration Council, a coordinating body in which the former Mayor of Athens Georgios Kaminis participates as Special Envoy for the MMC and C40.

What is the relation between city diplomacy and the image of a city? Do you think that partnerships with other cities and international actors can contribute to place branding, and what could be the impact on the reputation and the image of a country?

It is undeniable that cities worldwide are competing to attract investment, companies, talent, tourists, and students. A primary resource in this competition is the increasingly widespread practice of city branding, aimed at defining and promoting a particularly attractive identity for the urban area.
However, it would be erroneous to identify an incompatibility between the competitive goal of city branding and city diplomacy's collaborative approach. An increasing number of cities are engaged in bilateral and multilateral initiatives to enhance their respective city branding strategies by sharing best practices and through cross-promotion activities.
Furthermore, the very fact of being a member of a famous city network such as C40, Eurocities, or the UNESCO Creative Cities Network represents a highly coveted addendum to the international brand of a city.
More and more states are endorsing and supporting their cities' international branding, integrating it into their public diplomacy strategy. Examples include the growing involvement of cities in relations between France and African countries and Chinese cities' role in the Belt and Road Initiative.

In your opinion, what should be the role of community stakeholders such as citizens, organizations, businesses, etc., in city diplomacy?

One of the key differences between nation and city diplomacies lies in the participatory approach of the second. As the closest political institution to citizens and local actors, cities are ideally positioned to foster the co-creation and co-responsibility of international activities.
This multi-stakeholder approach allows municipal administrations to integrate the ideas, energies, goals, and hopes of citizens and local actors into a unique international strategy. The most effective and appreciated diplomatic actions of cities have been designed around this approach. By creating local coalitions for international actions, citizens and students can volunteer and strengthen their skills, NGOs can enhance their global reach and impact, companies obtain visibility, and establish new partnerships abroad. Moreover, the participation of local actors - especially from the entrepreneurial sector - can allow municipalities to scale up their projects thanks to financial and in-kind contributions.

In your latest book, "City Diplomacy" (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), you are combining theory with practical evidence. What would be your advice to practitioners and city officials who wish to design and implement impactful diplomatic strategies?

As I highlight in my book, city diplomacy has the potential to jointly enhance a municipality's local and international activities through the political, financial, and technical resources deriving from international partnerships. Given that it is a relatively young field of municipal action, its role might be misunderstood or even disputed by other municipal departments. As a result, city diplomacy requires to be clearly and pedagogically identified as a priority by the mayor and the city council, which should take all the necessary steps to fully deploy its transversal contribution to the different components of the municipal government.
Once this step is completed, defining a strategy connected to local identity and specificities is paramount. Hence, the municipal staff should identify formal and informal existing links with foreign partners to assess their current and potential contribution to the city's international positioning and action. Those links include, for example, international relations between companies, NGOs, universities, museums, or those between migrants and their communities of origin. By engaging and empowering these actors, the municipal administration can design and implement an original, coherent, impactful, and widely supported international strategy.

* Interview by Ioulia Elmatzoglou

More info about the event PD Talks 2021 "City Diplomacy: Creating Global Networks"

The “Public Diplomacy Talks (PD Talks)” constitutes an annual Forum inaugurated in 2020 by the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad and Public Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to provide a platform for a vibrant and fruitful exchange of views and best practices on Public Diplomacy.

In the first part of this year's event Dr. Lorenzo Kihlgren Grandi, founder of Urban Flag, and lecturer at Sciences Po Paris, École Polytechnique and Columbia University, Ms Sohaela Amiri, researcher at the University of Southern California and Dr. Antonios Karvounis, Head of the Interministerial Committee for the International Partnerships of Local Government, will focus on the new globalized role of the cities with examples from Greece and abroad. A discussion on cooperation and expectations regarding City Diplomacy will follow between the Mayor of Athens, Mr. Kostas Bakoyannis and the Mayor of Porto, Mr. Rui Moreira, as well as between the Mayor of Ioannina, Mr. Moses Elisaf and the Mayor of Kiryat Ono, Mr. Israel Gal. The discussion will be moderated by Ms Nektaria Stamouli, foreign affairs reporter at Athens News Agency and regional correspondent for Politico.

More info here: https://tinyurl.com/c6krr82s

Working language: English

June 16, 2021 - 17:00 EEST 

Register at: events@mfa.gr (deadline June 15)

Read also via GNA 

Public Diplomacy Talks | Beyond archaeology and tourism: A new image for Greece, in the post-pandemic world?

Join the first “Greek Public Diplomacy talks” webinar: the new initiative of the Sec Gen for Public Diplomacy

Nicholas J. Cull, Professor of Public Diplomacy at the USC, speaks to GNA about nation branding and cultural diplomacy 

I.E. 

The post PD Talks 2021 | Dr. Lorenzo Kihlgren Grandi speaks to GNA about city diplomacy & the role of cities in the global community appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

The Aristotle University of Thessaloniki is dynamically participating in the “Study in Greece” campaign whose aim is to bring international students closer to Greece, by offering challenging and innovative fully English-taught programs (both undergraduate and postgraduate) in a variety of disciplines. The initiative is supported by the General Secretariat of Higher Education of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs and the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad and Public Diplomacy of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Among others, special mention should be made to the “European Public Diplomacy” course, the first to be taught in a Greek university at postgraduate level, forming an important part of the School of Journalism and Mass Communications Department’s English language Master’s program on “Digital Media, Communication and Journalism”, especially for the second pathway/specialization on “European Journalism”.

Greek News Agenda⃰ spoke to the program’s Director and Holder of Jean Monnet Chair since 2016, Professor of International Relations Christos Frangonikolopoulos** who gave an insight on the program’s learning objectives and comparative advantages. Professor Frangonikolopoulos also shared his perspective on Greece’s 40 years course in the EU and the EU’s role in a changing world, thus contributing to the public dialogue that was recently launched in Greece and throughout Europe, in the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Why should a potential student choose the Aristotle University's MA program on “Digital Media, Communication and Journalism”? What are its comparative advantages, taking into consideration the plethora of similar study programs around the world?

The School of Journalism and Mass Communications has in recent years repeatedly featured among the top 50 Media/Communications Schools of Europe and is a member of the European Journalism Teaching Association. Its English-taught MA program builds on its 25-year long experience in training international students in its tailor-made English-taught program for Erasmus students. Above all, it is based on the School’s 30 year-long success in promoting learning through theory-building, cutting edge technical skills, and professional training, and reflects its steadfast commitment to innovation, excellence, interdisciplinary education, and international outlook.

What makes our Master’s program relevant is the consistent integration of the students' study, skills, and projects to the real world. Innovation and thoughtfulness have always been the only route for students, but I can’t think of a more critical time than now, in our highly complex, risk-ridden, globalized, and networked societies, for all thinking to become more methodical, reflexive, and innovative. We look for students who are eager to take on more challenges, to learn more about themselves and about the world, to reach their full potential. Our faculty, all active scholars and researchers, are committed to helping students succeed in their pursuits. Together we work to make each student’s experience at Aristotle University a rich and fulfilling one that broadens his or her intellectual and professional horizons.

You have been awarded twice a Jean Monnet Chair on European Journalism Integration (2016-2019) and European Public Diplomacy (2020-23). Could you provide insight into the Jean Monnet Chair on European Public Diplomacy, regarding the learning objectives of the course and/or other activities planned as part of this prestigious position?

During the last decade, the European Union is often misunderstood and seen in negative terms. The crisis of the Eurozone, the refugee crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic, exacerbated the criticism on the usefulness of European integration, contributing to the development of a significant gap between what the EU has accomplished and how the wider public, internally and externally perceives it. In fact, given that most of the complex and interlinked crises that trouble the EU have not been resolved, the EU and its members are not only characterized by fragmentation, distrust, increased divergence, social and political cleavages, but also by the inability to fairly balance national interests and frustration with today’s Union.

Bearing that in mind, the Chair on European Union Public Diplomacy has launched a teaching and research program exploring and identifying how to use Public Diplomacy to increase connections and shape perceptions in and outside the EU. The Chair is addressed mainly to the School’s undergraduate and postgraduate students but is also open to students of other Departments of the University.Τhe Chair focuses not only on theoretical issues or descriptive accounts of EU PD, but also pays attention to practical issues and skills that are in short supply.

Through publications, workshops, seminars, and conferences, the Chair brings together students, academics, journalists, and civil society representatives to (a) investigate the role of the media and civil society in contemporary and future EU PD, (b) discuss and explore how to reshape EUPD through regular and informed public dialogue, (c) explore how EUPD can invest in analysis, synthesis and dissemination by creating hubs for discussion, argumentation, counter-argumentation and feedback, (d) develop a reflective process that helps to understand the shortcomings and deficiencies of EU policies, and (e) explore how PD can be expanded to become the means for the improvement of the EU’s domestic and foreign policies.

The past decade has seen major and unprecedented shifts in international politics. In your view, where does Europe stand, today, in a changing world?

The EU has championed multilateralism as the core of its approach to global politics. However, not only do member states disagree on global security and foreign policy issues, but the EU also has to face challenges to the basic philosophy and practices of the international liberal order, like those posed by Russia, China, and populist leaders such as Trump. The EU appears to be vulnerable and weak in the “battle of narratives” regarding the global order. Both China and Russia have stepped up their interference in Europe and its neighborhood to attempt to portray the EU – and democratic systems more generally – as too weak and too slow to contain the pandemic. These efforts fall on fertile ground as the financial crisis, the political controversies sparked by large-scale migration, and the covid-19 pandemic have shaken the core of public confidence. This reality, however, should also provide the opportunity for the EU to work towards a global order that is in line with its strategic interests. This requires not only working on strengthening multilateralism but also on policies that allow the EU to provide stability in its wider periphery, to uphold and protect global trade, to deal more effectively with migration, and to set global standards for emerging technologies.

Pandemics, in particular, have traditionally had a pronounced effect on world politics. From your perspective, what are the main challenges lying ahead for the EU in the post-covid19 era?

The covid-19 pandemic has clearly demonstrated that interdependence is and will remain a central pillar of global politics and European integration. More and enhanced cooperation among member states, citizens, and the institutions of the EU will facilitate a debate and effort to apply higher standards for the protection of the environment and other global public goods (such as human rights, human security, public health). In a world where the borders between what can be defined and understood as foreign and domestic policy are very difficult, the EU with its economic power and global regulatory powers is not only in a position to deal with today’s most urgent challenges but is also in a position to develop an extrovert and outward strategy.

The Conference on the Future of Europe was recently launched. What is to expect from this promising initiative?

The Conference on the Future of Europe underlines that the success of the EU will not only depend on its ability to enhance its engagement in global politics, but also on its ability to reinvent its democratic processes. The EU’s problem in trying to convince, internally and externally, about its positions/policies, is not only related to the content, but also to the way the institutions communicate the content. Its strategic communication is mainly one-sided, focused mainly on the need to provide information. Rationality and promises of a positive future do not sell. And rightly so, as the deep economic, social, and technological transformations of the 21st-century touch on and are related with sensitive questions of identity and community. If the EU desires to assist its citizens to adapt to a rapidly changing world, it can only resolve this disconnection by facilitating support for difficult and collective political decisions.

Greater benefits can be reaped if a discursive approach to political debate and participation is employed. The political debate needs to focus on the principal issues of global politics and engage the public in an open debate, with the aim to communicate standpoints, but also listen and reply to potential counter-arguments and, in some cases, even incorporate some of them into final policies. In the absence of discursive procedures, policies are not thoroughly explicated, and there is an accountability, transparency, and integrity deficit that makes EU politics more obscure and problematic. Discursive procedures can be helpful in three directions: (a) getting across to the broad public arguments and ideas, (b) gaining a deep mutual understanding through the study of the perspectives, and (c) receiving potentially helpful insights.

The use of new technologies can be very helpful in the conduct of such strategic discursive processes in a number of ways. The creation of official sites sponsored fora where citizens of the EU can express their opinions and comments and ask critical questions that will receive replies is one option. Second, online interviews with officials can be organized. This way, citizens would see their queries answered and official policies fully explained. These initiatives could bear several positive effects: (a) they are by themselves a trust-building measure, (b) they allow dialogue to flourish, and (c) shortcomings and contradictions of current policies can be spotted and scrutinized; officials can learn by the exchange of ideas, which may lead to the improvement of policies. At the same time, the governments and institutions of the EU should co-operate closely with NGOs and academic institutions whose activities center on these issues. Creating open access networks of dialogue amongst member states, the institutions of the EU, NGOs, and the public is conducive to profound discursive processes that can help the definition and framing of the parameters of the problem and the designation and implementation of responding policies. In a nutshell, discursive public procedures are an indispensable foreign policy tool for the twenty-first century. They aim to adjust to the changes that have taken place in the international system in the last decades and focus on addressing the public and creating solid partnerships with the less appreciated and reckoned with global actors, the citizens of the EU.

2021 marks the 40th anniversary of Greece’s accession to the EU family. In your opinion, what is the particular relationship between Greece and Europe; what were the main lessons learned so far - what are the ways forward and prospects ahead?  

Greece’s relation and position towards the EEC/EU is complex characterized by many fluctuations and contradictions, determined by internal political developments, the strategies, and perceptions of political leaders, as well as the trends or transformations of European politics. Beginning in the 1970s, when Greece applied for membership in the EEC, a strong anti-European narrative developed, which projected the country as a “victim” of the periphery. This narrative did not succeed in becoming dominant. Following the end of the Cold War, and despite the growing support to a conservative anti-Western/anti-European position expressed by a group of religious/political figures in the 1990s, 60+% of Greek society supported Greece’s participation in the EU. This pro-European position was associated with the economic development, increasing consumption, and affluence that was made possible with the funds injected into the Greek economy by the EU. The debt crisis changed this condition. By 2014, according to the Eurobarometer, only 33% viewed Greece’s participation in the EU positively. It was only in 2019 that support for the EU returned to the level of the previous decades. The vast majority of Greeks, however, maintained that the bailouts damaged, rather than helped the country’s growth and that Greece could have overcome the crisis on its own, without aid from Europe. What does this indicate? It indicates that perceptions of the EU are ambivalent and cautious. This becomes all the more important when considering that the consequences of the pandemic may end up in consolidating new cleavages, with tremendous repercussions, within the political system and society of Greece.

It is clear that Greece can no longer afford to move forward with such misconceptions. Especially, when considering the challenges facing the EU, as well as the debate on the future of the EU. To do so Greece needs to: [1] to recognize its position within the EE as well as the contribution of the EU to its development, (b) decide how the country will deal, comprehend and interpret its past and the contradictions associated with the dominant “underdog” political culture, (c) decide how identity conceptions and roles within the EU must be redefined in light of new regional and global problems. The Prespes Agreement and the resolution of the conflict with Northern Macedonia indicate that Greece desires to emerge and operate as a pillar of stability and cooperation for the EU. A powerful and stable Greece requires a powerful and stable EU. Greece should invest in a strong and cohesive EU, emphasizing the need for: (a) the further integration of the economic and financial union, (b) the enhancement of the EU’s social policies, (c) the promotion of a more cohesive European defense policy, (d) the promotion of a more complete migration/refugee strategy, with emphasis on fairer allocation and the adoption of a common asylum system, (e) the treatment of the democratic deficit and (f) the revision of the Treaties and their replacement with a single constitutional treaty that is understandable by the citizens of the EU.

*Interview by Eleftheria Spiliotakopoulou

**Christos Frangonikolopoulos studied Politics and Government (BA Honors) and International Relations (PhD) at the University of Kent at Canterbury (England). He has worked as a diplomatic newspaper correspondent (1995-2003) and advisor to the Greek Parliament (1997-2003). In 2004-05 he also worked for public television. He combines a significant research output with practical experience. His research interests and teaching have an interdisciplinary character, combining international relations and European Integration with European Journalism. He has published, co-published, edited, and co-edited ten (10) books in Greece and abroad, and academic articles in over 40 edited books and peer-reviewed journals.

Professor Frangonikolopoulos is a Holder of Jean Monnet Chair since 2016. Jean Monnet Chairs are awarded through a highly competitive process by the European Commission through the EU’s Erasmus+ program. The position is awarded based on promoting excellence in teaching and research on EU studies, fostering debate around European issues, encouraging active citizenship, and disseminating knowledge to the wider public, critically and objectively.

MA on “Digital Media, Communication and Journalism” AT A GLANCE

See also on GNA:

• Study in Greece: International Master's Programs taught in English or visit the “Study in Greece” portal
• 40 years of Greece's membership in the EU
• Quo Vadis Europa past interviews

For more info about the Conference on the Future of Europe:

• Visit the EU’s official micro-site, and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ specially designated digital platform, Facebook page, and Twitter account.
• Read also, the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Miltiadis Varvitsiotis’ address at the celebration for the 40 years of Greece – EU and the Conference on the Future of Europe (Zappeion, Athens 27.05.2021).

E.S.

The post Quo Vadis Europa | International Relations Professor Christos Frangonikolopoulos on Jean Monnet Chair, Greece’s 40 years course in the EU and the Future of Europe appeared first on Greek News Agenda.

Greek Tourist Guides are directly linked to tourism in Greece and the promotion of Greece’ s image abroad. Tell us a few words about the history and the institutional making of your profession.

The first official reference to Tourist Guide Training goes back to 1931 when the Tourist Guide School was founded for the first time by law in Athens. The School started its operation in 1935 and its graduates obtained an official guiding license from the Greek National Tourism Organization, GNTO. After WWII, tourism in Greece increased dramatically raising at the same time the demand for official guiding services in the historical and archaeological sites of the country. Aiming at covering those needs by highly educated professionals, the GNTO established the regular operation of the School of Tourist Guides in the 1960s. As a result, students graduated from the School on an annual basis acquiring a professional license which permitted them to guide throughout Greece. The most important law that defined the guiding profession was voted in 1977 (law 710 ref Guides) regulating the legal and institutional framework of our profession up to this day. Some amendments had to be made in order to align the Greek Law for Tourist Guides to the relevant regulations of the European Union. In the 1980s the Guiding School of Athens was further upgraded extending its course duration to a two-year program and in 1997 the School received an award by the EU Vocational Organization CEDEFOP as the best professional School in Europe. Five Tourist Guide Schools are currently operating in Greece in the city of Athens, Thessaloniki, Corfu, Rhodes and Crete under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Tourism. Today 2,500 licensed Tourist Guides professionals cover guiding needs in 28 languages and work across the country.

Tourist Guides operate as intermediaries between visitors and the visited destinations. How do Greek Tourist Guides perceive this role and how do they deal with the diverse international audience with whom they come into contact?

Whereas in most countries tourist guides are licensed to work locally, the Greek Tourist Guides are licensed to conduct tours throughout the country including the mainland and the islands or Greece. Thus, the tours we lead differ in duration and can last even for two weeks. We travel by land, by sea and by air with our guests.
As a result, our programs are particularly comprehensive exceeding by far simple visits at museums and archaeological sites, and, rather, presenting our visitors the opportunity to broaden their horizons by experiencing a wide range of approaches to Greek culture, from the natural world and geology to religion, traditions, attitudes, gastronomy, political situations and international relationships. We interpret the cultural tangible and intangible heritage of our country and explain to our guests not only what they see, but also what is behind the scenes. At the end of such programs the traveler connects all the information and comprehends in depth the Greek cultural phenomenon.
Moreover, a Tourist Guide may go a step further and establish associations between the historical reality of Greece and that of the visitor’s country of origin highlighting common grounds. By way of example, 2021 is the year Greeks celebrate a 200-year anniversary from the War of Independence in 1821. References will be made by the Guide to the French Revolution when guiding a French audience, to the American War of Independence when with Americans and to the uprisings and the foundation of modern Latin American States to Latin American visitors. By creating images and emotions of one’s own experience, the Guide will enable foreign visitors to get direct insights into specific historical events of our country.
Guiding is not only about leading someone to explore a new country but also about bridging different cultures.

Apart from Tourist Guides contribution to the archeological and historical tourism, in what other forms of tourism are tourist guides involved, taking into consideration the increased demand of visitors concerning alternative forms of tourism? Is there any cooperation between tourist guides and other tourism stakeholders in Greece when it comes to the development of new programs responding to new global trends?

Greek Tourist Guides are active citizens and as professionals they keep constant contact with foreign visitors. Thus, they possess increased awareness of the current reality and the dynamically changing tourism product demands. Moreover, the School of Guides contributes tremendously to the proper preparation of its graduates and adapts its curriculum to meet the latest requirements of tourism. As a result, Greek Tourist Guides are perfectly competent to respond to the current trends of tourism.
The services of the Licensed Tourist Guides cover a wide range of subjects giving them the facility to answer questions visitors have on every aspect of life in Greece. Their activities range from gastronomy to the discovery of nature and agrotourism including visits to wineries, olive presses, cheese factories, juice producing factories, fish farms, beekeeping units, as well as walks in nature pointing out the biodiversity of the country, its rich fauna and flora, its herbs and mushrooms. Besides, Tourist Guides are also keen to emphasize aspects of cityscape tours such as the urban landscape, culinary culture, the architecture of buildings and the history of town centers, even streets that are named after mythological figures giving the opportunity to narrate ancient myths and biographies of great men and women of the country. Tourist Guides are trained to offer their services at highly demanding situations, and they are for example able to lead religious groups to pilgrimages sites such as those included in the so-called ‘Steps of Apostle Paul’ in Greece.
Tourist Guides are actively involved in the designing of tour programs in Greece. Due to their profound experience in field work and their everyday interaction with foreign visitors, they are the ones who obtain direct insights into their actual needs and interests. Acknowledging and appreciating this professional advantage, Tour Operators consult Guides when drafting their tour plans in order to achieve the best possible conditions for a well-planned program.

The Association of Tourist Guides recently organized an online lecture about the way that ancient Greek and Byzantine monuments in Turkey are presented by Turkish guides to visitors and about the way Turkish visitors perceive the monuments of these periods in Greece when they visit the country. What should be the role of Tourist Guides in dealing with such issues? How should Tourist Guides approach history so as to facilitate mutual understanding?

Tourist guides cover a wide range of issues not only related to the past but also to current history and everyday life. Foreign visitors regardless of their nationality, are always interested in learning about Greece’s role in the two World Wars, Greek – Turkish relationships, the economic crisis and recently the handling of the pandemic. Concerning these issues visitors very often carry their own memories and opinions based on their personal experiences, their education and information.
A Tourist Guide often has to explain events that are linked to the nationality of the visitor. These topics must be discussed in a historical and objective way, based on facts and academic studies. We may walk on thin ice but as well-trained professionals we have the ability not only to present the historical truth together with the position of our country without creating any tension and misunderstandings, but also to build bridges of communication at the same time. Our personal opinion must be put aside.
We acknowledge the responsibility that we have towards our visitors and through our personal relationship we make them feel welcome. This is the key to Greek hospitality. We introduce the beauties of our country to the visitor but also help them better understand the history of Greece and its people from the past to the present. The goal is for them to enjoy their holiday and return to their country with positive feelings of a beautiful and meaningful experience that they will share with their family and friends.

Many members of your Association hold master’s or doctoral degrees. To what extent are Tourist Guides organizing their work according to scientific evidence and in which cases do they use stereotypical narrations that are more easily understood?

Most Tourist Guides choose this profession because of a profound inherent sense of curiosity and avid learning desire which remains unchanged throughout their professional career. That also explains in part their parallel studies in related or other fields and accounts for the impressive number of Greek Tourist Guides possessing higher education degrees from various institutions.
Guides must constantly keep updating the knowledge and the information they transmit to their visitors. Skilled Tourist Guides combine past and new information to meet the needs of their audience. Even those who possess rich academic CVs must develop the ability to popularize complex concepts and turn them into easily and pleasantly digestible presentations for less educated visitors.
Adaptation of information is sometimes more important than the information itself because of the variety of audiences.

The evolution of new communication technology offers new possibilities in the guiding sector. Do you think that this evolution can threaten the Tourist Guide profession? In your opinion what should be the role of the tourist Guides in the new digital era?

There are some applications that offer full guided tours step by step in some archeological sites. A few years ago, audio guides also appeared in Greece but were never widely adopted. Some clients prefer this kind of a guided tour especially because of the lower cost and also because some visitors wish to follow their own pace.
However, a guiding application has a very specific way of presenting a site or a museum and provides adapted information. In a one-to-one guided tour, visitors can ask the tourist guide for further information or ask questions about things they did not understand or clarifications on something that drew their attention, or even discuss some of their thoughts on a relevant theme.
We strongly believe that the charm of a guided tour is to be found in a person-to-person interaction and human communication, which is irreplaceable. The live narration, the performance and the ability of the Tourist Guide to capture the changes in the mood of their audience and to adapt the tour accordingly cannot be replaced by technology.

The interview was given to the bulletins of the Secretariat General for Greeks Abroad & Public Diplomacy in English, French, German, Spanish and Italian.

Photos: Greek Association of Licensed Tourist Guides

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